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NOTES
Antitrust-United States v. American Building Maintenance
Industries: A Narrow Construction of Section 7 of the Clayton Act
The United States Supreme Court has clearly and consistently held
that "Congress wanted to go to the utmost extent of its Constitutional
power in restraining trust and monopoly agreements . . ." when it
enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act. Consequently, the Sherman Act
has been applied to cases involving entirely intrastate activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce.' In United States v. American
Building Maintenance Industries3 the Supreme Court ruled that the
jurisdictional reach of section 7 of the Clayton Antitrust Act4 does not
extend as far as that of the Sherman Act. Instead, the Court held that
the Clayton Act applies only to corporations that are actually involved in
interstate commerce. 5 The American Building decision, coupled with
the Court's decision in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co.,6 which
limited the application of the Robinson-Patman Act7 to persons actually
engaged in interstate commerce, not only limits the effective scope of the
federal antitrust laws but also suggests that the present Supreme Court
may be hostile toward vigorous enforcement of those laws.
The Government commenced a civil antitrust action against Amer-
ican Building Maintenance Industries, contending that the corporation's
acquisition of the stock of J.E. Benton Management Corp. and its
merger of Benton Industries into one of its wholly owned subsidiaries
violated section 7 of the Clayton Act.8 American Building was the
1. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954);
Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
3. 95 S. Ct. 2150 (1975). Mr. Justice Stewart wrote the opinion of the Court. Mr.
Justice White wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment, while Mr. Justice Brennan
joined in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas. Mr. Justice Blackmun filed a
separate dissenting opinion.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). This section deals with the acquisition by one cor-
poration of the stock or assets of another.
5. 95 S. Ct. at 2157-58.
6. 419 U.S. 186 (1974). Mr. Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion in this
case; Mr. Justice Brennan joined in Mr. Justice Douglas's dissent. Mr. Justice Blackmun
was the only member of the majority in Gulf Oil to dissent from the American Building
decision.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970). In 1936 the Robinson-Patman Act rewrote the price
discrimination provisions of section 2 of the Clayton Act.
8. 95 S. Ct. at 2153-54. The suit was filed in the United States District Court for
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largest supplier of janitorial services in Southern California, handling
ten percent of the sales in that area. The two acquired corporations
together supplied an additional seven percent of those services. While
American Building was clearly involved in interstate commerce, 9 the
Court concluded that the Benton companies were not.1" Therefore, since
section 7 of the Clayton Act explicitly states that both the acquiring and
the acquired corporation must be "engaged in commerce" for that Act
to apply," the Court ruled that this case did not fall within the jurisdic-
tional ambit of the Act. The crucial aspect of the case, however, is not
the Court's discussion of whether the Benton corporations were in fact
engaged in interstate commerce; 12 more important is the Court's initial
decision that the "engaged in commerce" language of the Clayton Act
requires a corporation to be actually involved in interstate commerce
rather than merely involved in activities that affect interstate commerce
before it falls within the scope of the Act.
The Court persuasively reasoned that FTC v. Bunte Brothers13
provided strong support for its construction of the "engaged in com-
merce" language of section 7 of the Clayton Act. 4 In that case the
Court held that the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission under
the Central District of California. The district court granted American Building Mainte-
nance Industries' motion for summary judgment holding that there had been no violation
of section 7 of the Clayton Act. The Government then appealed directly to the Supreme
Court pursuant to section 2 of the Expediting Act, 32 Stat. 823 (1903), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 29 (1970). 95 S. Ct. at 2152-53.
9. 95 S. Ct. at 2153. There was no dispute on this point.
10. Id. at2158.
11. The relevant jurisdictional language of section 7 of the Clayton Act follows:
"No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or
any party of the stock or other share capital . . . of the assets of another corporation
engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country,
the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970) (emphasis added).
12. All of the Benton companies' janitorial and maintenance contracts were per-
formed within California. These companies did not advertise nationally, and they made
only very limited use of interstate communications. The Benton companies hired their
labor in the local market and purchased most of their equipment and supplies from local
distributors. The companies did, however, service customers who were engaged in
interstate commerce. For the Court's discussion of why such activities do not constitute
participation in interstate commerce, see 95 S. Ct. at 2158-59. For Mr. Justice White's
argument that such activities may well constitute participation in interstate commerce,
see his concurring opinion, 95 S. Ct. at 2159.
13. 312 U.S. 349 (1941).
14. 95 S. Ct. at 2154-55. The Court also suggests that Gulf Oil v. Copp Paving Co.,
419 U.S. 186 (1974), supports its conclusion. Gulf Oil held that the "in commerce"
language of the Robinson-Patman Act does not extend to the full commerce clause power
of Congress but rather is limited to activities actually constituting interstate commerce,
i.e. the Robinson-Patman Act does not extend to purely intrastate activities that substan-
tially affect interstate commerce. 95 S. Ct. at 2154.
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section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which regulates "unfair
methods of competition in commerce," was limited to competition that
involved actual interstate commerce. 15 While this decision does not
provide a direct precedent for the American Building issue, it is persua-
sive by way of analogy since section 7 of the Clayton Act and section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act were enacted by the same Con-
gress 6 and, as the Court notes, were both "designed to deal with closely
related aspects of the same problem-the protection of free and fair
competition in the Nation's market places. '17
But there are several reasons for concluding that Bunte Brothers
provides less support for the American Building decision than suggested
by the Court. First, as the Court recognized, the words "in commerce"
do not have a uniform meaning whenever used by Congress.18 Certainly,
the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act were passed by
the same Congress with the goal of protecting free trade and competi-
tion; but the two acts involve -very different substantive provisions.
While the Federal Trade Commission Act established an administrative
agency with a broad mandate to police against unfair trade practices, the
Clayton Act renders specified actions illegal.' 9 The Bunte Brothers
Court based its decision partially upon its fear that a broad construction
of the jurisdictional language of section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act would create a grave danger of undue federal interference
in local affairs.20 The specific provisions of the Clayton Act, however,
offend less against these notions of federalism than does the idea of a
federal agency with "pervasive control over myriads of local businesses
in matters heretofore traditionally left to local custom or local law."'"
15. The Commission claimed that it could proceed against unfair methods of
competition used in intrastate sales when those sales result in a handicap to interstate
competitors. The Court rejected.this view. 312 U.S. 349, 350.
16. The Sixty-third Congress.
17. 95 S. Ct. at 2155.
18. E.g., Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 520-21 (1941).
19. For example, section 7 of the Clayton Act applies only to the acquisition of the
stock or assets of one corporation by another corporation. For a discussion of the
purposes of the Sherman, Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts see Oppenheim,
Guides to Harmonizing Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act with the
Sherman and Clayton Acts, 59 MIcH. L. REv. 821 (1961). The purposes of these acts are
also discussed in FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 647-48 (1931).
20. The Court emphasized the need for a proper adjustment of local and national
interests in Bunte Brothers. The Court said, "We ought not to find in § 5 radiations
beyond the obvious meaning of language unless otherwise the purpose of the Act would
be defeated." 312 U.S. at 351.
21. Id. at 354-55. The Court went on to say that "Ealn inroad upon local
conditions and local standards of such far-reaching import as is involved here, ought to
await a clearer mandate from Congress." Id. at 355.
1976]
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Furthermore, Congress responded to the Bunte Brothers decision in
1974 by extending the Federal Trade Commission's jurisdiction to the
full extent of Congress's commerce clause power.22 While this action by
a later Congress does not speak directly to the intent of the framers of
the Act, it is at least suggestive.
In American Building the Court also relied upon the difference
between the jurisdictional language of the Sherman Act and that of the
Clayton Act to support its holding.3 The Sherman Act forbids conduct
"in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations",24 while section 7 of the Clayton Act applies to corpora-
tions "engaged in commerce. 25 Certainly the Sherman Act's language is
broader, and, as the Court suggests in Gulf Oil v. Copp Paving Co., the
"in commerce" language of the Robinson-Patman Act and the Clayton
Act "appears to denote only persons or activities within the flow of
interstate commerce-the practical, economic continuity in the genera-
tion of goods and services for interstate markets and their transport and
distribution to the consumer. 26
But the Court failed to investigate the import of this difference in
jurisdictional language fully enough. It is clear from Kirschbaum Co. v.
Walling27 and related cases that the phrase "in commerce" does not have
a uniform meaning whenever used by Congress. Furthermore, the Bunte
Brothers case relied upon so heavily by the Court in American Building
states that,
[w]hen in order to protect interstate commerce Congress has regu-
lated activities which in isolation are merely local, it has normally
conveyed its purpose explicitly. . . . [T]o be sure, the con-
struction of every such statute presents a unique problem in which
words derive vitality from the aim and nature of the specific legis-
lation.28
Since it is well established that the aim of the Clayton Act was to reach
agreements embraced by the Sherman Act in their incipiency,29 one
22. Congress replaced the words "in commerce" with "in or affecting commerce" in
sections 5, 6 and 12 of the Act. The purpose of Congress was clear. "It is unrealistic to
restrict the jurisdiction of the FTC under section 5 of the Act to only interstate
transactions." U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1974, at 7712-13.
23. 95 S. Ct. at 2155-56.
24. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
25. Clayton Act, id. § 18.
26. 419 U.S. at 195.
27. 316 U.S. 517 (1941).
28. 312 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added).
29. E.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589
(1957); FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 647-48 (1931); Standard Fashion Co. v.
Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 355-57 (1922).
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cannot fairly conclude merely from an ambiguous change in jurisdic-
tional language that Congress intended the Clayton Act to have a more
limited jurisdictional reach than the Sherman Act. 0 Such a conclusion,
based upon the jurisdictional language of the two acts, seems especially
unwarranted when one considers that before the Clayton Act was enact-
ed the Court often held that wholly intrastate acts could be "in restraint
of trade or commerce" as that phrase was used in the Sherman Act.31
Furthermore, the definition of "commerce" in the Clayton Act is "trade
or commerce among the several States," and before the Clayton Act was
enacted the Court held on several occasions that "among the several
States" embraces all commerce "except that which is confined to a single
State, and does not affect other States.132
The Supreme Court also offered a strong reenactment argument in
support of its holding in American Building. The Court concluded that
regardless of whether Congress intended to extend the Clayton Act to its
full commerce clause power when that Act was enacted in 1914, by
1950 when the Clayton Act was reenacted the phrase "engaged in com-
merce" had become "a term of art, indicating a limited assertion of fed-
eral jurisdiction." 3  Certainly it is true that prior to 1950 the Court had
clearly distinguished between activities "in interstate commerce" and
those "affecting interstate commerce. ' 34  Furthermore, the Bunte
30. The Court also notes that the Sherman Act proscribes every contract, combina-
tion or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce, whether entered into by a natural
person, partnership, corporation or other form of business organization, while section 7
of the Clayton Act is limited to corporate acquisitions. 95 S. Ct. at 2155. This limitation
implies, according to the Court's analysis, that Congress might well have intended to
limit the jurisdiction of section 7 in other ways as well. But the corporate limitation of
section 7 involves an entirely different aspect of jurisdiction than does the "in commerce"
language; the corporate limitation involves not the type of activity covered by the Act
but rather the type of individuals and organizations covered by it. One would expect the
very specific kinds of problems dealt with in section 7 of the Clayton Act, unlike the
broad problems addressed by the Sherman Act, to involve primarily corporations.
Furthermore, the Federal Trade Commission has held that it has authority under section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to proceed against section 7 Clayton-type
violations by persons and partnerships. In re Beatrice Foods Co., 67 F.T.C. 473, 724-27
(1965). In any case, the Court in American Building does not rely heavily upon the
limitation of section 7 to corporate acquisitions.
31. United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 541-43 (1913); Swift & Co. v. United
States, 196 U.S. 375, 397 (1905). On this point see Mr. Justice Douglas's dissent in Gulf
Oil, 419 U.S. at 204.
32. Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 46-47 (1912) (emphasis
added); see Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 398-99 (1913). Mr. Justice Douglas
discusses these cases in his dissent in Gulf Oil, 419 U.S. at 204.
33. 95S.Ct.at2156.
34. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); A.L.A.
Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542-44 (1935). The Bunte Brothers
decision is, of course, also on point here.
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Brothers decision (limiting the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Com-
mission under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act) pre-
ceded the reenactment of the Clayton Act in 1950. In addition, as the
Court notes, Congress had demonstrated prior to 1950 its awareness
of the distinction between a limited assertion of its commerce clause
power, including only activities actually in interstate commerce, and a
full assertion of its commerce clause power, including activities affect-
ing interstate commerce.3 5 Consequently, the Court concluded that
Congress's decision to retain the "engaged in commerce" language in
1950 clearly implied a congressional intent, at least in 1950, to limit the
reach of section 7 of the Clayton Act to corporations actually engaged
in interstate commerce. 6,
While Congress's actions in 1950 do support the Court's conclu-
sion, an investigation of the legislative history of the reenactment of the
Clayton Act in 1950 raises serious questions about that conclusion.3 7
The changes made in the language of the Act in 1950 were designed to
expand its coverage. Congress intended, as the Court noted in American
Building, to expand the Act's coverage to include acquisition of assets as
well as stocks.38 By deleting the "acquiring-acquired" language from the
original text,39 Congress hoped to render it clear that section 7 applied
to vertical and conglomerate mergers as well as to mergers between
competitors.40 Indeed, "the dominant theme pervading congressional
consideration of the 1950 amendments was a fear of what was consid-
ered to be a rising tide of economic concentration in the American
economy. '41 It seems anomalous at best that a Congress so clearly
concerned with economic concentration would limit the jurisdictional
ambit of an antitrust statute while simultaneously expanding its substan-
35. E.g., the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970), adopted an
"affecting commerce" jurisdictional standard.
36. 95 S. Ct. at 2157.
37. For a full discussion of the legislative history of the reenactment of the Clayton
Act in 1950, see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 312-23 (1962).
38. 95S.Ct.at2157.
39. Material in brackets was deleted in 1950, while material in italics was added.
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject
to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole
or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce,
where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
auisition may be [to] substantially to lessen competition [between the corpo-
tion whose stock is so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition,
or to restrain such commerce in any section or community], or to tend to
create a monopoly [of any line of commerce].
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 311 n.18 (1962).
40. Id. at 317.
41. Id. at 315.
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rive scope. Furthermore, it is important to consider that Congress acted
not only against the background of the Bunte Brothers decision and
with an awareness of the in commerce-affecting commerce distinction,
but also against the background of the broad judicial interpretation of
the Sherman Act's jurisdictional scope and with an awareness that the
phrase "engaged in commerce" does not have a uniform meaning.
Consequently, an examination of the legislative history of the Clayton
Act diminishes the strength of the Court's reenactment argument.
Finally, the American Building Court reasoned that the past en-
forcement policies of the Federal Trade Commission and of the Depart-
ment of Justice suggest that a broad jurisdictional scope is unnecessary
to accomplish the goals of section 7 of the Clayton Act.4 2 The Federal
Trade Commission has held that section 7 applies only to activities
involving interstate commerce.43 The Department of Justice has limited
its previous cases under section 7 almost exclusively to those that clearly
involved firms actually participating in interstate commerce. 44 But in
concluding that these policies support its holding, the Court ignores two
crucial points. First, whether the enforcement agencies choose to employ
a power granted by Congress has no bearing upon what power Congress
did in fact grant. Second, there may well be practical reasons, such as
manpower shortages and department priorities, that explain the Justice
Department's decision to limit its enforcement effort primarily to firms
in interstate commerce. Such pragmatic decisions should not, however,
imply that the Justice Department lacks or does not need the power to
proceed against firms affecting interstate commerce when those firms
pose serious antitrust problems.
The four arguments advanced by the Court to support its
holding-the Bunte Brothers analogy, the language of the Act, the
reenactment argument and the past enforcement policy argument-
would be more than sufficient to justify its holding in the absence of
strong countervailing considerations. But since the acknowledged pur-
pose of the Clayton Act is to supplement the Sherman Act by arresting
restraints on trade in their incipiency,45 and since the Sherman Act
clearly extends to the full limit of Congress's commerce clause power,4
it is highly anomalous to attribute to Congress an intent to limit the
42. 95 S. Ct. at 2157.
43. E.g., Mississippi River Fuel Corp., 75 F.T.C. 813, 918 (1969); Foremost
Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944, 1031-33 (1962).
44. 95 S. Ct. at 2157.
45. See note 27 supra.
46. See note 1 supra.
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jurisdictional scope of the Clayton Act. Such an action should not be
attributed to Congress without a very clear demonstration of congres-
sional intent. Yet, the Supreme Court in American Building reached its
conclusion on the basis of arguments that, while valid, fall short of
clearly establishing such a congressional intent.
The direct practical implications of the Supreme Court's decision in
American Building are not crucial since most section 7 actions do
involve corporations actually participating in interstate commerce; only
a relatively small number of important cases will fall outside the reach of
the Clayton Act as a result of the decision. More importantly, however,
the American Building decision, coupled with the Gulf Oil v. Copp
Paving Co. decision, suggest a hostility on the part of the Burger Court
toward vigorous enforcement of the federal antitrust laws. This hostility
may be reflected in the Court's handling of other antitrust issues.
RicHAR_ A. SIMPSON
Civil Rights-A Back Pay Award Standard: Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 as amended by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,2 represents the Congres-
sional effort to eradicate discrimination in pfiblic and private employ-
ment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.' Since
July 2, 19651 the federal judiciary has possessed discretion under Title
VII to award back pay to employees and applicants for employment
who prove that they were the victims of unlawful employment prac-
tices.' In exercising this discretion the lower federal courts have devel-
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. 11, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
3. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
(1)-(2) (1970).
4. This is the effective date of id. § 2000e (1970).
5. Id. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970).
This section provides that:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is inten-
tionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the com-
plaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,
which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees,
with or without back pay . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate (emphasis added).
[Vol. 54
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oped inconsistent and even conflicting standards6 to determine whether
or not to award back pay. On. June 25, 1975, almost ten years after the
effective date of Title VII, the United States Supreme Court addressed
this question for the first time in Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody.7 The
majority opinion," after rejecting the standard applied by the Fourth
Circuit, designed a stringent requirement that a district couxt must meet
to justify a denial of back pay to a plaintiff who has successfully proven
he was the victim of an unlawful employment practice.9
The plaintiff class in Moody was comprised of present and former
black employees of Albemarle Paper Company's Roanoke Rapids,
North Carolina paper mill. One of their major allegations 0 was that the
plant's present job seniority system was perpetuating the overt segrega-
tion that existed in the plant's departmental assignments prior to July 2,
1965.11 They sought injunctive and back pay relief."2 The district court
found that the job seniority system constituted an unlawful employment
practice and ordered the company to implement a system of plantwide
6. See note 43 and accompanying text infra.
7. 95 S. Ct. 2362 (1975).
8. Id. Mr. Justice Stewart wrote the majority opinion. Justices Marshall, Rehnquist
and Blackmun filed concurring opinions. Mr. Chief Justice Burger filed an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the
consideration or decision of the case.
.9. Id. at 2370, 2373.
10. The plaintiffs also alleged that the company's pre-employment testing program
was being used as a pretext for discrimination. They argued that the company's
requirement that applicants for employment in the skilled job classifications possess a
high school diploma and pass both a verbal and nonverbal intelligence test was not a
valid job-related requirement in accordance with Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971). The district court refused to enjoin this testing program. The Fourth Circuit
reversed the district court holding that Albemarle had failed to justify their testing
procedures under the "business necessity" test outlined in Griggs. The Supreme Court
affirmed the Fourth Circuit's decision and remanded the issue to the district court for
consideration in accordance with the Court's opinion. For the Supreme Court's coverage
of this issue see 95 S. CL at 2375-81. For a general coverage of pre-employment testing
and the consequences of the Griggs decision see Comment, Employment Testing: The
Aftermath of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 72 COLUM. L. REV. 900 (1972).
11. 95 S. Ct. at 2367-68. The district court found that the company had utilized
racially discriminatory employment practices that placed blacks in only certain depart-
ments in the plant prior to July 2, 1965. It also found that though these practices had
been abolished the "job seniority" system that had been instituted under a new collective
bargaining agreement with the Halifax Local No. 425, in 1968, was perpetuating this
prior overt segregation. This was due to the fact that the former black lines of progres-
sion were tacked on to the bottom of the former white lines thus placing the black
employees in the lowest paying job categories. Therefore, when layoffs were necessary,
the blacks, being in the lowest job categories, were the first to be laid off. White em-
ployees who occupied positions in the higher job categories were thus isolated from such
actions. The district court ordered the company to institute a system of plantwide sen-
iority where such actions as layoffs and promotions would be determined by the number
of years one had with the company, not by one's job classification. Id.
12. Id. at 2367.
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seniority. The court refused, however, to award plaintiffs back pay for
losses attributable to the job seniority system because there was no
evidence of bad faith non-compliance with the Act.1 3 Additionally, the
court concluded that Albermarle would be "substantially prejudiced" by
such an award since the claim for back pay was not made until five
years after the suit was filed. 4 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the denial of back pay, holding that: "[A] plaintiff or a
complaining class who is successful in obtaining an injunction under
Title VII of the Act should ordinarily be awarded back pay unless
special circumstances would render such an award unjust."'" The Su-
preme Court, although agreeing with the Fourth Circuit's reversal of the
district court, rejected the "special circumstances" standard. 10 Instead,
the majority fashioned a standard based upon their interpretation of the
congressional objectives behind the enactment of Title VII.' 7 In articu-
13. Id. at 2368. The district court based this conclusion on its findings that Al-
bemarle had as early as 1964 begun an active recruitment of blacks for its Mainte-
nance Apprenticeship Program and that certain lines of progression in the plant had been
merged on its own initiative. Id. at 2387 n.1.
14. Id. at 2368. In an answer to Albemarle's motion for summary judgment filed on
November 22, 1966, the plaintiffs stated that they were seeking only injunctive relief.
Then, on June 4, 1970, almost five years after the institution of the suit, the plaintiffs
informed Albemarle that they planned to amend their complaint and include a prayer for
back pay relief. Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134, 145 (4th Cir. 1973).
15. Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134, 142 (4th Cir. 1973). The court
indicated that the situation in which an employer has instituted a certain employment
practice relying upon a state's women's protective statute would be a "special circum-
stance." Id. at 142 n.5. See notes 29-31, 57-59 and accompanying text infra for a further
discussion of states' women's protective statutes and Title VII.
16. 95 S. Ct. at 2370. The Fourth Circuit's standard was based upon Newman v.
Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam), which dealt with the
proper standard to be applied by a district court in determining whether to award
attorney's fees to a successful plaintiff in Title II (public accomodations) litigation.
Though the Supreme Court stated that this would be an appropriate case for determining
Whether to award attorney's fees to a successful Title VII plaintiff as well, it rejected its
use as a precedent concerning back pay awards since it was not directly on point. 95 S.
Ct. at 2370.
17. As discussed in Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & Cot4. L.
Rnv. 431 (1966), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a compromise measure
of the Eighty-eighth Congress. Much of the controversy centered around the question
who was to possess the power to enforce the provisions of the Act and provide remedies
for discriminatees. Though there was basic reliance upon the National Labor Relations
Act, there was one important deviation from that model that reflects the compromise
nature of the Act. Where the NLRA provided for an administrative agency (NLRB)
possessing both investigatory and judicial functions, the EEOC under Title VII was given
only investigatory and conciliatory functions. Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 160-61 (1970) with
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(f) (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972). This difference reflected
the opinion of most congressmen that the final determination of employment discrimina-
tion should rest with the federal judiciary, and that the litigation burden should fall upon
those private litigants alleging such discrimination. Vaas, supra at 436. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-6 (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972), authorized the Attorney General to bring
suit on behalf of discriminatees in "pattern and practice" situations. The Equal Employ-
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lating these objectives they stressed the use of the National Labor
Relations Act as a model in the drafting of Title VII,'1 particularly as to
the remedies section, which is almost a verbatim copy of the same
provision in the NLRA.' 9 Also noted was the fact that under NLRB
case law, back pay has been liberally awarded 0 as a means of fulfilling
the dual objectives of "reimbursing employees for actual losses suffered
as a result of a discriminatory discharge and of furthering the public
interest in deterring such discharges."'" The majority in Moody conclud-
ed that the congressional objectives behind Title VII's enactment were
analogous to those of the NLRA.22 Therefore, a denial of back pay to a
plaintiff involved in Title VII litigation, who had successfully proven the
existence of unlawful discrimination, could only be deemed proper if
such a denial would not frustrate the Act's general objectives of elimi-
nating discrimination in employment and providing the victims of such
discrimination compensation for economic losses they had suffered.28
Prior to Moody, the development of conflicting judicial standards
governing the award of back pay under Title VII resulted from incon-
sistent judicial responses to the major defenses that have been asserted
by employers to justify a denial of back pay. 4 Probably the most
frequently asserted defense has been based upon the language of section
2000e-5(g), which authorizes an award of back pay "[i]f the court
finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally
ment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. 11, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (1970), gave the EEOC the power to initiate litigation on behalf of individuals
but the final determination of discrimination and the awarding of appropriate relief
remains with the federal courts. For a detailed discussion of the EEOA of 1972 see Sape
& Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40
Gno. WASH. L. REv. 824 (1972); Note, In America, What You Do Is What You Are:
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 22 CATHOLIC U.L. RV. 455 (1973).
18. 110 CONG. REc. 7214 (1964). See also Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BRooxYN L. REV. 62, 64-65 (1964); Vans,
supra note 17, at 433.
19. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970), as
amended, (Supp. II, 1972).
20. See, e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); NLRB v. Mastro
Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 972 (1966).
21. NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1965). Accord,
Section-by-Section Analysis of H.R. 1746, The Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 118
CONG. Ruc. 7168 (1972) (remarks of Senator Williams).
22. The Court also relied upon its decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 429-31 (1971), in identifying the primary objective of Title VII: to eliminate
employment discrimination throughout the economy. 95 S. Ct. at 2371.
23. 95 S. Ct. at 2373.
24. The issue of back pay is of course only reached after the existence of unlawful
employment practices has been established by the plaintiff. For .more extensive
coverage of defenses which have been asserted by employers see Annot., 21 A.L.R. Fmu.
472, 511-34 (1974).
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engaging in an unlawful employment practice .... ,25 The argument
has been that "intentional" means the plaintiff must prove that the
employer's motive in using a particular employment practice was to
discriminate. Though this construction has received some acceptance,20
most courts have instead interpreted "intentional" to mean that the
challenged employment practice was undertaken deliberately rather than
by accident.2 7 This position stresses that relief under this section is
designed to compensate victims for the consequences of unlawful prac-
tices rather than to punish employers for the motivation underlying such
practices.28
A unique version of the "non-intentional" defense has been assert-
ed in a number of sex discrimination cases. This defense involves an
employer allegation that the employment practice complained of was
instituted in good faith reliance upon a state statute ostensibly designed
to protect women,29 and has been accepted by some courts as a complete
defense to a back pay award."0 Other courts have viewed such good
faith reliance as an "intentional" violation within the meaning of the
statute, but have nevertheless affirmed denials of back pay as properly
within the trial courts' discretion."'
Employers have also argued that their present good faith efforts to
comply with Title VIE should give the court justification for denying
back pay. This defense typically involves plaintiffs who, like those in
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. H, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
(1970).
26. E.g., United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 464 F.2d 301 (8th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973); Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F.
Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969).
27. E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Pettway v. American
Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974); Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973); Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002
(9th Cir. 1972); Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972);
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), dismissed pursuant to rule 60, 404
U.S. 1006 (1971).
28. E.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974);
Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v.
Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444
F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), dismissed pursuant to Rule 60, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
29. These statutes typically limit the number of hours a woman can work per day,
or the number of pounds she may be required to lift regularly on the job. See, e.g., Ang.
STAT. ANN. § 81-601 (1960); CAL. LIoR CoDE §§ 1350, 1350.5 (West 1971).
30. E.g., Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971);
Garneau v. Raytheon Co., 341 F. Supp. 336 (D. Mass. 1972); Richards v. Griffith
Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969).
31. E.g., Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973);
Manning v. International Union, 466 F.2d 812 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 946
(1972); LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 460 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972).
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Moody, are victims of employment practices that are not discriminatory,
but that nevertheless perpetuate the effects of prior overt discrimina-
tion.32 Although occasionally accepted at the district court level,"3 this
defense has been rejected by all three of the circuit courts of appeal in
which it has arisen on the grounds that back pay, by its statutory nature,
is compensatory rather than punitive. 34 The only "good faith" defense
consistently accepted by the courts is the narrow one contained in
section 2000e-12(b) of the Act, which provides that an employment
practice instituted in reliance upon a written interpretation or opinion of
the EEOC will not constitute an unlawful practice.3 5
Employers have on occasion asserted that the plaintiff was not
entitled to back pay, even though unlawful discrimination had been
proven, because the plaintiff's claim for such relief had not been filed in
a timely manner. The Fourth and Fifth Circuits36 have both rejected this
defense relying upon rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure 7 and the broad compensatory purpose behind Title VII. However,
it has been indicated that this defense would be effective if the employer
could prove actual prejudice as a result of the belated clain.35
32. E.g., Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974);
Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1972).
33. Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp., 350 F. Supp. 139 (S.D. Ga. 1972), rev'd,
495 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1974). This defense was also accepted by the district judge in
Moody. 95 S. Ct. at 2368.
34. Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974); Head
v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1973); Moody v. Albemarle Paper
Co., 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973). The Fifth Circuit's response in Johnson, supra at
1376, is representative:
Goodyear's argument completely misconstrues the nature of a back pay
award. The entire thrust of this contention is based on the premise that back
pay is punishment for its misdeeds and thus the court in good conscience
should consider the motive of the employer in imposing the "penalty." This
proposition has been totally rejected by our court . . . Our Circuit has been
steadfast in its determination to insure that sufficient affirmative relief be pro-
vided to vindicate the rights guaranteed by Title VII. In short, back pay
awards are not designed to punish the employer but to economically elevate
the victims to the status which is rightfully theirs (footnotes omitted).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b) (1970). Cases in which this particular defense has
been raised have turned on the issue of whether the interpretation allegedly relied upon
was actually "a written interpretation or opinion of the EEOC." E.g., Sprogis v. United
Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971); Robinson v.
Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), dismissed pursuant to rule 60, 404 U.S. 1006
(1971).
36. Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1972); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d
791 (4th Cir.), dismissed pursuant to Rule 60, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). See also Sprogis v.
United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971); Ro-
sen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 409 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1969).
37. FED. R. Crv. P. 54(c) requires that "every final judgment shall grant the relief
to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not
demanded such relief in his pleadings."
38. E.g., Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973); Robinson
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Additional defenses"9 that have received inconsistent treatment by
the lower federal courts have been based upon the uncertain state of the
law surrounding back pay,40 the difficulty in determining the eligibility
of discriminatees for back pay,41 and the difficulty in ascertaining the
amount of back pay to award.42 The inconsistent standards employed by
the lower federal courts to govern back pay awards, demonstrated by the
unpredictable judicial responses to employer defenses, were expressly
noted by the Supreme Court in granting certiorari in Moody.4"
Viewed in the context of prior judicial ambiguity, the primary
significance of the Moody opinion is its definitive resolution of this
judicial uncertainty in favor of a consistently liberal approach toward
the award of back pay. Evident throughout the opinion is the proposi-
tion that a denial of back pay should be the exception rather than the
rule, once a finding of discrimination and economic loss by the discrimi-
natee has been made. This orientation is clearly revealed by the Court's
statement that "given a finding of unlawful discrimination, backpay
should be denied only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not
frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination
throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered
through past discrimination."" The affirmation of a liberal approach is
v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), dismissed pursuant to Rule 60, 404 U.S. 1006
(1971).
39. Two other defenses which are not relevant to the development of judicial
standards governing an award of back pay in the Moody context have been adequately
treated elsewhere. For defenses based on class action requirements see Edwards, The
Back Pay Remedy in Title VII Class Actions: Problems of Procedure, 8 GA. L. RaV. 781
(1974). See also 95 S. Ct. at 2370 n.8. For defenses based upon the appropriateness of
back pay claims by the government on behalf of discriminatees in "pattern and practice"
suits see Annot., 21 A.L.R. FaD. 472, 504-08 (1974).
40. E.g., Johnson v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir.
1974) (defense rejected); United States v. N.L. Indus. Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir.
1973) (defense accepted); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.),
dismissed pursuant to Rule 60, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971) (defense rejected).
41. E.g., Norman v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 497 F.2d 594 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 95 S. Ct. 826 (1975) (defense accepted); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe
Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974) (defense rejected); United States v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry., 464 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973)
(defense accepted).
42. E.g., Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975) (defense
rejected); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974)
(defense rejected); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973)
(defense accepted); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), dismissed
pursuant to Rule 60, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971) (defense rejected).
43. 95 S. Ct. at 2369. Compare Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d
211 (5th Cir. 1974); Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1973);
Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973) with Kober v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco
Ry., 464 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973).
44. 95 S. Ct. at 2373.
also exemplified by the Court's rejection of the district court's "no bad
faith" reason for denial of back pay.45 The Court reasoned that "Title
VII is not concerned with the employer's good intent or absence of
discriminatory intent for Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the
consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation."4 6
The only exception to the Court's firm rejection of the "good faith"
defense is the narrow one expressly provided for in section 2000e-
12(b).47
The carefully articulated standards concerning back pay awards in
Moody are firmly based upon a perceptive review of the legislative
history48 and prior judicial interpretations of the Act.49 Having earlier
identified the primary purpose of Title VII to be the achievement of
equality of employment opportunities,50 the Court rejected as inconsist-
ent with that purpose Albemarle's contention that a district court has
virtually unfettered discretion to award or deny back pay,51 and that the
statute provides no further guidance 2 Instead, they reasoned that any
discretion that exists to deny back pay after a finding of unlawful
discrimination must be derived from an examination of the possible
roles that such an award would have in achieving the congressional
objectives of Title VII. 3 Relying upon language from the Eighth Circuit
in United States v. N. L. Industries,54 the majority concluded that back
pay awards could further the primary objective of guaranteeing equality
of employment opportunity by providing employers with a catalyst to
reexamine and reevaluate their own employment practices and could
thereby lead to the eradication of discrimination through self compli-
ance.55 The secondary objective of the Act, to compensate or "make
45. Id. at 2374.
46. Id. This reasoning is the same as that expressed by the various circuit courts of
appeals in their rejection of the "good faith compliance" defense discussed in the text
accompanying notes 32-35 supra, and the majority view of the definition of "intentional"
in section 2000e-5(g) discussed in text accompanying notes 25-2-8 supra.
47. The Court stressed the narrowness of this defense saying, "it is not up to the
courts to upset this legislative choice to recognize only a narrowly defined 'good faith'
defense." Id. at 2374 n.17. See text accompanying notes 32-35 supra.
48. See notes 17-22 and accompanying text supra.
49. See text accompanying notes 24-43 supra.
50. The Court also relied upon Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30
(1971), in identifying this primary objective. 95 S. Ct. at 2371.
51. 95 S. Ct. at 2370.
52. Id. at 2370-71. See note 16 supra.
53. 95 S. Ct. at 2371-72.
54. 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973).
55. 95 S. Ct. at 2371-72. For the contrary conclusion drawn by Mr. Chief Justice
Burger in his dissent, see id. at 2387-88, in which he reasons as follows: "By the same
token, if employers are to be assessed backpay even where they have attempted in good
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whole" the victims of unlawful discrimination, is obviously supported by
an award of back pay.58 This analysis of the interrelationship between
the statutory objectives and back pay results in an almost total repudia-
tion of trial court discretion, once unlawful discrimination has been
established.
The Moody decision leaves some uncertainty concerning two de-
fenses to back pay awards. One still unsettled defense involves an
employer trapped between the dictates of Title VII and a state's wom-
en's protective statute.57 The Court declined to rule on the validity of
those decisions that have affirmed denials of back pay under such
circumstances. 58 However, cases of this type should be of decreasing
significance in the future, since a number of these statutes have been
invalidated by lower courts.59 In jurisdictions in which this has not yet
occurred, employers who recognize this judicial trend should rely upon
similar local statutes only if actively enforced by state officials. Even
under such circumstances, an employer could be reasonably prompted
by the Moody decision to seek a declaratory judgment as to the validity
of the state statute to foreclose any possibility of subsequent liability for
back pay.
The other unsettled defense involves the question whether the
lateness of the request for back pay in Moody was a sufficient reason
for denying back pay. Though the majority indicated that a denial on
this ground could prevail despite the Moody standard, it remanded the
issue to the district court for a determination whether Albemarle had
been in fact prejudiced and whether the plaintiffs' conduct was excusa-
faith to conform to the law, they will have little incentive to eliminate marginal practices
until bound by a court judgment."
56. See text accompanying notes 28, 34, 46 supra.
57. See text accompanying notes 29-31 supra.
58. 95 S. Ct. at 2374 n.18.
59. E.g., Bums v. Rohr Corp., 346 F. Supp. 994 (S.D. Cal. 1972); Ridinger v.
General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 474
F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1972). These cases have relied upon the supremacy clause of tho
United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1970), which reads as follows.
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person
from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or fu-
ture law of any State or political subdivision of a State, other than any such
law which purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would be
an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter.
The effect of such invalidations upon back pay claims is exemplified in Schaeffer v.
San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972), in which the court denied
back pay for the period in which the employer had in good faith relied upon a California
women's protective statute; but authorized such an award to the plaintiff for a period
after the statute had been declared invalid and the employer had nonetheless continued




ble.60 If the district court does find that Albemarle was unexcusably
prejudiced by plaintiffs' late claim and denies back pay, then it must
carefully articulate the grounds upon which its conclusion is based.""
The majority emphasized that review by the Fourth Circuit of such a
finding would be governed by the familiar "clearly erroneous" and
"abuse of discretion" tests. 62 Mr. Justice Marshall devoted his entire
concurring opinion to this issue, concluding that Albemarle had not
been substantially prejudiced and that the plaintiffs' actions were ex-
cusable.63 However, Mr. Chief Justice Burger in his dissent stated that
the district court had not abused its discretion on this issue.64 The prac-
tical impact is that the Court's handling of this issue in both substance
and tone seems to undercut the liberal approach taken by the majority
towards back pay awards in general. Although this aspect of the deci-
sion could be fatal to the efforts of the Moody plaintiffs to secure back
pay and could likewise exert an adverse effect on an unknown number
of pending Title VII cases, it offers but limited solace to employers who
continue to resist the broad egalitarian mandate of the Act. In view of
expansive Supreme Court decisions under the Act during the last few
years, it may reasonably be anticipated that most recently filed com-
plaints automatically include a claim for back pay; certainly this will be
true in the post-Moody era. Consequently, even if Justice Marshall's
well-reasoned analysis of the laches defense is not accepted by the dis-
trict court on remand, the Moody opinion will effectively achieve its
primary objective of using the threat of a back pay award to coerce
voluntary employer compliance with the requirements of Title VII.
The standard applied by the majority in Moody is a stringent one.
The defenses that remain available to employers faced with back pay
claims are extremely limited. This will hopefully have the effect of
increasing the number of employment discrimination disputes that are
settled without litigation and quicken the pace of employers in taking
affirmative action to comply with Title VII. It is only through such self-
compliance that the primary objective of Title VII, "to eliminate, as far
as possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in
this country's history," 65 can be met.
F. JosEP: TREAcY, JR.
60. 95 S. Ct. at 2375.
61. Id. at 2373 n.14.
62. Id. at 2375.
63. Id. at 2383-84.
64. Id. at 2388.
65. United States v. N.L. Indus., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973).
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Constitutional Law-Annexations and the Voting Rights Act
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 has been praised as "the most
successful piece of civil rights legislation ever enacted by Congress."'
Designed to regulate the details of certain states' registration of voters
and voting procedures, the Voting Rights Act contains a stringent and
extraordinary provision, section five, that is intended to prevent future
attempts to evade the act.2 Jurisdictions under the purview of section
five' must gain approval from federal authorities before instituting any
1. Hearing on the Enforcement and Administration of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 as Amended Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess., ser. 8, at 86 (1971) (statement of H. Glickstein, Staff Director, U.S. Comm'n
on Civil Rights). For an assessment of the progress achieved by the Voting Rights Act
see U.S. COMM'N om Crm Rxorrs, THE VoTiNa RIGHTS ACT: TEN YEARs LATER
(1975).
2. Section 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970) provides:
Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions
set forth in 42 U.S.C. 1973b(a) based upon determinations made under the
first sentence of section 1973b(b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek
to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or ef-
fect on November 1, 1964, or whenever a State or political subdivision with
respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section 1973b(a) of this title
based upon determinations made under the second sentence of section 1973b(b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting quali-
fication or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with re-
spect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1968, such
State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification,
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and
will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account
of race or color, and unless and until the court enters such judgment no person
shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such qualification,
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure; Provided, That such qualification,
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced without such
proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure
has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of
such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney General
has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission, except
that neither the Attorney General's failure to object nor a declaratory judgment
entered under this section shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement
of such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure. Any ac-
tion under this section shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges
in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of Title 28 and any appeal
shall lie to the Supreme Court.
3. The initial Act applied only to states or parts of states that had literacy tests or
similar devices and in which the registration or voter turnout for 1964 was less than 50%
of the voting age population. States covered by the Act in 1965 were: Alabama, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia; forty counties of North Carolina and
several non-Southern areas. After five years a jurisdiction could terminate its coverage,
but in 1970 this period was extended to ten years. The Voting Rights Act Amendment of
1970 broadened coverage to include those states which used a literacy test and which had
less than 50% of the registration or turnout for the year 1968. Thus, after 1970 the act
also included three populous New York City boroughs: Bronx, Brooklyn and Manhattan.
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1970). On July 28, 1975, the Congress passed a bill extending
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changes in voting laws or procedures. 4 By virtue of section five, the
burden of proof is no longer on the voters opposing the new election
procedure; it has been shifted to the state or subdivision, which must
demonstrate that the alteration is not invidious in purpose or effect.5
In City of Richmond v. United States" the United States Supreme
Court was confronted with the issue whether an annexation that brings a
heavy influx of whites into a city and alters the racial balance to the
detriment of the black community's political influence violates section
five. Refusing to invalidate the annexation in question, the Court indi-
cated that section five is not a shield to protect pre-annexation voting
strength; instead it is to serve only as a mechanism to ensure that blacks
are afforded representation reasonably equivalent to their proportion in
the post-annexation community. 7 The Court also made clear that an
annexation tainted by the impermissible desire to abridge or deny black
voters' access to the political system is not a per se violation of section
five so long as "verifiable reasons are now demonstrable in support of
the annexation.""
The case arose as a result of the persistent efforts of :Richmond to
expand its boundaries to encompass some of the suburban areas encir-
cling it.9 Negotiations were bitter and protracted. While they dragged
on, demographic and voting changes swept the city. Blacks achieved a
majority status which, due to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, had a great
potential for being translated into political power.'0 Finally, in May
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 for seven more years for those areas having a literacy test
and a less than 50% registration or voting turnout for the year 1972. Congress also
broadened the scope of the bill to include Spanish-speaking Americans and other
"language minorities." Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 203 (Aug. 6, 1975). Thus, Texas, with its
heavy concentration of Mexican-Americans and Alaska with its large native population
are now covered by section 5, in addition to parts of other states such as California and
Colorado. N.Y. Times, July 29, 1975, at 1, col. 4.
4. A voting change that is not precleared can not be enforced. Approval may be
secured by obtaining a declaratory judgment from the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia that the proposed change is not discriminatory in purpose or effect
or by obtaining the assent of the Attorney General of the United States. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973c (1970).
5. See, e.g., Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973).
6. 95 S. Ct. 2296 (1975). Mr. Justice White wrote the majority opinion. Justices
Brennan, Douglas and Marshall dissented in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Brennan.
Id. at 2308. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration of this case.
7. Id. at 2304.
8. Id. at 2305 (emphasis added).
9. Id. at 2300. As early as 1962, the city sought judicial approval of two
annexation ordinances, seeking to annex part of Henrico and Chesterfield Counties. In
1965 when it became apparent that an Henrico County annexation settlement would be
too costly, the city shifted its efforts to the Chesterfield County negotiations.
10. In Holt v. City of Richmond, 334 F. Supp. 228, 231-32 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd,
459 F.2d 1093 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 931 (1972), the court noted, "Mhe
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1969, a compromise agreement, which called for annexation of a por-
tion of Chesterfield County, was reached between the county and the
city. A Virginia court'- approved the plan effective January 1, 1970.12
One immediate result of the annexation was a diminution in the propor-
tion of blacks in the city so that in the post-annexation, at-large elections
of 1970, they constituted forty-two percent of the total population of the
enlarged city strength, as compared to their fifty-two percent pre-an-
nexation strength.
In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Perkins v.
Matthews,13 the city submitted its annexation decision to the United
States Attorney General for approval in a belated attempt to conform to
the commands of section five. On May 7, 1971, sixteen months after
Richmond assumed jurisdiction over the annexed area, the Attorney
General interposed an objection to Richmond's continued use of at-large
elections. Meanwhile, a class action by black Richmond voters was filed
in federal district court in Virginia challenging the annexation on fif-
teenth amendment grounds. The district court found in favor of plain-
tiffs and ordered new city council elections.' 4 The Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed.' 5
Unable to gain the Attorney General's acceptance of the plan, the
city elected to initiate an action in the District Court for the District of
Columbia, seeking a declaratory judgment that the annexation was
legal.' 6 In response to another annexation ruling, City of Petersburg v.
United States,17 Richmond also developed and submitted to the Attor-
evidence shows an increase in Negro voting strength ranging from 4,000 qualified voters
in 1956 to more than 35,000 at the present time .... While in 1968 there were more
whites than Negroes registered to vote, about 50% of the registered Negroes voted as
against approximately 30% of the white registered voters."
11. The controlling Virginia statutes permit annexations only after obtaining a
favorable judgment from a three-judge annexation court. 95 S. Ct. at 2300 n.2.
12. A writ of error was refused by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.
Deerboume Civic and Recreation Ass'n v. City of Richmond, 210 Va. lii, cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1038 (1970).
13. 400 U.S. 379 (1971). See text accompanying note 42 infra.
14. The court found that "the purpose of the compromise agreement was to
deprive the plaintiff's class of a basic constitutional guarantee." Holt v. City of
Richmond, 334 F. Supp. 228, 237 (E.D. Va. 1971).
15. 459 F.2d 1093 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 931 (1972). The court relied
on Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1970), and United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367 (1967), to conclude that "the unconstitutional motivation [was] too remote from thejudicial annexation decree, which firmly rested on non-racial ground, to warrant a grant
of any relief." 459 F.2d at 1094. See Note, Constitutional Law-Municipal Boundary
Changes and the Fifteenth Amendment, 51 N.C.L. Rav. 573 (1973).
16. See note 4 supra.
17. 354 F. Supp. 1021 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd, 410 U.S. 962 (1973). See text
accompanying notes 46-47 supra.
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ney General various plans attempting to "neutralize to the extent possi-
ble any adverse effect [of annexation] upon the political participation
of black voters."' The Attorney General indicated that one of the plans
was satisfactory, and it was subsequently submitted to the district court
in the form of a consent judgment. 9
The matter was referred to a special master who concluded that the
city had failed to meet its burden of proof that the annexation, even as
modified, did not have the purpose or effect of diluting the black vote of
that city.20 The master's findings indicated that the white political
leadership was fearful that without an influx of whites into the city,
black voters would be able to elect a majority to the City Council in the
1970 elections.2" The master emphasized that the city had not demon-
strated any acceptable counter-balancing economic and administrative
benefits to support the annexation22 and. that the city had failed to
minimize to the greatest extent possible the diluting effect of its action.2s
The district court, finding these conclusions to be compelled by the
record before the master, declined to grant Richmond a declaratory
judgment.24
On appeal, 5 the Supreme Court held that cities under the jurisdic-
tion of section five can alter their racial composition by annexing
predominantly white suburbs so long as blacks enjoy a proportionate
share of power in the enlarged city.2 6 The Court accepted the district
court's finding that the annexation, as it was carried out in 1969, was
infected by the impermissible purpose of denying the voting rights of
black citizens. Nevertheless, the Court was persuaded that section five
could be satisfied by the adoption of a fair ward plan, provided that
verifiable reasons could now be presented in favor of the annexation. 8
18. Id. at 1031.
19. The nine-ward plan finally submitted by the city was composed of four wards
which were heavily black, four wards which were predominantly white, and a "swing"
ward which had a black population of 40.9 percent. 95 S. Ct. at 2304.
20. City of Richmond v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 1344, 1346 (D.D.C. 1974).
21. Id. at 1349.
22. Id. at 1353.
23. Id. at 1356-57.
24. Id. at 1346.
25. See note 2 supra.
26. 95 S. Ct. at 2304.
27. Id. at 2305.
28. Id. The Court remanded on this issue for the purpose of bringing up to date
and reassessing the evidence. Justice White stated, "We are not satisfied that the Special
Master and the District Court gave adequate consideration to the evidence in this case in
deciding whether there are now justifiable reasons for the annexation which took place
January 1, 1970." Id. at 2306.
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Rejecting the district court's demand for a ward plan that would protect
pre-annexation black voting strength, the Court pointed out that this
requirement would necessarily entail an abridgment of other citizens'
voting rights in the enlarged city. 29 The majority was concerned that an
overly strict interpretation of section five would effectively preclude
cities from entering into otherwise legitimate and perhaps desperately
needed annexations.3 0 The Court was unwilling to believe that Congress
intended such a result.31
In order to put the Court's holding in appropriate perspective, it is
necessary to examine briefly the evolution of section five's interpretation
prior to Richmond. The Supreme Court in South Carolina v. Katzen-
bach3 2 upheld the constitutionality of section five. It noted that the
suspension of new voting regulations might have been "an uncommon
exercise of congressional power" but concluded that "exceptional condi-
tions can justify legislative measures not otherwise appropriate.13 En-
forcement of section five, however, was more difficult than the Court's
facile resolution of the constitutional issues indicated it would be. Juris-
dictions under the purview of section five were uncertain of its scope
and wary of unnecessary compliance. 4 The Attorney General ques-
tioned its workability and failed to adequately promote its enforce-
ment. 5 It was obvious that without further direction from the Supreme
Court section five would become largely dormant.
Allen v. State Board of Elections36 provided the necessary impetus
and paved the way for the full impact of section five to be felt. In that
case Chief Justice Warren declared that Congress intended section five
to be given the broadest possible scope and that consequently the Act
encompassed "any state enactment which altered the election law of a
29. Id. at 2304.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
33. Id. at 334.
34. During the first three years only South Carolina made any pretense of
compliance with section five; it submitted 118 voting changes to the Attorney General
while all the other states and subdivisions combined submitted only two changes. See
H.R. RP. No. 94-196, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1975).
35. See Hearings on the Extension of the Voting Rights Act Before a Subcomm. of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 169 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings on Extension].
36. 393 U.S. 544 (1969). Allen involved four instances where states passed new
laws or issued new regulations affecting voting or registration. These changes included
at-large requirements; switches from elective to appointive office; a statute making it
more difficult for independent candidates to run for office by increasing the number of
required signatures, shortening the times, and adding other inconvenient requirements;
and a state regulation governing assistance to illiterate voters. All four cases were found
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covered state in even a minor way." 7 This broad interpretation of the
Act was reinforced when Congress extended the Act in 1970 and
resisted vigorous attempts by some of the affected states to repeal the
preclearance provisions of section five.3 8 Accepting this clear mandate,
the Justice Department promulgated regulations for the enforcement of
section five and initiated energetic efforts to ensure compliance.3 9
In another important section five decision, Georgia v. United
States,4 the Court confirmed that "the very effect of section five was to
shift the burden of proof with respect to racial discrimination in vot-
ing. '41 A three-judge district court for the District of Columbia empha-
sized in City of Petersburg v. United States that this burden is a heavy
one for a community with a long history of block racial voting, in a state
with a history of past racial discrimination.42
In Perkins v. Matthews3 the Court for the first time held that
changing boundary lines by annexation fell squarely within the scope of
to have the potential for diluting black voting power, and therefore before these changes
could have legal effect, they would have to be approved under the section five preclear-
ance procedures. Id. at 571.
37. Id. at 566.
38. Hearings on Extension, supra note 34, at 169. In Georgia v. United States, 411
U.S. 526, 533 (1973), the Court noted, "Had Congress disagreed with the interpretation
of § 5 in Allen, it had ample opportunity to amend the statute. After extensive
deliberations in 1970 on bills to extend the Voting Rights Act, during which the Allen
case was repeatedly discussed, the Act was extended for five years, without any
substantive modification of § 5. . . . We can only conclude, then, that Allen correctly
interpreted the congressional design."
39. The Attorney General has interposed objections, at the state and local level, to
at-large requirements, polling place changes, majority vote requirements, staggered terms,
increased candidate filing fees, redistricting, switches from elective and appointive
offices, multimember districts and annexations. "Although 4,476 voting changes have
been submitted under § 5 since 1965, between 1965 and 1969 the number of changes
submitted was only 323 or 7% of all the department has received. About 93% of all
changes have been submitted since 1970. The year 1971 was the peak year for changes
reviewed (1118) and objections entered (50), a natural occurrence in light of upcoming
elections and redistrictings following the 1970 census. The past three years, however,
have continued to require the Department to review a high number of changes (between
850 and 1,000 a year.)" Hearings on Extension, supra note 34, at 25 (testimony of
Stanley Pottinger, Ass't Att'y Gen., Civil Rights Div., Dep't of Justice).
40. 411 U.S. 526 (1973). In this case which involves the 1972 reapportionment
plan for the Georgia House of Representatives, the state of Georgia challenged the
Attorney General's regulations which placed the burden of proof on the States under
section five. The Court held that reapportionment is within the ambit of section five and
that the states have the burden of proof under section five. Id. at-535, 538.
41. Id. at 538. See 28 C.F.R. 51.19 (1974) which states, "If the evidence as to the
purpose or effect of the change is conflicting, and the Attorney General is unable to
resolve the conflict within the sixty-day period, he shall, consistent with the above-
described burden of proof applicable in the District Court, enter an objection and so
notify the submitting authority."
42. 354 F. Supp. at 1027.
43. 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
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section five. The Court noted that annexations have a potential to
abridge or deny the vote, since
(1) by including certain voters within the city and leaving others
outside, it determines who may vote in the municipal election and
who may not; (2) it dilutes the weight of the voters to whom the
franchise was limited before the annexations and "the right of
suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight
of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the
free exercise of the franchise."'44
The standard of proof demanded of a municipality before its
annexation would be approved was not made clear by the statute or by
the Perkins decision. The District Court for the District of Columbia
struggled to formulate a workable test to determine when an annexation
can be approved and when it should be declared discriminatory under
section five.4 5 Although Perkins left no doubt that annexations have the
potential for denying or abridging the vote, no decision has held that
annexations per se are violative of the act. In City of Petersburg v.
United States a three-judge District of Columbia court concluded that
the city's annexation in the context of at-large elections would serve to
dilute the black vote. 46 The court advised that in such circumstances
approval would be denied until "modifications calculated to neutralize
to the extent possible any adverse effect upon the political participation
of black voters are adopted, i.e., that the plaintiff shift from an at-large
to a ward system of electing its city councilmen. 47
The three-judge District of Columbia court in the Richmond case
purported to subscribe to the Petersburg test, but in the process extend-
ed it considerably. Interpreting section five as a mandate to preserve and
protect the present potential for black voting strength, they viewed as
discriminatory any annexation that diminished that strength.4
The Supreme Court in Richmond settled the confusion which the
two District of Columbia district court decisions may have generated.
Over sharp objections from the dissent, the majority stated that focusing
upon present minority strength is not the proper approach in the case of
44. Id. at 388, quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1963).
45. Under section five, a District of Columbia three-judge court has the responsi-
bility to determine whether a standard, practice, or procedure has the purpose or the
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. Since the
composition of these three-judge courts is not static, the district court opinions may
vary until the Supreme Court addresses the issue in question. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970).
46. 354 F. Supp. at 1028-29.
47. Id. at 1031.
48. 376 F. Supp. at 1348. Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, insisted that
this was the correct application of Perkins. 95 S. Ct. at 2311.
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annexation.49 It rejected this approach on the grounds that it would
effectively preclude annexations from occurring or would invidiously
dilute the voting strength of other racial groups in the community. 0 Ther
majority focused instead on preserving and protecting voting rights in
the enlarged boundaries after annexation.51
The Court's approach was based on pragmatic considerations. It
proceeded from the presumption that annexations are a legitimate gov-
ernmental option for cities faced with such problems as a declining tax
base and a rising demand for services. Accordingly, the Court devised a
test that does nothing to inhibit this option. A city seeking to enlarge its
boundaries need only ensure that the electoral system used after annexa-
tion be one calculated to give the black community a voting strength
most nearly proportionate to its numbers in the new city.5z ,Richmond in
effect allows dilution when accomplished through annexation, 53 but it
rationalized this result by declaring, "[A] different city council and an
enlarged city are involved after the annexation.
54
In delineating the principles that should govern the application of
section five, insofar as it forbids voting changes having a discriminatory
effect on the voting rights of blacks, Richmond appears to be a signifi-
cant departure from Perkins. In Perkins the Court reasoned that annex-
ation has the potential to abridge the vote of black citizens since "it
dilutes the weight of the votes of the voters to whom the franchise was
limited before the annexation." 55 In Richmond the court no longer was
concerned with the voting patterns before annexation, apparently believ-
ing that a fair ward plan after the annexation was all that was necessary
to ensure effective minority representation.56
This reliance on a ward system is not an entirely satisfactory
remedy for a minority group fast approaching majority status in a
community. The ward plan can be objected to on at least three grounds.
First, while four representatives on a city council of nine is a solid base
from which to voice dissent, it is not tantamount to wielding effective
power. "[B]lacks would have a greater opportunity to elect five council-
men responsive to their concerns and interests in an at-large system






55. 400 U.S. at 388 (emphasis added).
56. 95 S. Ct. at 2304.
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within Richmond's old boundaries than in a ward system operating
within the expanded boundaries.157 Secondly, if demographic trends of
the last decade continue, blacks can shortly anticipate attaining majori-
ty status despite the recent addition of whites by the annexation. Majori-
ty status alone, however, will not bring with it the advantages that would
result from the combination of that status with an at-large voting system.
Thus, annexation will not only deprive blacks of the probability of
immediate power, it will also ensure that the white community will be
guaranteed maximum representation if the blacks attain majority status
at a later date. A third objection is that, whereas an at-large electoral
system tends to reward those candidates who appeal to the broadest
spectrum of the community, a ward system typically serves to reward
those candidates who reflect the interests of their district. Thus, an un-
intended consequence of a court-imposed ward system may be an in-
tensification of racial bloc voting, which can very well result in height-
ened racial tension. 58
The second prong of any section five inquiry is whether the pro-
posed voting change has been adopted for the purpose of denying or
abridging the voting rights of blacks.59 In Richmond, the Court was
presented for the first time with a district court finding that the purpose
of a voting change was violative of section five. Unable to completely
ignore the clear mandate of the Voting Rights Act concerning invidious
purpose, the Court stated, "An official action, whether an annexation or
otherwise, taken for the purpose of discriminating against Negroes on
account of their race has no legitimacy at all under our Constitution or
under the statute."6
The Court, however, was not convinced that a strict enforcement of
the "purpose" clause would be satisfactory. Concerned that the imper-
missible intent of a few might become a vehicle for denying a boundary
change needed for the health of the entire municipality, the Court
adopted a "verifiable justification" standard by which purpose becomes
determinative only if no countervailing economic and administrative
benefits can be demonstrated to be a product of the annexation."1
Impermissible motivation serves simply to trigger a demand for a legiti-
mate reason for the action.
57. 376 F. Supp. at 1355-56.
58. Cf. LaPonce, The Protection of Minorities by the Electoral System, 10 W. POL.
Q. 318, 330-31 (1957).
59. See note 2 supra.
60. 95 S. Ct. at 2307.
61. Id. at 2308.
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Minority citizens who attempt to challenge voting changes on
fifteenth amendment grounds, as in Holt, often find the burden of proof
placed on them to be an insurmountable obstacle.62 As one commenta-
tor has noted, "[The Supreme Court has applied the fifteenth amend-
ment to strike down discriminatory measures in only eight cases in a
century." 68 In recognition of the futility of the litigation method of
securing voting rights, the Voting Rights Act shifted the burden of
proof. The legislative intent was clearly to make this burden of proof6 4 a
formidable hurdle for those areas under the jurisdiction of section five.
However, after Richmond, states and municipalities are unlikely to
experience undue difficulty in sustaining the burden of proving that the
purpose of the annexation was not illegal under section five.6"
A municipality now has the option of proving that impermissible
purposes were not originally present or presenting compelling current
economic and administrative justifications for the annexation. Given the
difficulty of ascertaining improper motivations66 and the multitude of
verifiable, legitimate purposes which may plausibly accompany an an-
nexation, it is now highly unlikely that municipalities wil fail to meet
the burden of proof on this issue.
The Voting Rights Act has often been praised for its deterrent effect
in preventing invidious election changes and in inhibiting those maneu-
vers that were typically used in the past to deny or abridge the voting
rights of blacks.67 Justice Brennan, in the dissenting opinion, wrote that
"[t]o hold that an annexation agreement reached under such circum-
stances can be validated by objective economic justifications offered
many years after the fact, in my view, wholly negates the prophylactic
purpose of §5.' o68 Government officials in the areas affected by the Act
may be less hesitant in circumventing the letter of the law in the belief
62. See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
63. Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAli. L. Ray. 523,
561 (1973).
64. See note 2 supra.
65. Congressman McCulloch, ranking minority member of the House Judiciary
Committee, stated, "The burden of proof under section 5 is rightfully placed upon the
jurisdiction to show that the new voting law or procedure is not discriminatory. As in tort
law, when circumstances give rise to an inference that there has been misconduct, the
party that has access to the facts is called upon to rebut the inference and show that its
conduct was proper." 115 CONG. Ruc. 38,486 (1969). Accord, 116 CoNo. RuE. 6154
(1970) (Statement of Senator Fong).
66. E.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968). For an excellent discussion of this problem see Ely, Legislative and
Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L. 1205 (1970).
67. E.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 335 (1966).
68. 95 S. Ct. at 2310 (dissenting opinion).
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that an ex post facto justification will suffice if judicial action is initiated
under section five.69
The Court's pragmatic approach to annexations is not without
merit. The attainment of power by blacks in a city that is no longer
economically viable is an empty victory. However, in its eagerness to
afford relief to beleaguered cities, the Court seriously undercut the
power of section five. The burden of proof concerning the question of
discriminatory purpose has become meaningless. By ignoring pre-annex-
ation minority political influence, the Court has invited that influence to
be diluted. Politicians in the states and subdivisions covered by section
five can no longer successfully prevent blacks from voting. However,
annexations may become one method of preventing blacks from winning
or deciding elections. The promise of full voting rights is an elusive one
if it is subject to manipulations of this kind. In the wake of the violence
at Selma, Alabama, President Johnson urged Congress to enact voting
rights legislation. The President stated, "No law we now have on the
books . .. can ensure the right to vote when local officials are
determined to deny it." °70 The Richmond decision serves notice to local
officials determined to prevent blacks from wielding real power that
there is now no law that prevents annexations from being used to dilute
the political influence of blacks.
BRIAN A. POvERS
Constitutional Law-The Establishment Clause: Drawing the
Line on Aid to Religious Schools
Since its first ruling on an establishment clause1 challenge to state
aid to religious schools,' the United States Supreme Court has sought to
69. Annexations are often viewed as a safety valve for our larger cities. This
decision will also affect much smaller cities eager to add white voters for their tax dollars
and their votes. Perkins involved the expansion efforts of Canton, Mississippi, a town
with a 1970 census of 10,703; Petersburg involved Petersburg, Virginia, a city with a
1970 population of 36,103.
70. See Hearings on Extension, supra note 34, at 5.
1. The establishment clause provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion ..... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The establishment clause was
presumed applicable to the states via the fourteenth amendment in Everson, supra at 15,
and has subsequently been expressly applied to the states. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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apply the Jeffersonian view of the first amendment as "a wall of
separation between church and state."' Implementing this separation,
the Court has developed the following three-pronged test to be applied
to challenged state assistance:4 the aid statute must have a secular
legislative purpose;5 its "primary effect" must neither inhibit nor ad-
vance religion;6 and the statute must not involve government in "exces-
sive entanglement" with religious matters or institutions.7 In Meek v.
Pittinger8 the Court applied these tests but reached conclusions as to the
various forms of aid being challenged that cannot be reconciled under
an even-handed application of the tests.
Plaintiffs in Meek9 brought suit in federal district court' 0 seeking
to enjoin expenditure of funds under two Pennsylvania statutes" that
mandated state aid to "nonpublic schools."' 2 The challenged aid was
divided into four classifications: "auxiliary services,"1 3 "instructional
equipment," "instructional materials" and "textbooks.' 4 Plaintiffs con-
3. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
4. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
5. Id.; see School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
6. See School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
7. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Another consideration, poten-
tial for political devisiveness, may be considered a fourth test, though it has not yet been
elevated to that level by the Court. This consideration was the focus of Mr. Justice
Brennan's dissent, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall joined, in
Meek v. Pittinger, 95 S. Ct. 1753, 1767 (1975).
8. 95 S. Ct. 1753 (1975).
9. Plaintiffs were three individual resident taxpayers of Pennsylvania and four
organizations with resident taxpayer members. Standing was granted to both groups with
respect to their establishment clause claims under Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)
(first amendment challenge by taxpayer with standing granted) and Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (organization has standing to represent injured members)
respectively. Meek v. Pittinger, 374 F. Supp. 639, 646-47 (E.D. Pa. 1974). The Supreme
Court affirmed standing of all parties, 95 S. Ct. at 1758 n.5.
10. Meek v. Pittinger, 374 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Pa. 1974). A three-judge district
court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-84 (1970).
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 9-972, -973 (1975).
12. Id. § 9-972(b) defines a "nonpublic school" as: "[Any school, other than a
public school within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, wherein a resident of the
Commonwealth may legally fulfill the compulsory school attendance requirements of this
act and which meet the requirements of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Public
Law 88-352)."
13. Id. defines "auxiliary services" as:
[G]uidance, counseling and testing services; psychological services; serv-
ices for exceptional children; remedial and therapeutic services; speech and
hearing services; services for the improvement of the educationally disadvan-
taged . . . .and such other secular, neutral, non-ideological services as are of
benefit to nonpublic school children and are presently or hereafter provided for
public school children of the Commonwealth.
14. Id. § 9-973(b) defines the following terms:
"Instructional equipment" means instructional equipment, other than fixtures
annexed to and forming part of the real estate, which is suitable for and to
be used by children and/or teachers. The term includes but is not limited to
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tended that expenditures under the statutes 5 violated the establishment
clause of the first amendment and deprived unconsenting taxpayers of
their rights under the free exercise clause.
Applying the tripartite test previously developed by the Supreme
Court,' the three-judge district court upheld all of the statutory classes
of aid except "instructional equipment"' 7 that could be diverted to reli-
gious purposes.' 8 On direct appeal 9 the Supreme Court reversed, up-
holding only the textbook provision. 20
The Pennsylvania programs were invalidated on two grounds.
First, the Court observed that seventy-five percent of the schools eligible
to receive aid were sectarian in nature and that their secular and
religious functions were "inextricably intertwined.' Characterizing in-
structional materials and equipment as "massive aid,"' the Court con-
cluded that the aid to the sectarian institutions had the unconstitutional
"primary effect' '23 of advancing religion. Secondly, the Court invalidat-
ed the auxiliary services provision by holding that an "intolerable
projection equipment, recording equipment, laboratory equipment, and any
other educational secular, neutral, non-ideological materials as may be of bene-
fit to the instruction of non-public school children and are presently or here-
after provided for public school children of the Commonwealth.
"Instructional materials" means books, periodicals, documents, pamphlets,
photographs, reproductions, pictorial or graphic works, musical scores, maps,
charts, globes, sound recordings, including but not limited to those on discs and
tapes, processed slides, transparencies, films, filmstrips, kinescopes, and video.
tapes, or any other printed and published materials of a similar nature....
The term includes such other secular, neutral, non-ideological materials as are
of benefit to the instruction of nonpublic school children and are presently or
hereafter provided for public school children. ...
"Textbooks" means books, workbooks, including reusable and nonreusable
workbooks, and manuals, whether bound or in looseleaf form, intended for use
as a principal source or study material for a given class or group of students,
a copy of which is expected to be available for the individual use of each pupil
in such class or group. Such textbooks shall be textbooks which are acceptable
for use in any public, elementary, or secondary school of the Commonwealth.
15. Id. §§ 9-972, -973.
16. See text accompanying notes 4-7 supra.
17. See note 14 supra.
18. 374 F. Supp. at 661. The district court found no merit in the plaintiffs' free
exercise claim since taxes resulting from the expenditures in question had no real effect
on free exercise rights. Id. at 662.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970) allows direct appeal to the Supreme Court from a
judgment of a three-judge district court concerning the constitutionality of a state law.
20. 95 S. Ct. at 1767. The Court was badly divided, with Stewart (writing for the
Court), Blackmun, and Powell in the majority as to all statutory provisions. Burger,
Rehnquist and White dissented except as to the upholding of the textbook loan program.
Brennan, Douglas and Marshall joined with the Court except as to the upholding of the
textbook program.
21. Id. at 1764, quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 657 (1971) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
22. 95 S. Ct. at 1763.
23. Id. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
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degree of entanglement2V4 between church and state" would result in
overseeing the program's administration.
25
The Court found the textbook provision to be identical "in every
material respect" 6 to the program approved in Board of Education v.
Allen2 7 seven years earlier, and upheld it on that basis alone. In doing so,
the majority did not subject this particular program to the analysis that it
applied to the other provisions.28 Distinguishing between the forms of
assistance in this manner, the Court apparently tried to achieve govern-
mental neutrality without depriving either the state legislature of the
right to benefit its citizens or parents of the right to exercise their reli-
gious beliefs.
In order to understand the principles applied in Meek, it is neces-
sary to examine the earlier cases that dealt with the establishment clause
limitations on state involvement with religious matters. Everson v. Board
of Education9 was the first Supreme Court decision to deal with the
establishment clause in the context of state aid to religious schools. In
Everson the Court held that the reimbursement of parents of the costs of
busing their children to parochial schools was only incidentally benefi-
cial to the sectarian schools since it was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
welfare statute analogous to police and fire protection.30 The Everson
rationale has since become known as the "pupil benefit theory."31 In
Board of Education v. Allen3" the Court extended the pupil benefit
theory to include secular textbooks provided directly to all school chil-
dren through expenditures of state funds.
A competing line of cases approached the state aid problem by
developing and relying primarily upon the three-part test. In School
District of Abington v. Schempp,3 though not a state assistance case,
24. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
25. 95 S. Ct. at 1765.
26. Id. at 1761.
27. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
28. 95 S. Ct. at 1760-62.
29. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). In 1899 the Court upheld federal construction grants to a
hospital administered by a religious order, thus rejecting the view that the establishment
clause of the first amendment prohibits any form of financial aid to religious institutions.
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
30. 330 U.S. at 17. The Court further stated that in guarding against intrusion
upon Establishment Clause principles "we must be careful. . . that we do not inadvert-
ently prohibit New Jersey from extending its general state law benefits to all its citizens
." Id. at 16. This dictum expresses the crux of the problem in Meek as well.
31. Note, Establishment Clause of the First Amendment-Free Textbook Loans to
Pupils in Private Schools Held Constitutional, 37 FoRDHAM L. Rnv. 123, 124 (1969).
32. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
33. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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the Court set forth two criteria by which a statute should be tested
under the establishment clause. These criteria were the requirements of
"secular purpose" and "primary effect. '8 4
In Lemon v. Kurtzman35 the Court added the requirement that the
aid program not involve "excessive entanglement '8 6 of church and state.
Under this third test, state salary supplements to teachers of secular
subjects were invalidated. The Court in Kurtzman held that entangle-
ment of government and religion would result from the state's ensuring
that teachers who received the supplement remained religiously neu-
tral.37 The Kurtzman Court also developed a fourth consideration,
potential for political division along religious lines, which, though not
given the weight of the other tests, was deemed a "warning signal"' 8 of
unconstitutionality.
The conflict inherent in the principles that were the basis of
Everson and Schempp did not go unnoticed by the Court. In Walz v.
Tax Commission 0 the Court upheld real property tax exemptions grant-
ed by New York to religious organizations. Though the rationale for the
decision was the incidental nature of the benefit to religion, which was
comparable to fire and police protection, 40 the Court paid particular
attention to the inconsistency in the developing case law. The Court
observed that inconsistencies in the opinions of the Court derived from
"too sweeping utterances on aspects of these [religion] clauses that
seemed clear in relation to the particular cases but have limited meaning
as general principles." 41
The Court in Walz suggested that the struggle to establish neutrali-
ty was one of finding a "neutral course between the two Religion
Clauses. 42 The source of the conflict, the Court concluded, lay in the
34. 374 U.S. at 222. See text accompanying notes 5-6 supra. The requirement of
valid "secular purpose" is the least stringent requirement of the tripartite test because of
the difficulty in refuting the argument that aid is provided to benefit primarily the state's
citizens. Aid statutes may preempt the problem by placing statements of policy in the
statute's preamble. See, e.g., PA. STAT. AN. tit. 24, §§ 9-972(a), -973(a) (1975).
35. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
36. Id. at 613. See text accompanying note 7 supra. The Court has applied the
various tests with far less severity when the institution involved is one of higher
education and where the Court can take notice of a free academic atmosphere. See Tilton
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); see also Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
37. 403 U.S. at 620-21.
38. Id. at 625.
39. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
40. Id. at 676. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
41. 397 U.S. at 668. Though Walz is not a state aid to religion case, the
establishment/free exercise clause principles involved are identical.
42. Id.
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fact that the religion clauses "are cast in absolute terms, . . . either of
which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the
other." 3 Because the Meek decision rested on both the pupil benefit
theory as to textbooks and the tripartite test as to the other programs, it
was inevitable that it would show the strains of the conflict delineated in
Walz.
An analysis of the Meek case must begin with an examination of
the manner in which the tripartite test was extended to cover the
invalidated provisions.4 The auxiliary services program4 5 was invali-
dated because the Court felt that in order for the state to guarantee
teacher autonomy from religious authorities, it would necessarily be-
come excessively entangled with those authorities. Though Lemon v.
Kurtzman4" was used as authority for this portion of the holding, the
teachers in Meek were chosen by the state for special functions associat-
ed more with health-related services than with regular classroom activ-
ites.4 7 The Court noted these differences but gave them little weight in
its factual analysis.4" This approach to excessive entanglement extended
the Court's invalidating power beyond the Kurtzman case to situations
that present very little danger of actual "fostering of religion."'49
The Court likewise changed its means of determining whether a
statute has the primary effect" of advancing religion. In the past,
programs were held to violate the establishment clause only if the
character of the aid was such that religion would be directly advanced
thereby, as when a statute authorized assistance without expressly limit-
ing it to nonreligious uses.5' In Meek the Court declared aid to be
impermissible when it exceeds an acceptable quantitative limit. The
instructional materials and equipment programs were struck, not be-
cause they could be diverted for religious use,52 but because they
43. Id. at 668-69.
44. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
45. See note 13 supra.
46. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
47. See note 13 supra.
48. See 95 S. Ct. at 1766.
49. Id. The Court noted in dicta that speech and hearing services of a "diagnostic"
character were probably constitutional but found that clause nonseverable from the
invalid section, even though a severability clause was present in the statute. Id. at 1766
n.21.
50. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
51. See Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973). See also Sloan v.
Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973).
52. 95 S. Ct. at 1763. The district court had based its test on whether or not aid
could be diverted to relligious purposes. The court invalidated only that portion that could
be so diverted. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
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constituted "massive aid."53 This development extended the "primary
effect" limitation to cover state assistance that is suspect both in charac-
ter and in quantity.
The Court did not make clear its reasons for exempting the text-
book provision from the tripartite test. "[S]ubstantial amounts of direct
support" was the stated concern of the Court.54 There is, however, no
indication in the holding or in dicta why textbooks were not considered
"substantial" assistance, except that in Allen55 a similar provision was
upheld. Likewise, Mr. Justice Brennan's argument in his dissent that the
textbooks were going in fact to the school and not to the students
remains unanswered.56 In short, the textbooks seem to be direct aid to
the nonpublic schools and appear no less "substantial" than the other
provisions.
On the other hand, if the Everson approach (treating textbooks as
primarily benefiting the pupil) is used, the textbook program is justifia-
ble. The Court did in fact use the pupil benefit theory to support the
textbook provision in Meek. 57 Using Everson and Allen as starting
points, it is difficult to justify the striking of the instructional materials
program as unconstitutional. No explanation was given by the Court as
to why it distinguished between aid that provided textbooks, which was
held constitutional, and aid that provided "books, periodicals, docu-
ments, pamphlets" etc.,58 which was not. On the basis of the nature of
the materials, no rational distinction can be made. 9 To retain consisten-
cy the Court should have either upheld at least the auxiliary materials
under the pupil benefit theory 0 or struck the textbook provision under
53. 95 S. Ct. at 1763.
54. Id.
55. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
56. Brennan argued that the loan procedures and the language of the administrative
guidelines show that the loans are in fact made to the schools, not the children, 95 S. Ct.
at 1770-71.
57. Id. at 1761.
58. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 9-973 (1975). Choice of materials and administrative
distribution procedure remained with the state as was the case with the textbooks.
59. Rehnquist made this observation: "I fail to see how the instructional materials
and equipment program can be distinguished [from the textbook program] in any
significant respect. Under both programs 'ownership remains, at least technically, in the
State'." 95 S. Ct. at 1776.
60. Though the Court claims the distinction lies in the fact that the instructional
materials program was "direct" aid to schools and the textbook program was not, it is
highly doubtful that if the aid had been given directly to students that it would have been
upheld. Both Brennan and Rehnquist in separate dissents and for different reasons show
that the "direct" aid argument of the majority is simply a makeshift one. See id. at 1770-
71, 1776.
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the tripartite test. The Court chose instead to sacrifice internal consisten-
cy.
The origin of the inconsistency lies primarily in the case law that
preceded Meek and in the conflicting interests present within any con-
cept of government neutrality. If in striving for neutrality government
becomes the adversary of religion, free exercise rights will be adversely
affected."1 This struggle for neutrality is the cause of the Court's ac-
knowledgment in Meek that the lines between permissible and im-
permissible aid are blurred and that the various tests are little more
than guidelines.62
Apparently not wanting to cut off all state power to benefit citizens
who exercise their religious rights, the Court stood on the precedential
authority of the "pupil benefit" cases. Additionally, fearful of increasing
state entanglement in religious affairs and of fueling political division on
religious grounds, the Court drew the line, albeit somewhat arbitrarily,
as to the extent of permissible state aid. The result of the clash between
these competing considerations was the inconsistency in the Court's
treatment of the aid provisions in Meek.
The Meek decision is significant because it made relatively clear
the line between permissible and impermissible aid. While affirming the
constitutionality of state aid that supplies busing,63 textbooks,6 4 health
care and lunches, 5 the Court further raised the barrier to state aid not
within these protected classes of assistance. As a result, state legisla-
tures should be forewarned that it is unlikely that the Court will ap-
prove state assistance to religious schools66 unless it comes within or
is closely associated with one of the protected classes.
It is unfortunate that the Court ignored its own statement on aid
classifications: state assistance is invalid if aimed at the "primary,
religious-oriented educational function of the sectarian school. ' 61 In this
61. This struggle for neutrality is the struggle described in Walz. See text accompa-
nying notes 41-42 supra.
62. 95 S. Ct. at 1760.
63. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), had upheld transportation cost
reimbursement to parents, and was noted with approval by the Court in Meek. 95 S. Ct.
at 1760.
64. 95 S. CL at 1762-63, afj'g Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
65. In dicta the Court in Meek noted that health care and school lunches are
permissible aid, 95 S. Ct. 1763. Likewise, the Court noted that "speech and hearing
services" would have been upheld if severable from the remainder of the auxiliary
services program. Id. at 1766 n.21.
66. "Religious schools" in this context refers to primary and secondary religious
schools. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), shows a less strict approach to
institutions of higher learning administered by religious groups. See note 35 supra.
67. 95 S. Ct. at 1763.
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rough formula the Court posed a reasonable answer to the religious aid
issue. Lunches, health care and transportation can be upheld under the
pupil benefit theory as not being part of the actual educational function
that the Court has found to be "inextricably intertwined"' 8 with religion.
Textbooks, however, are an inseparable part of the primary educational
function of schools and should have been invalidated. Though this
approach would require the bolder actions of overruling Board of
Education v. Allen 9 and striking the textbook program in Meek, it
would more clearly establish the lines of state neutrality without requir-
ine the sacrifice of consistency.
ERIC NEWMAN
Criminal Procedure-Prison Escapee's Pending Appeal
Dismissed Despite Early Recapture
Escape from prison or other official custody is not only a common-
law' or statutory2 offense but it can also be a ground for major proce-
dural disabilities. Summary dismissal of the pending appeal of a prison
escapee or other fugitive from justice, at least while the appellant is still
at large, is accepted practice in many appellate courts.3 The result of this
procedure is a total preclusion of review of an escaping prisoner's
original conviction. In Estelle v. Dorrough4 the United States Supreme
Court extended its approval of this practice twofold by holding that a
Texas statute5 that allowed the automatic dismissal of an escaping
68. Id. at 1764, quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 657 (1971). See text
accompanying note 21 supra.
69. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
1. United States ex rel. Manzella v. Zimmerman, 71 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Pa.
1947); Smith v. State, 145 Me. 313, 75 A.2d 538 (1950); State v. Pace, 192 N.C. 780,
136 S.E. 11 (1926).
2. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-45 (1973); TEx. PENAL CODE art. 38.07 (1974).
3. See text accompanying notes 32-41 infra.
4. 420 U.S. 534 (1975) (per curiam).
5. TEx. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 44.09 (1966). This statute provides:
If the defendant, pending an appeal in the felony case, makes his escape
from custody, the jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals shall no longer
attach in the case. Upon the fact of such escape being made to appear, the
court shall, on motion of the State's attorney, dismiss the appeal; but the order
dismissing the appeal shall be set aside if it is made to appear that the defend-
ant has voluntarily returned within ten days to the custody of the officer from
whom he escaped; and in cases where the punishment inflicted by the jury is
death or confinement in an institution operated by the Department of Correc-
ESCAPEE'S APPEAL DISMISSED
felon's pending appeal, not only when the felon is recaptured soon after
his escape but also when his appeal is not delayed, did not violate the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.'
The history of the case began in 1963 when Jerry Mack Dorrough
was convicted in a Texas court of felonious bank robbery and given a
twenty-five year sentence. Direct appeal was taken to the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals. While his appeal was still pending, Dorrough escaped
from jail by stealing a United States mail truck. Two days later he was
recaptured. Thereafter the appellate court, upon motion by the State,
dismissed Dorrough's appeal pursuant to article 44.09 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure. The statute in effect required automatic
dismissal since "jurisdiction. . . shall no longer attach" if the appellant
escapes.7 There are, however, two express exceptions. The order dis-
missing the appeal must be set aside if the escapee is a term felon who
voluntarily surrenders within ten days, and the order may be set aside if
the escapee is a felon under a life or death sentence who surrenders or is
recaptured within thirty days.8 Since Dorrough was only serving a term
of years and since his recapture prevented his voluntary surrender, the
appellate court did not (and could not) reinstate his appeal.9
Dorrough was then charged under federal law for theft of the mail
truck, to which he pleaded guilty and was given a twenty-five year
federal prison term. He is now serving this sentence and is also being
held under a Texas detainer warrant for his original state sentence.'0
After numerous unsuccessful challenges to his federal guilty plea
and to the state detainer warrant," Dorrough sought federal habeas
tions for life, the court may in its discretion reinstate the appeal if the defend-
ant is recaptured or voluntarily surrenders within thirty days after such escape.
6. 420 U.S. at 539.
7. See note 5 supra.
8. See note 5 supra.
9. See note 5 supra. See also Maugia v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. 539, 236 S.W. 740
(1922).
10. 420 U.S. at 535.
11. There were four attacks on his guilty plea under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970) and
one challenge to the detainer warrant prior to the present case, all in the federal courts.
The merits of the state case were not considered. The full case history is as follows:
Dorrough v. United States, 327 F.2d 667 (5th Cir. 1964) (per curiam); Dorrough v.
United States, 344 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1965) (per curiam); Dorrough v. United States,
385 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1967), aff'd en banc, 397 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1968) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1019 (1969); Dorrough v. Texas, 440 F.2d 1063 (5th
Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 840, rehearing denied, 404 U.S. 959 (1971);
Dorrough v. United States, 440 F.2d 1336 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 915, rehearing denied, 404 U.S. 979 (1971); Dorrough v. Estelle, 497 F.2d 1007
(5th Cir. 1974), rev'd, Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534 (per curiam), rehearing
denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975).
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corpus relief on the ground that the earlier dismissal of his state appeal
denied him equal protection. The district court denied relief but the
Fifth Circuit reversed and ordered the state detainer warrant voided
unless Dorrough was given a direct appeal or a new trial for his state
offense.12
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit in a five to four per
curiam opinion. 13 After stating that "there is no federal constitutional
right to state appellate review of state criminal convictions,"' 4 the Court
held that the classifications' 5 created by the exceptions in the Texas
mandatory dismissal law did not violate the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment.'" Relying upon traditional equal protection
analysis, the Court applied the rational basis test'1 to the statute since no
fundamental interests or suspect criteria were involved.18 Under this
standard, the Court reasoned that the classifications were rationally
related to the legitimate state interests of discouraging escapes, encour-
aging surrenders and promoting the "efficient, dignified operation of the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals."' 9 In dissent, Justices Stewart, Bren-
nan and Marshall stressed both the irrationality of dismissing an appeal
after the appellant-escapee is back in the custody and control of the
court, and the disparity of punishments resulting from application of the
Texas law.20
A few other states have statutes similar to the one upheld in
Estelle.21 Yet, in the absence of a statute, decisional law uniformly has
12. Dorrough v. Estelle, 497 F.2d 1007, 1014 (5th Cir. 1974) (Wisdom, J., for the
court in an excellent opinion).
13. 420 U.S. at 534. Texas sought review under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1970).
Certiorari was granted in the present case, 420 U.S. at 536.
14. 420U.S.at 536.
15. Article 44.09 of the Texas Code creates at least four classifications: (1)
escaping felons v. escaping misdemeanants, (2) escape pending appeal v. escape before
appeal, (3) felons serving a life or death sentence v. felons serving a term of years, and
(4) term felons surrendering within ten days v. term felons surrendering after ten days.
See note 5 supra.
16. 420 U.S. at 539.
17. Id. at 538-40. See also notes 71-76 and accompanying text infra.
18. These phrases were not specifically mentioned in the opinion but it seems clear
that the majority did not consider the defendant's interest in appellate review to be
"fundamental." See 420 U.S. at 536.
19. Id. at 537.
20. Id. at 542-45. Justice Douglas filed a short separate dissent. Id. at 542.
21. E.g., GA. CoDE ANN. § 6-809(b) (1972) (dismissal of appeal for mootness);
OxzA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1058 (1951) (appeal bond subject to condition that
defendant not depart without leave of court). The Texas law (article 44.09), however,
appears to be unusually harsh in expressly requiring dismissal for a recaptured escapee,
since this statute deprives the court of jurisdiction when the appellant has escaped. The
Oklahoma statute gives the court discretion to dismiss. Trotter v. State, 334 P.2d 452
(Okla. Crim. App. 1959). The Georgia statute has been construed to require mandatory
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sustained the appellate dismissal practice as it applies to the non-
returning appellant-escapee 2 and sometimes as to the returning escap-
ee. 23 In the relatively few escape-pending-appeal cases to reach the
Supreme Court, the first question faced was whether there is a constitu-
tional right of appeal. Answering this in the negative, 24 the Court on
several occasions has then proceeded to approve of the practice of
dismissal for escape. 25 In fact, the Supreme Court itself has either
"removed the appeal from its docket" or dismissed certiorari when the
appellant escaped after the granting of certiorari.
Smith v. United States28 was an important early case in which the
appeal was conditionally ordered off the Supreme Court docket unless
the appellant returned before the next term of Court. Although Smith
involved an appeal from a state conviction, the case established the
Supreme Court's own early dismissal practice; 27 it did not establish the
validity of state court dismissal practice. Nevertheless, the rationale of
Smith, the inability of a court to enforce its judgment against a fugitive,
is potentially applicable at all levels of appeal: "If we affirm the judg-
ment, [the escapee] is not likely to appear to submit to his sentence. If
we reverse it and order a new trial, he will appear or not, as he may
consider most for his interest."28 The Court's present method of dispo-
sition of an escapee's appeal is unconditional dismissal of certiorari.2 9
Not long after Smith the Supreme Court had occasion to review a
state appellate dismissal rule in Allen v. Georgia."0 In this case, a state
court's semi-discretionary practice of dismissal subject to reinstatement
dismissal for escape, Pope v. State, 126 Ga. App. 488, 191 S.E.2d 115 (1972), but the
case involved a non-returning escapee. It is not clear how Georgia would treat a
recaptured escapee. His appeal ought not to be moot once he returns to custody.
22. See note 39 infra.
23. See note 41 infra.
24. See note 78 infra.
25. Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365 (1970) (per curiam); Eisler v. United
States, 338 U.S. 189 (per curiam), cert. dismissed, 338 U.S. 883 (1949), noted in 18
GEo. WASH. L REV. 427 (1950), 48 MIcH. L. REv. 112 (1949), and 7 WASH. & LEE LT
REv. 214 (1950); Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138 (1897); 'Bonahan v. Nebraska, 125
U.S. 692 (1887); Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97 (1876). See also United States v.
Campos-Serrano, 404 'U.S. 293, 294 n.2 (1971) (dictum); National Union of Marine
Cooks v. Arnold, 348 U.S. 37, 43 (1954) (dictum).
26. 94 U.S. 97 (1876).
27. Smith was followed in two later cases, Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189
(per curiam), cert. dismissed, 338 U.S. 883 (1949), and Bonahan v. Nebraska, 125 U.S.
692 (1887).
28. 94 U.S. at 97.
29. Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365 (1970) (per curiam). Certiorari was not
dismissed in Estelle because the Court was reviewing a state court's dismissal. In
Molinaro the appellant escaped after certiorari was granted.
30. 166 U.S. 138 (1897).
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was upheld over a due process challenge. Reasoning that a fugitive
should not dictate the terms of his surrender, the Supreme Court permit-
ted the Georgia courts to set a sixty-day limit for return to custody. In
Allen, recapture of the escapee one year later was found not sufficient
for reinstatement of the appeal, despite the fact that the escapee faced a
death sentence.3 1
Practice in the state courts has generally been in accord with Smith
and Allen, but these courts often differ about the manner in which the
appeal is dismissed, the legal theories employed, and the policy reasons
considered. The methods of disposing of escapees' appeals are in large
part classifiable as either unconditional dismissal32 or conditional dis-
missal. Unconditional dismissal is usually tantamount to dismissal with
prejudice but some courts allow eventual reinstatement.8 4 Conditional
dismissal means that the escapee's appeal will be dismissed unless he
returns to custody within a certain period of time, usually thirty days8"
but sometimes longer.36 The return to custody may be either by recap-
31. Id. at 139.
32. Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365 (1970) (per curiam); Lofton v. State,
149 Miss. 514, 115 So. 592, cert. denied, 278 U.S. 568 (1928); State v. Page, 23 N.C.
App. 539, 209 S.E.2d 379 (1974); Forder v. State, 456 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. Crim. App.
1970); see Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189 (per curiam), cert. dismissed, 338 U.S.
883 (1949).
33. Bonahan v. Nebraska, 125 U.S. 692 (1887); Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97(1876); United States v. Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323 (2d Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Laird, 432
F.2d 77 (9th Cir.), merits considered, 435 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1970); People v. Estep,
413 Ill. 437, 109 N.E.2d 762 (1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 970 (1953); State v. Spry,
126 W. Va. 781, 30 S.E.2d 88 (1944). Some early cases spoke of "leaving the appeal off
the docket," until a certain date or until directions to the contrary, but this was similar to
conditional dismissal. See Bonahan and Smith supra. But see Eisler v. United States, 338
U.S. 189 (per curiam), cert. dismissed, 338 U.S. 883 (1949). See generally 18 GEo,
WASH. L. R-v. 427 (1950). One court in a recent case granted a general continuance
even though the appellant-escapee bad escaped once before and was still at large.
Commonwealth v. Galloway, 333 A.2d 741 (Pa. 1975). But indefinite postponement is
rare. See Jones v. State, 218 So. 2d 705 (Miss. 1969), overruling Harrelson v. State, 222
Miss. 514, 76 So. 2d 516 (1954). On a few occasions the court has heard the appeal in
the appellant's absence. Irvin v. State, 236 Ind. 384, 139 N.E.2d 898 (1957), rev'd on
other grounds, 359 U.S. 394 (1959); Stevens v. State, 26 Ohio App. 53, 159 N.E. 834(1927); State v. Broom, 121 Ore. 202, 253 P. 1042 (1927). In North Carolina, several
approaches have been taken including affirmance, dismissal, continuance, and leaving off
the docket. See State v. Williams, 263 N.C. 800, 140 S.E.2d 529 (1965). For a general
discussion of dismissal for escape pending appeal see 39 COLum. L. REv. 1244 (1939); 5
U. DEr. .IU. 77 (1941); 18 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 427 (1950); Annot., 26 L.R.A.(N.S.)
921 (1910).
34. Miller v. State, 311 So. 2d 348 (Miss. 1975) (reinstatement for good cause).
Mere recapture may not be good cause, Mitchell v. State, 294 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 1974),
but meritorious appeal may be, if the state's case has not been prejudiced by the escape.
White v. State, 514 P.2d 814 (Alas. 1973).
35. United States v. Eberhardt, 467 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); People
v. Clark, 201 Cal. 474,259 P. 47 (1927).
36. United States v. Shelton, 508 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1975) (reasonable time);
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ture or by surrender; results seldom turn on this distinction.37 Another
fact of apparently little significance to either conditional or uncondition-
al dismissal is the type of appeal involved. Courts tend not to distinguish
between statutory appeals of right and discretionary appeals, and hold
that both types are subject to some form of dismissal.3 8 Of vital impor-
tance, however, is the procedural juncture at which the escape occurs.
When the appellant escapes after he has been convicted and sentenced
and has filed his appeal, and is still a fugitive at the date set for the
appeal hearing, dismissal in some form is almost always granted.3"
When, however, the appellant escapes pending appeal but returns to
custody before the hearing date, the appeal is not usually dismissed.
40
In the few cases that allowed post-return dismissal, it appears that the
escapee delayed the appellate process by his long absence.4
A second way in which courts differ is the legal theory employed as
the ground for dismissal. The four major theories are lack of jurisdic-
tion,42 mootness, 43 waiver" and abandonment, 45 but there is a cornuco-
State v. Mosley, 84 Wash. 2d 608, 528 P.2d 986 (1974) (until date of filing of court's
opinion).
37. 39 COLUM. L. REv. 1244, 1246 n.11 (1939) (collecting cases); see Brinlee v.
United States, 483 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1973) (per curiam). But cf. Johnson v. Laird, 432
F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1970).
38. United States v. Swigart, 490 F.2d 914 (10th Cir. 1973).
39. Shelton v. State, 131 Ga. App. 786, 206 S.E.2d 654 (1974); State v. Page, 23
N.C. App. 539, 209 S.E.2d 379 (1974); see 18 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 427, 428 (1950); 5
U. DET. L.J. 77 (1941).
40. Ruetz v. Lash, 500 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1974) (collecting federal cases);
People v. Mutch, 4 Cal. 3d 389, 482 P.2d 633, 93 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1971); Stevens v.
State, 26 Ohio App. 53, 159 N.E. 834 (1927); Commonwealth v. Galloway, 333 A.2d
741 (Pa. 1975). A clear statement of the rationale appears in the Galloway case, supra:
"Since Galloway [the escapee] is no longer a fugitive from justice and is now subject to
the jurisdiction of this Court, he will be responsive to any judgment this Court renders.
Therefore, this Court has no basis upon which to grant a motion to dismiss the appeal at
this juncture." Id. at 743.
41. See Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138 (1897) (absence of one year); cf. State v.
Dalton, 185 N.C. 606, 115 S.E. 881 (1923) (per curiam) (appeal docketed three years
late).
42. Bonahan v. Nebraska, 125 U.S. 692 (1887); Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97
(1876); Gentry v. State, 371 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963); Vega v. State, 103
Tex. Crim. 308, 280 S.W. 824 (1926).
43. Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189 (per curiam), cert. dismissed, 338 U.S.
883 (1949); Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138 (1897); United States v. Dawson, 350 F.2d
396 (6th Cir. 1965) (per curiam); Mitchell v. State, 294 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 1974); State v.
John, 60 Wis. 2d 730, 211 N.W.2d 463 (1973). But see Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396
U.S. 365 (1970) (per curiam). For a discussion of mootness see 41 I-Dv. L. REv. 534
(1927); 34 HARv. L. REV. 416 (1920). For a discussion of the related "case and
controversy" question of escape as raised by the Eisler case, supra, see 48 MICH. L. REV.
111 (1949).
44. Mitchell v. State, 294 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 1974); State v. Jacobs, 107 N.C. 772, 11
S.E. 962 (1890); Hurt v. State, 72 Okla. Crim. 318, 115 P.2d 919 (1941.), noted in 5 U.
DET. L.J. 77 (1941); Kilpatrick v. State, 71 Okla. Crim. 125, 109 P.2d 514 (1941),
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pia of others including forfeiture,46 lack of standing,47 implied dismis-
sal, 48 loss of an indispensable party,49 lack of mutuality,50 breach of
condition,5 "disentitlement", 52 and even contempt of court 3 and ob-
struction of justice. ' The ground of no jurisdiction, sometimes phrased
in terms of the Smith rationale of nonenforceability of judgment, is the
most common, and is the nominal basis for dismissal in Texas."5 These
distinctions between legal theories are often academic,6 but they are
sometimes decisive. 57
Finally, courts support their dismissal decisions with various policy
considerations. Most of these fall into two categories: concern for order-
ly appellate procedure and concern for the proper methods of dealing
with criminal escapes. Included in the first are the policies favoring
prompt appeals,58 the policies against deciding moot cases, 19 and related
noted in 12 OKLA. B.A.J. 439 (1941); State v. Mosley, 84 Wash. 2d 608, 528 P.2d 986
(1974); State v. John, 60 Wis. 2d 730, 211 N.W.2d 463 (1973). But see Ruetz v. Lash,
500 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1974) (collecting cases); White v. State, 514 P.2d 814 (Alas.
1973). See generally 39 CoLUM. L. Rlv. 1244 (1939).
45. Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138 (1897); Mitchell v. State, 294 So. 2d 395 (Fla.
1974); Kirkman v. State, 232 Ind. 563, 114 N.E.2d 878 (1953); State v. DeVane, 166
N.C. 281, 81 S.E. 293 (1914); State v. John, 60 Wis. 2d 730, 211 N.V1.2d 463 (1973).
But see McKinney v. United States, 403 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1968).
46. Shelton v. State, 131 Ga. App. 786, 206 S.E.2d 654 (1974).
47. Lambert v. State, 21 Ala. App. 373, 108 So. 631 (1926); State ex rel. Ruetz v.
La Grange Cir. Ct., 258 Ind. 354,281 N.E.2d 106 (1972).
48. Cf. Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189 (per curiam), cert. dismissed, 338
U.S. 883 (1949).
49. Cf. State v. Carter, 299 A.2d 891 (Me. 1973).
50. Johnson v. Laird, 432 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Shapiro, 391
F. Supp. 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). This ground means that a court is unwilling to allow a
defendant to gain the benefit of a favorable result when he is unwilling to risk the burden
of an adverse decision.
51. Stevens v. State, 26 Ohio App. 53, 159 N.E. 834 (1927); Trotter v. State, 334
P.2d 452 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959).
52. Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365 (1970) (per curiam).
53. Crum v. Commonwealth, 232 Ky. 331, 23 S.W.2d 550 (1930); State v. Carter,
98 Mo. 431, 11 S.W. 979 (1889); State v. Jacobs, 107 N.C. 772, 11 S.E. 962 (1890); see
Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138, 141 (1897).
54. State v. John, 60 Wis. 2d 730,211 N.W.2d 463 (1973).
55. TEx. CODE CRlM. PRo. ANN. art. 44.09 (1966); Gentry v. State, 371 S.W.2d
566 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963).
56. For example, Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138 (1897), seems to be based on four
or five separate theories.
57. See, e.g., White v. State, 514 P.2d 814 (Alas. 1973) (escape by itself held not
to constitute waiver). Most escapees probably do not voluntarily and knowingly give up
their statutory rights of appeal. Cf. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
Furthermore the escapee's return to custody would seem to render most of the grounds
inapplicable.
58. Such as the court's interest in judicial economy, Loyd v. State, 19 Tex. Ct. App.
R. 137, 155 (1885), and similar interests of other appellants. See 39 COLUM. L. Rav.
1244, 1246 n.15 (1939).
59. Such as judicial economy and assuring vigorous adversary presentation. See
note 43 supra.
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arguments. 60 In the second category, some courts stress the impropriety
of allowing escapees to "blackmail" the state or dictate the terms of their
surrender. 1 But what occasionally stands out most sharply is an element
of punishment or retribution. 2 In some cases, dismissal of appeal is
viewed as an appropriate way of punishing either the escape itself6 3 or
the contempt of court or authority which the escape may represent. 4
Even if not directed to do so by statute, many courts seem compelled
to mete out procedural punishments for fugitives even before they are
tried for the crime of escape.63
This judicial condemnation of escape has been given a major boost
in Estelle v. Dorrough.6 By upholding a statute which allows the
dismissal of an appeal despite the early recapture of the escapee, the
Supreme Court has signalled a significant extension of an accepted but
heretofore limited practice. First, the Texas statute does not limit the
applicability of the dismissal rule to appellant-escapees who are beyond
the court's jurisdiction at the hearing date, as was the situation in most
prior cases such as Smith."' The fact that the escapee is back in the
custody and control of the court and therefore subject to its decrees is no
longer of any consequence. Secondly, and likewise irrelevant to the
Court, is the fact that the escape may have no dilatory effect on the
appellate process, which in effect removes the limitation implicit in
Allen for dismissal only after a long absence by the escapee.0 9 Thirdly,
an escapee's intent to remain a permanent fugitive is not required.
Although not at issue in Estelle, the dismissal rule apparently would
apply with equal force to an escapee on the verge of surrender at the
time of recapture.7"
60. E.g., the fact that appeals are different from trials, State v. Jacobs, 107 N.C.
772, 11 S.E. 962 (1890), and the asserted analogy between civil and criminal dismissals.
Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138 (1897); State v. DeVane, 166 N.C. 281, 81 S.E, 293
(1914).
61. See, e.g., Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138 (1897).
62. See, e.g., id. at 141; cf. Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970) (per
curiam).
63. Cf. Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. at 366.
64. Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. at 141; see note 53 supra.
65. The escapee need not be tried for escape under the Texas statute. A sheriff's
affidavit is the only proof required that an escape has occurred, and it is sufficient to
authorize dismissal of the appeal. Tnx. CODE CiM. PRo. ANN. art. 44.10 (1966);
Cuevas v. State, 467 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Powell v. State, 99 Tex. Crim.
276, 269 S.W. 443 (1925). This issue, however, is almost never raised. See, e.g., Allen v.
Georgia, 166 U.S. 138 (1897).
66. 420 U.S. at 534.
67. See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
68. See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
69. See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
70. The Texas statute makes no provision for an inquiry into the escapee's state of
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From the standpoint of constitutional theory, Estelle is neither
inconsistent with nor an extension of prior law. No definitive new tests
or principles were enunciated or novel approaches taken. Rather, the
Court continued to employ the traditional two-tier equal protection
analysis7' often used in challenges to state legislative classifications.
Applying this approach to the Texas statute, the Estelle majority reject-
ed the "strict scrutiny" standard of review by apparently reasoning that
since a criminal defendant's interest in appellate review is not constitu-
tionally guaranteed, 7 2 a fortiori it is not "fundamental." This is consist-
ent with the Court's recent hesitation to expand the list of fundamental
interests. 73 Rejection of strict scrutiny, of course, generally means ac-
ceptance of the "rational basis" standard of review.7 4 In accepting this
standard, the majority's holding that the Texas classifications were
rationally related to state interests 5 seems to be consistent with the
Court's usual allowance of wide latitude to state legislative choices under
this branch of the test."
mind. Such an inquiry would seem to be forbidden in light of the fact that escape
deprives the court of jurisdiction at the outset. TEx. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 44.09
(1966). One case, Leonard v. State, 53 Tex. Crim. 187, 109 S.W. 149 (1908), suggested
that intent to surrender might prevent dismissal, but this is contrary to the terms of the
statute, and the case was criticized in Gibson v. State, 83 Tex. Crim. 345, 203 S.W. 893
(1918). At any rate, the escapee in Estelle apparently did not allege that he was ready to
surrender.
71. 420 U.S. at 539. This approach to equal protection can be phrased as an
inquiry in the following form:
Does the statutory classification affect a "fundamental interest" or is it
based on "suspect criteria!'?
(1) If so, then the "strict scrutiny" standard of review applies, meaning that
the classification is permissible (in equal protection terms) only if justi-
fied by a "compelling state interest."
(2) If not, then the looser "rational basis" standard of review applies, meaning
that the classification is permissible if rationally related to legitimate state
purposes.
See United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973); Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658 (1969)
(Harlan, J., dissenting). For a discussion of two-tier equal protection see Developments
in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L REv. 1065 (1969). For a broad discussion of
equal protection in general see Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the
Laws, 37 CALIF. L RaV. 341 (1949).
72. 420 U.S. at 536; see cases cited note 78 infra.
73. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). But see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973).
74. See note 71 supra.
75. 420 U.S. at 537. The state interests mentioned were deterring escapes, encour-
aging surrenders, and expediting appeals. Id. The classifications created by the statute are
listed in note 15 supra.
76. 420 U.S. at 538 n.7; see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961);
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Railway Express Agency v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
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Although not momentous in constitutional terms, the potentially
great impact of Estelle to criminal appellate procedure demands close
examination of the Court's application of the equal protection analysis
in the case. Beginning with the rejection of strict scrutiny review, the
majority's declaration that there is no constitutional right of appeal77 has
indeed been echoed through the years,7 but it has rarely appeared as
more than a bald assertion devoid of reasoning. Federal appeal is a
matter of statutory79 and decisional ° right and all states provide for ap-
peal by statute."' The Supreme Court itself has greatly expanded appel-
late access in recent years by requiring states to furnish free transcripts8 2
and counsel83 to indigents on their first appeal of right.84 Also, the
Court now recognizes a generalized "right of access" to the courts 5 that
is grounded in the equal protection clause: "[A]venues [of appellate
review] must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that can only
impede the open and equal access to the courts. 8 8
77. More precisely, "no federal constitutional right to state appellate review of state
criminal convictions." 420 U.S. at 536.
78. See, e.g., Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973) (per curiam); Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 (1956); National Union of Maritime Cooks v. Arnold, 348
U.S. 37, 43 (1954); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894).
79. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1294, 2106 (1970); FED. R. App. P. 4(b).
80. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962); McKinney v. United States,
403 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1968). But cf. United States v. Swigart, 490 F.2d 914 (10th Cir.
1973).
81. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27 (Cum. Supp. 1974); Tnx. CODE CRIM. PRO.
ANN. art. 44.02 (1966). See generally A.B.A. PRoJEcT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE-STANDARDS RELATING TO CRIMINAL APPEALS (Approved Draft
1970).
82. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See also Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S.
189 (1971) (collecting cases).
83. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). See also Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967).
84. But not on discretionary appeal. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), noted in
53 N.C.L. REV. 560 (1975).
85. See Abram, Access to the Judicial Process, 6 GA. L. REv. 247 (1972);
Wedlock, The Emerging Rights of the Confined: Access to the Courts and Counsel, 25
S.C.L Rnv. 605 (1973); Note, The Expansion of a Prisoner's Right of Access to the
Courts, 1 CAPITAL U.L. REv. 192 (1972).
86. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966), quoted in Blackledge v. Perry,
417 U.S. 21, 25 n.4 (1974); Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 193 (1971); North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724 (1969), and Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S.
458, 459 (1969) (per curiam). In addition to indigents, the "right of access" rule has
been applied to prisoners in various contexts. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969);
Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951); Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F.
Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (per curiam), aff'd sub nom. Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S.
15 (1971) (per curiam). Other cases have acknowledged the importance of appeal in
general: "Justice demands an independent and objective assessment of a district judge's
appraisal of his own conduct of a criminal trial." Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S.
438, 455-56 (Stewart, J., concurring). Also, some authorities have expressed the view
that the right of appeal is a fundamental aspect of due process. See, e.g., State ex rel.
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In sum, the Court in Estelle failed to take note of the constellation
of recent developments concerning appellate access and the de facto
right of appeal in current practice. Although a full inquiry into whether
appellate review should be a "fundamental" interest is beyond the scope
of this note, a first look suggests than an appeal from a criminal
conviction is at least as fundamental as certain other interests so recog-
nized in recent years, such as travel87 and privacy.88 When a defendant
faces years in prison, denial of review of his possibly erroneous convic-
tion seems just as serious as denial of these other rights.
Also questionable is the Estelle Court's application of the "rational
basis" standard of equal protection review. Although a large portion of
the opinion dealt with this issue, the Court's conclusion that state
interests were rationally served s9 by a statute allowing dismissal for
escape despite recapture is unconvincing. In the first place, deterrence of
prison escape may be a proper state interest, but there is little support
for any rational relation between dismissal of a pending appeal and
deterrence of escape. Not only is there virtually no case law to support
this proposition" but there is also a dearth of empirical data. A statisti-
cal showing by the Court of some kind, such as one indicating that
dismissal practice reduced the number of escapes, would have been most
persuasive. The omission of such data is an unfortunate departure from
some recent cases in which the Court looked at the practical effect of a
statute as well as its theoretical effect.9 At least one "statistic," the large
amount of litigation under the Texas statute, belies the contention that
the threat of dismissal deters escapes. The escapee in Estelle certainly
was not deterred.
Statistics and precedent aside, common sense would seem to sug-
gest that no real deterrence results from the Texas statute. If the
potential escapee is even aware of the existence of a statute on the
subject, dismissal of his appeal is probably the least of his concerns. Of
Ruetz v. La Grange Cir. Ct., 258 Ind. 354, 357, 281 N.E.2d 106, 109 (1972) (DeBruler,
J., dissenting).
87. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
88. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
89. 420 U.S. at 537.
90. The majority cited only one case for its deterrence argument, namely Rodriguez
v. State, 457 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970). See 420 U.S. at 537 n.5. Rodriguez,
however, is totally unsupportive. Not only does the case fail even to mention deterrence,
but it does not even involve the same statute as Estelle. No case could be found which
suggests that the threat of dismissal deters escapes. One case suggests the opposite. See
White v. State, 514 P.2d 814, 815 (Alas. 1973).
91. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 537
(1973); cf. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 510 (1974).
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doubtful validity is the majority's statement in Estelle that escapes are
"reasonably calculated to disrupt" the appellate process.9 2 Why would a
convict deliberately sabotage his only chance of obtaining legal free-
dom? The fact that such sabotage in fact occurs is evidence only of the
escapee's confused state of mind, perhaps brought on by his motives for
escape--desire for freedom, family troubles, denial of parole hearing,
threats on his life or others.93 One commentator has pointed out that "to
the extent that psychological pressure affects the convict, the rational
basis of behavior which a deterrent theory presupposes is lacking."94
In addition to deterrence, the Court in Estelle mentioned orderly
appellate procedure as a state interest that was furthered by the Texas
dismissal statute.95 But again accepting this as a legitimate purpose, the
allegedly rational relationship between dismissal of appeal and orderly
procedure is questionable on two grounds. The first, which the Court
did not address, is the needlessness of punishing a defendant whose
escape has not been shown to prejudice the State's case.96 Although
prejudice to the State could indeed result from a long absence by the
escapee, 97 prejudice after two days would be rare. The second reason,
also omitted from the Court's discussion and perhaps the Court's most
flagrant omission, is the reality that two days of an appellant's absence
during his escape is hardly likely to even delay his appeal, much less
disrupt the judicial process. Texas, like most states, allows a ten-day
period for the filing of all appeals.9 Furthermore it has been estimated
that even under ideal conditions the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
does not hear a case until 165 days after conviction. 9 This suggests
a crucial distinction between the one year interval between escape and
recapture in Allen v. Georgia'"0 (relied upon by the majority), which
92. 420 U.S. at 541.
93. For a discussion of some psychological and social factors behind escapes see
Renteria and Holt, The Anatomy of an Escape, 33 AM. J. CoRRECnONS 10 (Jan./Feb.
1971). See also Loving, Stockwell and Dobbins, Factors Associated with Escape Behav-
ior of Prison Inmates, 23 FED. PROBATION 49 (Sept 1959).
94. 39 COLuM. L. REV. 1244, 1245 n.9 (1939).
95. 420 U.S. at 537.
96. See White v. State, 514 P.2d 814 (Alas. 1973).
97. Such as loss of evidence. See 39 CoLuM. L. REv. 1244, 1246 n.15 (1939).
98. Tnx. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 44.08(c) (1966).
99. Reid, The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, 44 TEXAS L. Rnv. 983, 1016
(1966). It is true that article 44.23 of the Texas Code authorizes the advancing of cases
out of their normal docket slots but this is almost never done. See, e.g., Gaines v. State,
58 Tex. Crim. 631, 127 S.W. 181 (1910), in which the court refused to advance an
appeal even though it was a homicide case and the accused was a member of the Texas
state legislature.
100. 166 U.S. 138 (1897); see text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
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could very well have delayed the appeal, and the two day interval in
Estelle.
It should also be stressed that there is no relation between a
dismissal rule and the purposes of deterrence or orderly judicial proce-
dure when a felon can escape after conviction but before sentencing or
before filing the record on appeal and yet still be heard by the appellate
court. As the Texas statute has been construed, escaping felons can be
heard on appeal after their recapture if the record on appeal has not
been filed, even if notice of appeal was given before the escape.""1 The
irrationality of these distinctions is obvious.
Finally, it is unfortunate that the Court failed to discuss alternative
measures available to states for dealing with prison escapes. Reduction
of the number of escapes, for example, would probably be better
achieved by increasing prison security, improving prison conditions, and
decreasing prison sentences. Not only would these methods have a far
more direct relation to escape than dismissal of appeal, but they would
also be much less severe to the prisoner.102 Furthermore, if escapes
continued to occur despite these efforts, they could be punished by the
substantive penalties of fine or imprisonment or increased sentence
already allowed by common law'03 and many state statutes.10 4
As a result of Estelle, Texas appellate calendars may be less
crowded and non-escaping appellants may not have their appeals de-
layed by escapees still at large. But the felon who escapes, for whatever
reason, will find his statutory right of review of one offense entirely cut
off by his subsequent commission of a wholly unrelated offense. This is
true even if the felon is never convicted or even prosecuted for the
second offense of escape, 0 5 and it may be true even if the escape is
justified.10 6 This is not to condone escape. It is a serious offense which
101. McGee v. State, 445 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) (appeal was
dismissed on other grounds); Walters v. State, 18 Tex. Crim. 8 (1885). See also
Cushman v. State, 493 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
102. It is true that, in equal protection litigation, the availability of less restrictive
alternatives has traditionally been a concern of the Court only in "strict scrutiny" cases
such as those involving first amendment rights. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407-08
(1963) (collecting cases). But it should also be a factor in "rational basis" cases. When
the alternative chosen by the legislature is of minimal rationality to start with, and use of
the alternative greatly affects individual interests which, although may not be "funda-
mental," are nevertheless important, and there are several eminently feasible, superior,
and much less severe alternatives available to the state, then such alternatives should at
least be considered by the Court in an equal protection challenge.
103. See note 1 supra.
104. See note 2 supra.
105. See note 65 supra.
106. Justification for escape, though rare, has been found in some instances, such as
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should be punished, but the penalty should be substantive, and only
after a due process conviction at a separate trial for the escape. Some
procedural sanctions such as conditional dismissal of appeal may be
justifiable when the escapee is still at large, but never after recapture
when personal jurisdiction has reattached, especially if the appeal has
not been delayed.
The preclusion of review allowed by Estelle means that a prison
term must be served by the escapee regardless of errors in his original
conviction which, had an appeal been allowed, might have resulted in a
new trial or outright reversal. Apart from this borderline due process
consideration, there is a serious equal protection issue not fully faced by
the majority. As Justice Stewart indicates in his dissent,0 7 a real possi-
bility exists of two prisoners escaping at the same time and in the same
manner and yet suffering completely disparate sentences dependent
upon the fortuity of errors at trial, and wholly unrelated to the gravity of
the offense of escape. Although the majority in Estelle v. Dorrough
considered the interests of appellate courts in judicial economy, the
interests of other appellants in expeditious appeals, and the interests of
the state and the public in deterring escape, the most important
interest-that of an inmate under a quarter-century prison term in
having justice done-has been sadly neglected.
OTHO B. Ross, m
Federal Income Taxation-Transfers to and Leasebacks from a
Short-Term Trust
For almost thirty years' tax planners have been frustrated by the
judicial confusion surrounding the deductibility of rental payments
made by a settlor for property used in his trade or business which he has
transferred to and leased back from a short-term trust.2 To date, two
for duress due to homosexual threats. People v. Harmon, 53 Mich. App. 482, 220
N.W.2d 212 (1974), noted in 43 U. Cun. L. REv. 956 (1974). The escapee in Estelle
apparently did not seek to justify his escape.
107. 420 U.S. at 542.
1. The first case to deal directly with this problem was Skemp v. Commissioner,
168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948).
2. Deductions of rental payments for property used in the taxpayer's trade or
business are generally allowed under section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954. That section provides in part:
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somewhat divergent lines of decision have emerged.3 Those cases allow-
ing the deduction as an "ordinary and necessary" business expense have
focused on the leaseback and have found "necessity" in the settlor's legal
obligation to pay rent.4 As part of this analysis courts so holding have
emphasized the identity of an independent trustee who has the power
and fiduciary obligation to enforce payment of the rent. Those cases
denying the deduction have rejected this bifurcated approach and have
viewed the transfer and leaseback as single steps in one integrated
transaction. So viewed, it has been held that the transfer and leaseback is
often merely a method of allocating the settlor's income to the trust
beneficiaries and is void of business purpose. If the transaction as a
whole is void of business purpose, rent paid pursuant to the lease cannot
be a "necessary" expense.5 In Perry v. United States" the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit followed the decisions that deny
the deduction and held that the active independence, not the identity, of
the trustee is the controlling factor.7
(a) In General.-There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business, including-
(3) rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition to the
continued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or business, of prop-
erty to which the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title or in which
he has no equity.
Prior versions of section 162, applicable to some cases hereinafter discussed, are
comparable.
3. The line of demarcation between these two sets of cases has been described as
"thin." Alden B. Oakes, 44 T.C. 524, 529 (1965); see Oliver, Income Tax Aspects of
Gifts and Leasebacks of Business Property in Trust, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 21 (1965).
4. See, e.g., Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 814 (1950); Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948); C. James
Mathews, 61 T.C. 12 (1973); Alden B. Oakes, 44 T.C. 524 (1965); Albert T. Felix, 21
T.C. 794 (1954). In several cases the identity of the trustee has been a factor in denying
the deduction. See, e.g., Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965) (grantor was trustee); White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398
(2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 928 (1952) (grantors wife was trustee); Jack
Wiles, 59 T.C. 289 (1972), aff'd mem., 491 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1974) (grantor was
trustee); Sidney W. Penn, 51 T.C. 144 (1968) (grantor was trustee); Irvine K. Furman,
45 T.C. 360 (1966), affd per curiam, 381 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1967) (grantor's wife was
trustee).
5. Perry v. United States, No. 74-1852 (4th Cir., July 29, 1975); see, e.g., Audano
v. United States, 428 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1970); cf. Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341
F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965). Compare Chace v. United
States, 303 F. Supp. 513 (M.D. Fla. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 422 F.2d 292 (5th Cir.
1970) with Hall v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 584 (N.D.N.Y. 1962). See also Jack
Wiles, 59 T.C. 289 (1972), aff'd mem., 491 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1974); Sidney W. Penn,
51 T.C. 144 (1968); Irvine K. Furman, 45 T.C. 360 (1966), aff'd per curiam, 381 F.2d
22 (5th Cir. 1967).
6. No. 74-1852 (4th Cir., July 29, 1975).
7. Id. at 8.
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The taxpayers in Perry were two physicians practicing medicine in
a partnership located in Louisburg, North Carolina. In 1963 construc-
tion was completed on an office building on property they had acquired
as tenants in common. Since that time the building had been used solely
for their medical practice."
In 1968 each taxpayer established a Clifford trust9 for the benefit
of his minor children. Except for differences in beneficiaries and in
duration,' 0 the two trusts were identical and the same bank was named
as trustee. Broad administrative powers were granted to the corporate
trustee and remainders were reserved in the grantors. Each physician's
undivided interest in the office building was the sole asset of his trust.
Prior to the formal conveyance of the res into trust, a. leaseback of
the office building was arranged with the corporate trustee. This arrange-
ment covered all the terms of the lease," and the lease was executed
8. Dr. Medders, Dr. Perry's partner, filed a separate refund suit, No. 74-1853 (4th
Cir., July 29, 1975). In each case the taxpayer's wife was joined since each couple filed
joint tax returns for the year in question. The two cases were consolidated for trial. No.
74-1852 at 3.
9. The parties stipulated that the short-term trusts were valid under the "Clif-
ford" sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (sections 671 through 678). No. 74-
1852 at 3. These sections require that a qualifying trust have a minimum duration of ten
years, list certain powers that the grantor cannot retain, and prohibit the use of trust
income for the grantor's benefit. If a trust qualifies, the income therefrom is taxed to the
trust and not to the grantor. Thus, the Clifford trust coupled with a leaseback to the
grantor has been a popular means of intra-family income splitting among those taxpayers
whose wealth is tied up in business property. Oliver, supra note 3, at 22; Note, The Use
of Business Property as Short-Term Trust Corpus, 19 VAND. L. REv. 811 (1966). The
taxpayer who owns business property can maximize tax savings by transferring such
property to a short-term trust, retaining a reversion, and taking back a lease on the
property. If the trust qualifies under the Clifford sections the income from the property
is taxed to the trust, presumably at a lower rate. And, at least in 1957, the grantor-tenant
could be reasonably confident of getting a deduction for rentals paid to the trust under
section 162(a) (3) if the rent was reasonable and the trustee was an entity with which he
had no affiliation. John T. Potter, 27 T.C. 200 (1956), acquiescing 1957-2 CuM. BULL.
6; Oliver, supra note 3, at 21.
Some commentators have argued that the tests for determining under the Clifford
sections to whom short-term trust income will be taxed should be used to determine the
deductibility of rentals paid to the trust under a leaseback situation. See Oliver, id. at 31;
Note, 19 VAND. L. REv., supra, at 822. While this may seem to be a logical approach it
has consistently been rejected by the courts. See, e.g., Perry v. United States, No. 74-
1852. This rejection is based on legislative history which specifically denies the applica-
bility of sections 671 through 678 to this situation and which has been expressly adopted
by the Treasury. Id. at 3 n.2, quoting S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 365 (1954);
Treas. Reg. § 1.671-1(c) (1956).
10. The Perry trust was to terminate ten years and one day from its establishment.
The Medders trust was to terminate in fourteen years. Each lease was for a term equal to
the life of the trust. Perry v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.C. 1974).
11. Under the prearranged lease the trustee was required to pay all real property
taxes and to make all exterior repairs. He reserved the right to declare the lease
terminated upon the taxpayer's non-payment of rent. Each taxpayer agreed to pay his
one-half of all utility expenses, to make interior repairs, and to pay a monthly rent of
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contemporaneously with the conveyance into trust. For the taxable year
1969 the taxpayers deducted under section 162(a) (3) of the Internal
Revenue Code'2 the rental payments made to the trustee. These de-
ductions were not allowed and the taxpayers paid the additional tax.
Each brought a refund suit in federal district court.13 That court, while
acknowledging that there were two divergent views'14 concerning the
deductibility of such rental payments, felt that the Perry facts were
squarely within the line of cases allowing the deduction on the basis of
the existence of an independent, non-related trustee.' 5
On appeal the Fourth Circuit reversed. Rejecting the lower court's
analysis, the Fourth Circuit focused on the realities of the entire transac-
tion.' 6 It concluded that, under the Perry facts, even though the corpo-
rate trustee was an independent entity, he had no actual powers or du-
ties other than rent collection and disbursement to the beneficiaries.
The trust principal was irrevocably reserved to the grantor's possession
from the moment the trust was created.' 7 Thus there "was literally no
area in which the broad powers of management vested in the bank as
trustee could operate. Its 'independence' from the settlors was largely
iluusory .... ,,'8 The Fourth Circuit concluded that, when viewed in
its entirety,' there was no real business purpose to the transaction."
two hundred dollars. It was stipulated by the parties that this rental was reasonable.
Perry v. United States, No. 74-1852. For the importance of reasonable rent in determin-
ing deductibility under section 162(a)(3), see Audano v. United States, 428 F.2d 251,
259 (5th Cir. 1970); Oliver, supra note 3, at 35; Note, 19 VArN. L. REv., supra note 9,
at 819.
12. See note 2 supra.
13. Perry v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.C. 1974). See note 8 supra.
Cross motions for summary judgment were filed on the stipulated facts. From an adverse
judgment the government appealed.
14. In the district court the government had argued that the rental payments were
not deductible because the taxpayers had a reversion in the trust corpus. Thus, the
government contended, they had an "equity" in the property expressly forbidden by
section 162(a)(3). See note 2 supra. The district court rejected this argument, and this
ruling was not appealed. 376 F. Supp. at 19-20. For an analysis of this argument,
compare C. James Mathews, 61 T.C. 12 (1973) and Alden B. Oakes, 44 T.C. 524
(1965) with Hall v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 584 (N.D.N.Y. 1962) and Sidney W.
Penn, 51 T.C. 144 (1968).
15. 376 F. Supp. at 19.
16. Perry v. United States, No. 74-1852 at 9.
17. Id. at 7, quoting Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440, 443 (5th Cir.
1965).
18. No. 74-1852 at 8.
19. The Fourth Circuit explicitly rejected the "bifurcated" business purpose test as
articulated in Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948). No. 74-1852 at 9.
See also Alden B. Oakes, 44 T.C. 524 (1965). Under the "bifurcated" approach the
transaction is viewed as it existed after the transfer into trust has been completed. Thus
the settlor's need for office space supplies the "business purpose" for his renting of the
building and, therefore, the rent should be deductible under section 162(a) (3).
20. It is well established that for an expenditure to be "necessary" within the
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Therefore, no expenses incident to elements of the transaction could
be "ordinary and necessary" business expenses deductible under sec-
tion 162.21
Before considering the import of the Perry decision, it is necessary
to examine briefly the two lines of transfer and leaseback cases that
preceded it. The Seventh Circuit was first to face the present problem in
the leading case of Skemp v. Commissioner.2 The taxpayer had estab
lished an irrevocable, twenty-year trust to which he conveyed the build-
ing that housed his medical offices. s3 Upon termination of the trust the
corpus was to be distributed to the beneficiaries by the corporate trustee.
Prior to the transfer the taxpayer had arranged to reserve the right to
rent all or part of the building from the trustee for a ten-year renewable
term. However, the rental amount was to be determined by the trustee.24
Under these facts the Seventh Circuit reversed a divided Tax Court25
and held that the rental payments made by the taxpayer to the trust were
deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses.2 6 in so holding,
the court of appeals emphasized that the existence of a corporate trustee
negated the Commissioner's contention that the taxpayer had "fixed"
the rental amount. The court reasoned that such a contention could be
valid only if the trustee had breached its fiduciary duty. 7 The Seventh
Circuit also rejected the Commissioner's "incomplete gift" argument
since the taxpayer had irrevocably conveyed the property while retaining
no reversion.2 8 Finally, the court was faced with the Commissioner's
meaning of section 162, there must have been a "business purpose' for making that
expenditure. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); see Treas. Reg. § 1.269-2(b)
(1962). What is at issue in the Perry case is at what point in the transaction that test is
to be applied.
21. No. 74-1852 at 9.
22. 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948).
23. Dr. Skemp used only part of his building. The remainder he rented to third
persons. Id. at 599.
24. The Tax Court appears to have assumed that the rent Dr. Skemp paid was
reasonable. A.A. Skemp, 8 T.C. 415, 422-23 (1947). See note 11 supra.
25. There were two dissenters in the Tax Court. Tyson, J., concurred in the opin-
ion of Black, J. Black's dissent, upon which the court of appeals looked with favor,
emphasized that the taxpayer had retained no reversion, had paid reasonable rent, and
was legally obligated by his lease from the corporate trustee, in arguing for the
deduction. A.A. Skemp, 8 T.C. 415, 422-23 (1947).
26. Skemp was decided under Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 23(2) (1) (A), 53
Stat. 12 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a) (3)). See note 2 supra.
27. 168 F.2d at 599. There was no evidence of such a breach. Id.
28. Id. at 600. The "incomplete gift" argument asserted that since the grantor
retained dominion and control over the trust corpus, the gift was not completed. Thus if
complete ownership had not been transferred, rental payments made to the trust Were not
"necessary." Rev. Rul. 54-9, 1954-1 Cum. BuLL. 20, cited in, Note, 19 VAND. L REV.
supra note 9, at 814 & n.29.
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contention that the rental payments were not "necessary" since the
taxpayer had made a voluntary conveyance of this business property
and it was this conveyance that made the rentals necessary. This argu-
ment was implicitly rejected. The court found "necessity" under section
162 in the taxpayer's legal obligation to pay rent.29
Skemp has been sporadically followed since it was decided. It has
been cited as authority for purposes of determining the necessity of rent,
for viewing the transaction from the point in time after the transfer into
trust is made,"' for considering the identity of the trustee as "crucial,""'
"pivotal, '32 and "controlling"33 in determining his independence,84 and
for viewing the retention by the grantor of no reversion as indicative of
release of all control over the property.85
The leading decision in the line of cases which denies tie deduction
under similar facts is Van Zandt v. Commissioner.8 In that case the
taxpayer, a physician, conveyed to two Clifford trusts8" the office build-
ing in which he practiced and the equipment that it contained. The
trusts were irrevocable and were to last for just over ten years. The
taxpayer was trustee for both trusts. Contemporaneously with the con-
veyance the taxpayer, as trustee, leased the building and the equipment
back to himself, as an individual. The Commissioner disallowed the
deductions the taxpayer had claimed for the rent he had paid to himself
as trustee.
The Tax Court denied the deduction, 8 distinguishing Skemp since
in that case there was an independent trustee.39 The Tax Court noted
29. "While the taxpayer voluntarily created the situation which required the
payment of rent, the fact remains that the situation created did require the payments."
168 F.2d at 600. This approach, viewing the single element, the leaseback, to determine
necessity under section 162, is referred to as the "bifurcated" approach. See note 19
supra. E.g., No. 74-1852 at 9.
30. Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d 1155, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 1972); Brown v.
Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926, 929 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950); C. James
Mathews, 61 T.C. 12, 18 (1973); Alden B. Oakes, 44 T.C. 524, 530 (1965).
31. C. James Mathews, 61 T.C. 12, 18 (1973).
32. Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 1972).
33. Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926, 929 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
814 (1950).
34. See cases cited note 4 supra.
35. Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 1972); Brown v.
Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926, 929 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950); Alden B.
Oakes, 44 T.C. 524, 530 (1965); John T. Potter, 27 T.C. 200, 213-14 (1956); Albert T.
Felix, 21 T.C. 794, 803-04 (1954).
36. 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965).
37. See note 9 supra.
38. .L. Van Zandt, 40 T.C. 824 (1963).
39. Id. at 830.
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that, when the overall effect of this transaction was considered, the result
was simply a shift in family income.40 Thus, since the taxpayer would
not have been required to pay rent before the transaction, and since the
transaction had no business purpose, the rents he paid were not "neces-
sary" under section 162.41
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. That court followed the Tax Courts
analysis and viewed the transaction as a series of integrated steps.42 So
viewed, the court of appeals could find no reason for the transfer and
leaseback other than an attempt to maximize tax savings. 4 '1 Skemp was
distinguished on its facts." Indeed, the Fifth Circuit thought its holding
in Van Zandt was not inconsistent with Skemp since the existence of
trust income other than the rents paid by Dr. Skemp could provide
management of the entire building as a valid business purpose.45 In
comparing the Van Zandt facts to those in Skemp, the court found the
prearranged leaseback, which included in its terms the amount of rent to
be paid, left the trustee with no active duties to perform in the interest of
the beneficiaries. Since the trustee in Van Zandt was also the grantor,
and since he had nothing to do but collect and disburse predetermined
income, the Seventh Circuit concluded that he could not be independ-
ent. Coupling this lack of independence with a lack of necessity, the
court concluded that the deductions were properly denied.
Van Zandt, like Skemp, has been widely followed.40 Recently the
Fifth Circuit reaffirmed several of its conclusions concerning transfers
and leasebacks first articulated in Van Zandt. In Audano v. United
States,47 upon very similar facts, the court noted that even if the rental
amount was reasonable, no deduction could be allowed if the obligation
to pay "was created solely for the purpose of effectively creating a
camouflaged assignment of income."4 s Such payments, the court con-
cluded, were not "necessary" within the meaning of section 162.19
In Perry the Fourth Circuit, faced with these conflicting prece-
dents, chose to follow the Van Zandt analysis.5 0 Using that approach,
40. Id.
41. Id. at 831.
42. 341 F.2d at 443.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 442.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., cases cited note 5 supra.
47. 428 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1970).
48. Id. at 256-57.
49. In denying the deduction the Fifth Circuit emphasized that the trustee had
done nothing to protect the beneficiaries' interests. Id. at 258.
50. No. 74-1852 at 8.
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the court viewed the transfer and leaseback as integrated steps in a
single transaction.51 In order for the rent payments to be deductible
there had to have been a real business purpose for the initial transfer
into trust to make the subsequent rental payments "necessary."5 2 Under
the Perry facts no such purpose was found.58
There has been substantial controversy in the courts 4 and in the
literature55 concerning the point at which the business purpose test
should be applied in a transfer and leaseback situation. Some early
commentators56 vigorously argued in favor of the "bifurcated" approach
followed in Skemp. They reasoned that demanding a business purpose
for the transfer into trust was inappropriate, especially in intra-family
arrangements where a decision to create a trust for the benefit of the
natural objects of one's bounty is seldom made for business reasons.
Thus, they argued, the test proved "too rigorous. '5 7 On the other hand,
applying the test at the time of the leaseback appears to provide a
business purpose for all such transactions. In most cases there would be
business purpose in renting office space. Therefore, all such rental
payments would be "necessary."
Both of these positions are supported by caselaw. "8 In choosing the
Ilan Zandt approach, the Fourth Circuit relied on its customary view of
the overall effect of a transaction. 59 Though there appears to be funda-
mental logic to this view, the court offered no analysis or policy for its
choice. What is clear, however, from the Perry opinion, is that a transfer
into trust with a subsequent leaseback should pass muster under the
business purpose test as applied by the Fourth Circuit if (a) the trust
income consists of something more than the rents paid by the settlor,
and (b) the settlor has retained no reversion.60
The selection of the two factors that the Fourth Circuit described
in Perry as "indices of a transaction having a real business purpose
51. Id. at 7.
52. Id. at 9. See note 20 supra.
53. No. 74-1852 at 8.
54. For cases applying the "bifurcated" analysis, see cases cited note 30 supra. For
cases supporting the single transaciton approach, see Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d
1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 1972) (Ely, J., dissenting); cases cited note 5 supra.
55. E.g., Oliver, supra note 3, at 30, 31; Note, 19 VAND. L. RE v., supra note 9, at
818-19.
56. See note 55 supra.
57. Oliver, supra note 3, at 31.
58. Cases cited note 54 supra.
59. No. 74-1852 at 9. "In our circuit we customarily view a multistep transaction
by its overall effect and not simply by scrutiny of mutually dependent steps." Id.
60. Id. at 11.
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.,61 is consistent with prior law and with the court's analysis. In
distinguishing precedent cited by the taxpayer,62 the court noted that
while the taxpayer in Perry retained a reversion, in none of the cases
cited in support of the deduction was a reversion retained. Likewise, in
analyzing the district court's opinion in Perry, the Fourth Circuit im-
plied that the lower court did not realize that "a factor probably leading
to the result in Skemp. .."6 was that in that case the taxpayer retained
no reversion. While the use of this factor is supported by both lines of
decisions,64 the emphasis in Perry was unusual.
The other index of real business purpose cited by the court in Perry
is not so well established in the caselaw.65 Considering trust income
other than the rents paid by the taxpayer-settlor as providing business
purpose for the transfer stems from the Van Zandt court's distinction of
Skemp. 66 The Fifth Circuit considered its denial of the rental deduction
not inconsistent with the Skemp holding. 7 The court reasoned that real
business purpose for the transfer into trust could be found in the settlor's
desire to have a trustee manage the uncertain amount of income other
than the rentals he paid.68 The Fourth Circuit in Perry adopted this
conclusion. 9 Since in Perry the taxpayer held a reversion, the Fourth
Circuit concluded that the trustee was administering the trust for the
ultimate benefit of the settlor. And since there was no trust income other
than the rentals paid by the settlor, the court concluded that the trustee
was merely a conduit through which the settlor could distribute his
income. 70
61. Id.
62. Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1972); Brown v. Commis-
sioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950); Skemp v. Commis-
sioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948).
63. No. 74-1852 at 6.
64. In most cases allowing the deduction no reversion was retained. E.g., cases
cited note 62 supra. In most cases denying the deduction the retention of a reversion was
considered as a retention of control in analyzing business purpose. E.g., Audano v.
United States, 428 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1970); Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965).
65. Three cases hold that trust income other than the payments made by the settlor
should be a factor supporting business purpose: Perry v. United States, No. 74-1852; Van
Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965);
Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948). This argument was rejected in
Jack Wiles, 59 T.C. 289 (1972), af'd mem., 491 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1974).
66. Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 814 (1965).
67. Id. at 444.
68. Id.
69. No. 74-1852 at 10.
70. Id.
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The taxpayer's failure in Perry to meet either of the two indices of
real business purpose previously discussed and his failure to show any
business purpose for the transfer into trust should have been sufficient to
defeat his claim for deductibility of the rentals.7" However, the Fourth
Circuit seized upon the opportunity presented in Perry to clear up some
confusion concerning whether the identity of the trustee or his actual
independence from the settlor is the proper inquiry when examining
control retained by the grantor.72 The taxpayer in Perry had argued that
the existence of an independent, corporate trustee placed him directly on
point with the Skemp facts. The Fifth Circuit in Van Zandt did seem to
emphasize that an important factor in denying the deduction was that
the settlor was also the trustee.73 This emphasis also seemed consistent
with the Skemp analysis in which the trustee's fiduciary duty was
considered to refute the Commissioner's argument that the settlor had
retained control.74 The Fourth Circuit, however, concluded that a care-
ful reading of the Van Zandt opinion invited the conclusion that the
actual independence, rather than the identity, of the trustee was the
proper inquiry. 75
The Perry court's conclusion is directly in line with substantial
precedent.7 While the identity of the trustee has been examined in
considering his independence, it is clear that this factor is not determina-
tive.77 Other factors bearing on the trustee's ability to actively protect the
beneficiaries' interest have been considered.78 Thus the conclusion com-
pelled by precedent and reached by the Fourth Circuit in Perry is that
regardless of the identity of the trustee, he must have actual indepen-
dence and active functions through which he can protect his benefi-
ciaries' interests. If he has such power, it can be fairly concluded that the
71. Regardless of who the trustee was, if the transaction had no business purpose,
the rents paid were not "necessary" under section 162. See note 20 supra; cf. C. James
Mathews, 61 T.C. 12, 18, 19 (1973).
72. No. 74-1852 at 7, 8.
73. Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440, 443 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.s. 814 (1965).
74. Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598, 599 (7th Cir. 1948).
75. No. 74-1852 at 7, 8.
76. E.g., Audano v. United States, 428 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1970); C. James
Mathews, 61 T.C. 12 (1973); Alden B. Oakes, 44 T.C. 524 (1965).
77. E.g., Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
814 (1950) (grantor's attorney was trustee, rents held deductible); John T. Potter, 27
T.C. 200 (1956) (grantor's father, wife and accountant were trustees, rents held
deductible).
78. E.g., cases cited note 11 supra (reasonableness of rents); Hall v. United States,
208 F. Supp. 584 (N.D.N.Y. 1962) (grantor's right to settle accounts with trustee); Jack
Wiles, 59 T.C. 289 (1972), affd mem., 491 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1974) (no formal lease
and sporadic rental payments).
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grantor has not retained sufficient controls to be considered owner of the
corpus.
The real significance of the Perry decision lies in tie advice the
Fourth Circuit has given tax planners. While the transfer and leaseback
of business property to a Clifford trust remains a tax savings device, the
court will demand strict compliance with two requirements. First, the
Fourth Circuit will apply the business purpose test at the time of the
transfer into trust. The retention of no reversion by the settlor and the
existence of trust income other than the settlor's rental payments will be
considered factors showing real business purpose. Second, the court will
look past the identity of the trustee and will focus on his actual indepen-
dence, indicated by his ability to protect and further the beneficiaries'
interests, to determine whether the settlor has properly relinquished
control over the corpus. It is hoped that the Fourth Circuit's clear
articulation of the standards it will require in the transfer and leaseback
situation will provide needed predictability to those prospective grantors
who seek to avail themselves of this tax savings device.
CARL N. PATTERSON, JR.
Federal Jurisdiction-The Abstention Doctrine as Amended by
Hicks v. Miranda: A Legal Definition and Ominous Omissions
The abstention doctrine1 is a judicial device designed to reduce the
tensions inherent in our dual system of government. The doctrine allows
federal courts to defer to state courts and thus to avoid unnecessary
confrontation when federal and state jurisdictions overlap. 2 Significant-
ly, the impact of abstention extends beyond the procedural level to affect
fundamental substantive rights.' Thus, in sensitive substantive areas,4
1. One commentator speaks of "abstention doctrines" since there are several
distinguishable lines of cases. C. Wmrr, HANDBOOK Op LAw OF FnDnJ4L CouRis § 52
(2d ed. 1970).
2. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941); Kurland,
Toward a Co-operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24
F.R.D. 481, 487 (1959); Comment, The Abstention Doctrine: Some Recent Develop-
ments, 46 TuL. L. PIv. 762, 763 (1972).
3. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); H. FRmNDLY,
FEDERAL JrmsDIcroN: A GENERAL Vinw 87-88 (1973); Maraist, Federal Intervention
in State Criminal Proceedings: Dombrowski, Younger, and Beyond, 50 TExAS L REV.
1324, 1326-27 (1972).
4. Civil rights litigation is a particularly sensitive area in which courts have
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abstention has become a volatile concept, expanded or compressed to
reflect particular predilections of the federal judiciary.5
In Hicks v. Miranda6 the United States Supreme Court focused on
the scope of abstention and defined one of the situations in which the
doctrine must be applied by the federal courts. The divided Court held
that, absent extraordinary circumstances or bad faith and harassment,
abstention is mandatory when a state criminal proceeding is initiated
against a federal plaintiff after the federal complaint is filed but before
any "proceeding of substance on the merits" has occurred in the federal
forum. 7
The abstention issue was raised in the federal district courts when
Vincent Miranda brought suit against local authorities for declaratory
and injunctive relief from enforcement of the California obscenity stat-
ute." As president and a stockholder of Pussycat Theatre,10 Miranda
sought to assert his first amendment right to present the film "Deep
Throat" without fear of prosecution under the allegedly unconstitutional
state statute. At the time of filing, no criminal prosecution was pending
against Miranda in state court; however, local authorities had already
seized copies of the film and box office receipts on four separate occa-
sions and had criminally charged two employees of the theatre. Before a
hearing on the merits could be had in federal court, the state criminal
complaint was amended to include Miranda as an additional party
defendant."1
Relief was granted by the three judge"2 district court which applied
the classic, three-pronged, "equity, comity, and federalism" analysis to
the question of abstention. The court held the abstention doctrine
reached contradictory conclusions concerning the appropriateness of abstention. Com-
pare Alabama Educ. Ass'n v. Wallace, 362 F. Supp. 682, 685 (M.D. Ala. 1973) with
Silverman v. Browning, 359 F. Supp. 173, 176-77 (D. Conn. 1972), a! 'd, 411 U.S. 941
(1973). See generally McCormack, Federalism and Section. 1983: Limitations on Judicial
Enforcement of Constitutional Claims, Part II, 60 VA. L. REv. 250 (1974).
5. Kennedy & Schoonover, Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Under the
Burger Court, 26 Sw. LJ. 282 (1972); Note, Federal-Question Abstention: Justice
Frankfurter's Doctrine in an Activist Era, 80 HARv. L. REv. 604, 607-08 (1967).
6. 95 S. Ct. 2281 (1975).
7. Id. at 2292.
8. Miranda v. Hicks, 388 F. Supp. 350 (C.D. Cal. 1974), rev'd, 95 S. Ct. 2281
(1975).
9. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 311 et seq. (West Supp. 1975). The complaint also sought
relief from the search warrant provisions of the statute. Id. §§ 1523-42.
10. 95 S. Ct. at 2285 n.2.
11. Id. at 2287.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970). This statute requires a three-judge court when




inapplicable under the circumstances on the grounds that no adequate
state remedy was available to protect Miranda's first amendment right,
that no criminal prosecution was pending against him in state court, and
that the facts demonstrated bad faith and harassment. 13
On direct appeal to the Supreme Court,14 five justices'15 joined to
reverse the lower court decision over the objection of a vigorous dis-
sent.' 6 Mr. Justice White, writing for the majority, concluded that, in the
interests of comity alone, abstention is required to "'permit the state
courts to try cases free from interference by federal court.' ,17 Further-
more, the Court held that the "pending" criterion should be liberally
construed so that the abstention doctrine is not "trivialized" by rigid
adherence to an arbitrary date. 8 Mr. Justice Stewart's dissent criticized
the majority's "pending" standard as failing to reflect countervailing
policy considerations founded on the role of the federal courts "as the
'primary reliances' for vindicating constitutional freedoms."'
In order to evaluate the Court's ruling in Hicks, it is necessary to
place the central issue of the case in historical perspective. The fountain-
head of the abstention doctrine, Railroad Commission of Texas v.
Pullman Co.,20 illustrated the judicial effort to reverse the trend toward
federal intervention which had been authorized by the landmark deci-
sion Ex Parte Young.' Justice Frankfurter's opinion for a unanimous
Court, which came to be known as the Pullman Doctrine, imposed limits
on the federal judiciary which were designed to "avoid the waste of a
tentative decision as well as the friction of a premature constitutional
adjudication. 22
Subsequent decisions interpreted the scope of Pullman abstention
and established the presumption in favor of the exercise of federal
jurisdiction when a federal question is raised.23 Since the hazards of
13. 388 F. Supp. at 360.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970) authorizes an appeal directly to the Supreme Court
from a judgment of a three-judge court concerning the constitutionality of a state statute.
15. Justices White, Powell, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger joined
in the majority opinion. Chief Justice Burger also filed a concurring statement.
16. Justice Stewart was joined in the dissent by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Douglas.
17. 95 S. Ct. at 2292, quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971).
18. 95 S. Ct. at 2292.
19. Id. at 2295.
20. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
21. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The majority opinion by Justice Peckham held that
federal courts may enjoin state officials from enforcing a state statute that is constitu-
tionally defective on its face.
22. 312 U.S. at 500.
23. The federal court exercises jurisdiction unless the state law is both unclear and
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abstention 4 in cases presenting constitutional issues often counterbal-
ance the harm of interference, the lower federal courts were directed to
exercise jurisdiction unless the state law in question was both unclear
and susceptible to an interpretation that would avoid constitutional
adjudication.2 5 Thus the abstention doctrine was characterized as a
narrow exception to the general rule.
An overview of the abstention cases indicates that the applicability
of the doctrine is generally determined by a balancing approach rather
than by application of precise rules. 8 Using this technique, a court
identifies the federal and state policies that abstention will serve and
assigns weights according to the relative significance of each. A line of
cases outside the Pullman27 mainstream indicates that the presumption
of exercise of federal jurisdiction shifts when the countervailing state
interest reaches the level of importance associated with a "State's good-
faith administration of its criminal laws."28 In the criminal context, the
burden is on the federal plaintiff to justify intervention with a requisite
showing of irreparable injury.29
Civil rights litigation precipitated a doctrinal dilemma in this area80
which was reconciled in one way by Dombrowski v. Pfister"' and in
another by Younger v. Harris.2 The Supreme Court in Dombrowski
held that imminent state criminal proceedings may be enjoined in two
situations: (1) when the state criminal statute infringes first amendment
susceptible to an interpretation that will avoid the federal constitutional question. Lake
Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 510-11 (1972); Harman v. Forssenius, 380
U.S. 528, 534 (1965); Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the
Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 PA. L REv. 1071, 1088 (1974).
24. The adverse consequences of abstention in terms of delay, expense, and
personal liberties are pointed out by Justice Douglas' dissent in Clay v. Sun Ins. Office
Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960): "Some litigants have long purses. Many, however, can hardly
afford one lawsuit, let alone two. Shuttling the parties between state and federal tribunals
is a sure way of defeating the ends of justice." Id. at 228.
25. E.g., Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 510-11 (1972);
Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534 (1965).
26. See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). See also Maraist, supra
note 3 at 1332-34.
27. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) dealt with a situation
in which no criminal prosecution was pending or even threatened.
28. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). See also Stefanelli v.
Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951).
29. A single prosecution does not constitute "irreparable injury." Douglas v. City of
Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 164 (1943).
30. Ironically, Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), which
introduced the abstention doctrine, contained the issue of racial discrimination which
subsequently produced doctrinal crisis. Note, 80 HARaV. L. Rnv, supra note 5, at 607.
31. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
32. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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guaranties and is overbroad or vague on its face; or (2) when officials
employ the statute in a manner that indicates bad faith harassment. 33
Narrowing the potential scope of Dombrowski, the Court in Younger
ruled that when criminal prosecution is pending in state court, federal
judges may not justify injunctive relief solely on first amendment
grounds but rather must find either bad faith harassment or extraordi-
nary circumstances. 34
Significantly, the narrower holdings in Younger and its companion
cases 35 extended only to situations in which state criminal prosecutions
were pending.3 6 When prosecution was merely threatened, the Dom-
browski holding remained intact.37 The rationale in support of the
pivotal distinction appeared in a later case, Steffel v. Thompson:38
When no state criminal proceeding is pending at the time the fed-
eral complaint is filed, federal intervention does not result in dupli-
cative legal proceedings or disruption of the state criminal justice
system; nor can federal intervention, in that circumstance, be
interpreted as reflecting negatively upon the state court's ability to
enforce constitutional principles. 9
Although the Court in SteHel addressed itself solely to a request for
declaratory judgment,40 the rationale is equally applicable to the appro-
priateness of injunctive relief when prosecution is threatened but not
pending in state court.
In Hicks the Court ignored the logic of Steffel and decided the case
on the basis of a novel definition. The majority held that "pending"
speaks to the time of "proceedings of substance on the merits" rather
than to the date of filing in federal court.4 The Court assumed without
discussion that the differentiation between "pending" and "threatened"
is an arbitrary distinction. This assumption is contrary to the rationale,
although not to the precise holdings, of prior decisions.1
2
33. 380 U.S. at 489-90.
34. 401 U.S. at 41. See also Note, Federal Jurisdiction-Younger v. Harris: A
Current Appraisal of the Policy against Federal Court Interference with State Court
Proceedings, 21 DE PAuL L. REv. 519, 539 (1971).
35. Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971);
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Samuels v.
Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
36. 401 U.S. at 41. A possible exception is Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77, 81
(1971), but the decision was primarily based on lack of standing rather than on the
abstention doctrine since plaintiffs failed to allege that they were threatened.
37. Cf. Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 814 (1974).
38. 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
39. Id. at 462.
40. Id.
41. 95 S. Ct. at 2292.
42. Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 814 (1974); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S.
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It is significant that the Court arrived at its definition with only
tangential regard for the balancing approach and its classic, three-
pronged inquiry. Justice White considered only the comity factor.43 He
concluded that the state interest was paramount in this case and that the
harm of intervention outweighed the harm of abstention.14 Implicit in
this approach is a trend toward greater deference to the state courts.
The dangers inherent in the Court's approach can be expressed in
terms of equity and federalism, principles ignored by the majority
opinion. The crux of the equity analysis in abstention problems is
adequacy of state remedy. If the federal plaintiff has already violated a
criminal statute, his defense to prosecution constitutes an adequate state
remedy.45 However, if a person is only threatened by state law, he may
be placed in the untenable position described in Steffel as "between the
Scylla of intentionally flounting state law and the Charybdis of forego-
ing what he believes to be constitutionally protected activity in order to
avoid becoming enmeshed in a criminal proceeding."'4" The Court in
Hicks failed to note this practical consequence, which was precisely the
situation faced by Miranda as president of the theatre.
Federalism, the second classic consideration overlooked by the
Court, concerns the proper relationship of the federal and state govern-
ments. Chief Justice Marshall once emphasized the importance of feder-
al jurisdiction in solemn dicta: "We have no more right to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not
given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution." 47
Marshall's statement is clearly not the modem rule." Confined by the
realities of the federal system-a limited number of judges and an ever
expanding case load-federal courts frequently decline to exercise ju-
risdiction.
However as guarantors of constitutional freedoms, the federal
courts may not abdicate responsibility to the states but rather must as-
sess other realities. In certain sensitive legal areas state courts may be
452, 462 (1974). See generally Note, Implications of the Younger Cases for the
Availability of Federal Equitable Relief When No State Prosecution is Pending, 72
CoLuM. L. REV. 874 (1972).
43. 95 S. Ct. at 2292.
44. Id.
45. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163-64 (1943).
46. 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974).
47. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
48. C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 52 at 196.
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unwilling to vindicate federal constitutional claims. In light of the
court's function as fact finder, the need for a sympathetic forum and an
independent judiciary is paramount under such circumstances.49 Direct
review to the Supreme Court cannot be expected to correct all the
nuances of factfinding that may prejudice the lower court determination.
Unless the court weighs all the factors and makes a deliberate effort to
strike a balance, the institutional goal of comity may engulf the primary
function of the federal courts as the guarantors of the individual's
constitutional rights.50
The significance of the Hicks definition of "pending" lies in its
impact on functional analysis of abstention problems. Traditionally, the
threshold question is whether the case should be classified under the
Pullman or the Younger line of authority. This determination is crucial
in light of the corresponding presumption regarding jurisdiction which
attaches.5 In the absence of state criminal proceedings, the former
category is appropriate. According to Ste fel,52 federal courts are not
required to abstain unless criminal prosecution is actually pending in
state court and not merely threatened. If pending, the strictures of
Younger5" apply unless the federal plaintiff can comply with the re-
quirements of one of the narrow exceptions.54
The practicil effect of broadening the scope of the "pending"
criterion in Hicks is virtually to eliminate the distinction betWeen pend-
ing and threatened prosecutions because state authorities can easily
transform the latter into the former.55 Thus the definitional approach
adopted by the Court effectively negates much of the holding in Ste fel
without the attendant embarrassment of overruling such a recent deci-
sion. The corollary to the broader definition of "pending' in Hicks is
growth of the doctrinal branch in which abstention is the rule and not
the exception.
While Hicks clearly broadens the scope of Younger abstention, it
fails to introduce certainty into doctrinal analysis. As pointed out in the
49. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 436(1964) (Douglas, J., concurring); ALI Srtuy OF DVisIoN OF JuEIsDIcnoN BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDmuL CoURTS 168 (1969); Gibert, Questions Unanswered by the February
Sextet, 1972 UTAH L. REv. 14, 20.
50. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 464 (1974); Mitchum v. Foster, 407
U.S. 225, 239 (1972); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 170-71 (1961).
51. See notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra.
52. 415 U.S. 452.
53. 401 U.S. 37.
54. Id. at 41.
55. 95 S. Ct. at 2296 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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dissent, the new "pending" standard announced by the majority is
marred by imprecise terminology that will make it difficult to apply.50
Since the Court neglected to provide guidelines, determination of what
constitutes "proceedings of substance on the merits"5 will be governed
by subjective rather than objective factors. The foreseeable result is an
array of contradictory lower court opinions.
Notably, the Court in Hicks also failed to clarify the outer limits of
Younger abstention. The Younger exceptions provide a potential safety
valve for plaintiffs who satisfy the rigorous burden of proof by showing
either bad faith harassment or extraordinary circumstances. 8 The clause
is phrased in the disjunctive and presumably provides two means of
escape. Although the Court has never precisely defined the latter excep-
tion, it indicated in Younger that multiple prosecutions might rise to the
level of extraordinary circumstances.5 9 However, the Court in Hicks did
not find the four separate seizures and subsequent charges to be suffi-
ciently extraordinary to justify federal intervention." Bad faith harass-
ment is an equally elusive concept. The lack of objective standards to
guide the lower federal courts portends uneven application of the
Younger exceptions. In light of the significant substantive questions that
may be at stake in federal constitutional cases, uncertainty in the absten-
tion doctrine is ground for practical as well as theoretical concern.
In the final analysis, the Court's definitional approach is the funda-
mental flaw of Hicks. Assuming that the purpose of a definition is to
clarify, the opinion is a paradox, for it generates more questions and
uncertainties than answers. The Court's focus on a single word repre-
sents a radical departure from the comprehensiveness of the balancing
approach to abstention problems. Concern for definitional detail seems
particularly inappropriate in the context of basic policy considerations
that were ignored by the Court. In light of doctrinal impact on individu-
al plaintiffs as well as on the entire federal scheme, abstention may be "a
custom [m]ore honored in the breach than the observance."'
SARA MCPEAIE GILKEY
56. Id. at 2294n.1.
57. Id. at 2292.
58. 401 U.S. at 41.
59. Id. at 46.
60. 95 S. Ct. at 2292-93.
61. W. SHAKxPEARE, HAMLET, Act I, sc. iv, 11. 15-16.
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Securities Regulation-Supreme Court Acceptance of the
Birnbaum Rule
Although other sections of the Securities Act of 1933' and the
Securities Exchange Act of 19342 provide expressly for private civil
actions," the civil actions implied under section 10(b) of the 1934 Acte
have long been favorites of plaintiffs in federal courts." In 1952, how-
ever, a limitation was placed on plaintiffs' access to section 10(b)
actions. In that year the Second Circuit, in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp.,' ruled that a plaintiff who alleged injury suffered "in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities" under section 10(b) and SEC
rule 10b-5 *7 could not maintain an action if he himself had not bought
or sold the securities involved. In subsequent years the Birnbaum doc-
trine was variously adopted,8 restricted, 9 and rejected' by lower federal
1. 15 U.S.C. § 77a et. seq. (1971).
2. Id. § 78a et. seq.
3. See note 43 infra.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1971) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so regis-
tered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
5. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13-14 n.10(1971); SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969).
In recent years, rule 10b-5 has become a significant weapon against corporate
mismanagement. See Note, The Controlling Influence Standard in Rule lOb-5 Corporate
Mismanagement Cases, 86 HAv. L. RPv. 1007 (1973); Note, Limiting the Plaintiff
Class: Rule l0b-5 and the Federal Securities Code, 72 Mic. L. REv. 1398 (1974). The
trend in federal courts has been toward expansion of civil liability under rule lOb-5. See,
e.g., Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 877 (5th Cir. 1970); N. LArrN, R. JENNNGS, & R.
BuxBAum, CORPORATIONS iii (4th ed. 1968).
6. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
8. See, e.g., Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974); Landy v.
FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Mount Clemens
Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972); Simmons v. Wolfson, 428 F.2d 455
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courts. It was not until twenty-three years after its original pronounce-
ment that the United States Supreme Court ruled on the doctrine
directly. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores'1 a divided Court
approved Birnbaum, holding that only purchasers and sellers of securi-
ties have the privilege'" of bringing suit for money damages under section
10(b) and rule lOb-5. In consecrating this obstacle, the Court left
plaintiffs to pursue state rather than federal remedies for violation of
section 10(b) of the Act.
Blue Chip Stamps arose out of an offering of securities that defend-
ant Blue Chip Stamps, a trading-stamp firm, was required to make
pursuant to a federal antitrust consent decree.13 Retailers like plaintiff
who had used the stamp service of Blue Chip's predecessor'4 were
entitled to purchase quantities of securitiesr in Blue Chip proportional
to their past stamp usage. Plaintiff Manor Drug Stores, which was not a
party to the consent decree, brought suit under section 10(b). The
complaint alleged that defendants intentionally made their prospectus
overly pessimistic, so that plaintiff and others'0 would reject the offer,
thereby enabling defendants to sell the securities to the public later at a
far higher price. Plaintiff alleged that its reliance on misleading state-
ments in the prospectus caused its failure to accept the offer within the
period of its duration.17
The district court dismissed the action because plaintiff failed to
meet the requirements of Birnbaum: it had neither bought nor sold
securities.'1 While purportedly adhering to Birnbaum the Ninth Circuit
reversed, finding that the consent decree satisfied the reasons for the
(6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 999 (1971); Jensen v. Voyles, 393 F.2d 131
(10th Cir. 1968).
9. See text accompanying notes 29-32 infra.
10. Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
11. 95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975).
12. The question is not one of constitutional standing, but of statutory interpreta-
tion. See Note, Securities Law-Rule lOb-5-They Had So Many Plaintiffs They Didn't
Know What To Do, 53 N.C.L. Rv. 150, 155-57 (1974).
13. 95 S. Ct. at 1920-21.
14. Blue Chip Stamp Company was the name of the predecessor firm. It was
merged into Blue Chip Stamps pursuant to the consent decree, and was also a defendant,
along with eight of its nine controlling shareholders. Id.
15. The offering was required to be made in units consisting of debentures and
shares of common stock. Id. at 1921.
16. Plaintiff claimed to represent the class of offerees who rejected defendants'
offer. Id.
17. Id.
18. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 339 F. Supp. 35, 40 (C.D. Cal.
1971), rev'd, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975).
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Birnbaum rule:19 the court reasoned that the consent decree limited the
potential liability of defendants, provided a precise measure of damages,
and even offered an "objective basis" for establishing that plaintiff's
intention to buy was thwarted by defendants' misrepresentation.
In reversing the Ninth Circuit and approving the Birnbaum doc-
trine, the Supreme Court split evenly three ways. While three justices
found that section 10(b) did not require a plaintiff to be a purchaser or
seller of securities, 0 three others found such a requirement in the
statute;21 their remaining colleagues, in the opinion of the Court by
Justice Rehnquist, found the statute inconclusive.22 The Court's opinion
concluded, for reasons of policy, that plaintiff's failure to sell or buy
securities should bar it from federal court.
Before examining the Blue Chip Stamps decision, it is helpful to
consider briefly the genesis and evolution of the seller-purchaser require-
ment first iterated in Birnbaum23 for rule lOb-5 actions. In Birnbaum
the Second Circuit based its dismissal of plaintiff's action on an interpre-
tation of rule 10b-5, holding that "Rule X-10B-5 extended protection
only to the defrauded purchaser or seller," and that section 10(b) was
directed at the kind of fraud "usually associated with the sale or pur-
chase of securities" rather than at corporate mismanagement. 24
The Birnbaum doctrine suffered serious erosion before its affirma-
tion by the Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps. One of the reasons for
this erosion was the Supreme Court's 1963 mandate that section 10(b)
be construed "not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate
19. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd,
95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975).
20. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan. dissented. 95 S. Ct.
at 1937.
21. Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion, in which he was joined by Justices
Stewart and Marshall. Id. at 1935.
22. He was joined by Justice White and Chief Justice Burger.
23. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 956 (1952). When the controlling shareholder of the corporation in which plaintiffs
owned stock sold control to a third party, the value of plaintiffs' stock fell. The court
found that, since plaintiffs had neither bought nor sold shares, rule 10b-5 did not apply.
Judge Augustus Hand, writing for himself, Judge Learned Hand, and Chief Judge
Thomas Swan, cited the press release with which the SEC had explained its adoption of
rule 10b-5: the rule was intended to close a loophole in the Commission's anti-fraud
powers by "prohibiting individuals or companies from buying securities if they engage in
fraud in their purchase." Id. at 463. The unanimous panel concluded that the rule should
apply no further. Later decisions upholding Birnbaum were based at least in part on
construction of section 10(b), however. See, e.g., A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d
393 (2d Cir. 1967); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 252 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
24. 193 F.2d at 464.
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its remedial purposes."2 5 By 1968, the continuing vitality of Birnbaum
was doubted by a leading district court judge,26 discounted by commen-
tators,27 and apparently left open by the court that had created it.28 It
became generally accepted that plaintiffs who had neither purchased nor
sold securities could sue under rule lOb-5 in four categories of cases.
First, shareholders in a corporation which sold or purchased in a
fraudulent transaction were allowed to bring derivative actions. 20 Sec-
ondly, "forced sellers," that is, persons who had not sold securities, but
who would be obliged to do so eventually, either practically or by oper-
ation of law, could maintain lOb-5 actions.80 Thirdly, "aborted pur-
chaser-sellers," plaintiffs who failed to purchase or sell because their
agreements to do so had been breached, withstood Birnbaum-based
motions to dismiss."' Lastly, plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief to pre-
vent the sale of securities did not need to show that they were purchasers
or sellers.3 2
The most serious attacks on the Birnbaum requirement occurred in
1973. In Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.38 the Seventh
25. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
26. Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (Bonsal, J.).
27. See, e.g., Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for
Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L Rlnv. 268 (1968); Comment, The Purchaser-Seller Rule: An
Archaic Tool for Determining Standing Under Rule 10b-5, 56 GEO. LJ. 1177 (1968).
28. Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 634 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
970 (1967). The Second Circuit later dispelled the confusion by stating that Birnbaum
was "still the rule" at least in actions for damages. Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580, 581
(2d Cir. 1968).
29. See, e.g., Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970); Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Ruckle v.
Roto American Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
30. See, e.g., Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Fin. Co., 446 F.2d 303 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971) (plaintiff's stock was converted into a speculative right
to payment of money); Coffee v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 383, 386 (5th Cir. 1970)
(liquidation of corporation would cause minority shareholder to sell "as a practical
matter"); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970) (plaintiff would be forced to sell shares or be faced with an
antitrust divestiture decree at a later time); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967) (plaintiff would have to sell because statute
provided for short-form merger when some other shareholders acquired a certain
percentage of outstanding stock).
31. See, e.g., A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967); Opper v.
Hancock Sec. Corp., 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966); Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F.
Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967). This situation does not constitute a true exception, because it
is covered by the language of the statute. Section 3(a) (13) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78c(a) (13) (1971) provides: "The terms 'buy' and 'purchase' each include any contract
to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire." Section 3(a) (14) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78c(a) (14) (1971) provides: 'The terms 'sale' and 'sell' each include any contract to
sell or otherwise dispose of."
32. See, e.g., Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
950 (1970); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
33. 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974). When Bank
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Circuit expressly disavowed Birnbaum, saying that the purchaser-seller
limitation was "not part of the law of this Circuit."' 4  The court pro-
posed to permit suit by any "investor" in a securities "transaction," since
investors were the class of persons that Congress intended section 10
(b) to protect.3 5
The circuit court opinion in Blue Chip Stamps also represented a
serious erosion of Birnbaum.36 The Ninth Circuit allowed plaintiffs
action despite its failure to buy or sell securities. Two members of a
three-judge panel, while maintaining their allegiance to the Birnbaum
rule, found that it did not bar plaintiff. The majority found that the
Birnbaum rule had its justification in the prevention of unlimited liabili-
ty of defendants and in its denial of the judicial forum to plaintiffs who
could establish neither that defendants' actions had damaged them, nor
to what degree they had been damaged.3 7 The Ninth Circuit saw no
such problems in the Blue Chip offer. Since the consent decree offer was
made to a limited class of persons, the potential liability of defendants
was limited. Because the amount of securities that plaintiff could have
bought was prescribed by the decree, damages could easily be deter-
mined. The majority found that plaintiffs complaint even solved the
problem of proving that it was defendants' misrepresentation that caused
the damage: the difference between 101 dollars, the price at which
defendants had been obliged to sell blocks of securities, and 315 dol-
lars, their later market value, was so great that it provided "prima facie,
an objective basis for a factual inference that users properly informed
rather than misled would have accepted the offer."3
The Supreme Court was unpersuaded by the Ninth Circuit's analy-
sis. The first issue it determined was whether the language of section
10(b) controlled. 9 Both the prevailing and the concurring opinions
Service Corporation (BSC) traded 7000 shares of stock for a car l.asing business,
plaintiff shareholders of BSC, as part of the deal, personally guaranteed payment of
BSC's liabilities to defendant. When defendant brought suit in state court on the
guarantees, plaintiffs sued in federal district court for their rescission.
34. Id. at 661.
35. See note 4 supra.
36. 492 F.2d 136.
37. Id. at 141.
38. Id. at 142.
39. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, leaned heavily on the legislative
history of the 1934 Act in construing section 10(b). He pointed out that Congress
rejected language that would have defined "sale" and "purchase" to include attempts,
offers, and solicitations. 95 S. Ct. at 1932 n.13. Both his and the concurring opinions
emphasized the refusals of later Congresses to amend section 10(b) to include "'any
attempt to purchase or sell' any security." Id. at 1924, 1935. Justice Rehnquist cited
Congress' obvious fear that strike suits would result from the private causes of action
19761
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contrasted section 10(b)'s "in connection with the purchase or sale'
with broader language in section 17(a) of the 1933 Act4" that reaches
fraud "in the offer or sale" of securities. The concurring opinion found
that this contrasting language "indicate[d] clearly that Congress selec-
tively and carefully distinguished between offers, purchases, and
sales,"4 whereas the opinion of the Court found that this difference,
along with others, "though not conclusive, support[ed] the result
reached by the Birnbaum court. '42
This argument is not so persuasive as it may appear. Using the
reasoning of the Blue Chip Stamps concurrers, the Court should not
have implied private causes of action under the 1934 Act. Its approval
of such actions-including those under section 10(b)---came in the face
of Congress' express creation of private rights of action in other sections
of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.43 In implying those actions, the Court
ignored the express actions, basing its decision on the policy ground that
"private enforcement. . . provides a necessary supplement to Commis-
sion action. 44
In dissent, Justice Blackmun relied on the statutory language to
support the plaintiffs action. He argued that Blue Chip Stamps came
within section 10(b) since the word "sale" could properly be construed
to mean "not only a single, individualized act transferring property from
one party to another, but also the generalized event of public disposal of
property through advertisement, auction, or some other market mecha-
nism."4
There being no definition of "contract" in the 1934 Act, a bet-
ter approach would have been to construe the statutory provision
"any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of' as equivalent to a "sale.""
As the Ninth Circuit majority pointed out, a decision by Manor to
purchase "could not have been thwarted by the intervention of an earlier
that it created expressly, and reasoned that courts should move especially carefully to
avoid that danger in administering judicially implied remedies. Id. at 1928.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1971).
41. 95 S. Ct. at 1935.
42. Id. at 1924.
43. See, e.g., 1933 Act, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1971); id. § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771
(1971); 1934 Act, § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1971).
44. J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (allowing an implied private
cause of action under section 14(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1971)).
When the Court finally authorized a private cause of action under section 10(b), it did
so in a footnote, with, by its own admission, "virtually no discussion." 95 S. Ct. at 1923.
The decision came in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6,
13 n.9 (1971).
45. 95 S. Ct. at 1939.
46. See note 31 supra.
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or higher bidder . ,47 In effect, what Manor had under the consent
decree was more than an offer: it was an option contract, albeit unen-
forceable because unsupported by consideration. Interpreting "con-
tract" in the 1934 Act to include this kind of obligation would have led
to the result that Justice Blackmun urged.48 Although, as the Court
observed, a consent decree is not enforceable by those who are not
parties to it,49 allowing plaintiff in Blue Chip Stamps recovery under this
theory would not be foreclosed. Plaintiffs action was not to enforce the
consent decree, but to recover for fraud.50
The three remaining members of the Court, having found no
statutory answer to the question of the necessity of the purchaser-seller
requirement, turned their attention to policy considerations. Their first
concern was avoidance of "liability in an indeterminate amount for an
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." 51 The Court seemed to
view the alternatives as either retaining Bimnbaum or discarding all
"standing" requirements under rule lOb-5. The Court warned that, with
the Birnbaum barrier removed, "strike suits" under rule lOb-5 would be
not only much more frequent, but also peculiarly vexatious. Justice
Rehnquist reasoned that vexatiousness would result because oral testi-
mony would be the key to each additionally allowed case, thus making
summary judgment unavailable.52 In addition, the availability of exten-
47. 492 F.2d at 142 n.15.
48. The majority in the Ninth Circuit alluded to such an interpretation by saying
that a consent decree serves the "same function" as a contract. Id. at 142. Judge
Hufstedler, dissenting in the Ninth Circuit, clearly failed to recognize such an interpreta-
tion. She saw no reason to allow a cause of action to one of ten offerees who were of-
fered 10,000 each of a 100,000 share offering, while denying a cause of action to one of
eleven offerees of 10,000 shares of the same-sized offering. Id. at 147 n.10. But the Blue
Chip situation involved more than just a limited offering: it involved an obligation, al-
beit unenforceable by the offeree, to sell a given amount to a given person at a given
price.
49. Buckeye Coal & Ry. Co. v. Hocking Valley Ry., 269 U.S. 42, 49 (1925).
50. See 492 F.2d at 142 n.14. This situation is quite similar to the one in which A
has an unenforceable contract with B, and C fraudulently induces B not to perform. If B
would have performed, A can sue C for fraud at common law. Rice v. Manley, 66 N.Y.
82 (1876) (Plaintiffs contracted orally to buy cheese from Stebbins. Although the con-
tract was unenforceable by the statute of frauds, both plaintiffs and Stebbins would have
performed. Defendant, knowing of the contract, signed plaintiffs' names to a telegram to
Stebbins cancelling the order, then proceeded to buy the cheese himself. Allowing
plaintiffs to recover, the court said, "What difference can it make that plaintiffs could
not enforce their agreement against Stebbins?" Id. at 84.); Benton v. Pratt, 2 Wend. 385
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829). See generally 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 41d (1943). In Blue Chip Stamps,
Blue Chip occupies in some way the positions of both B and C in the example. Like B,
Blue Chip would have performed had Manor Drug sought performance. Like C, Blue
Chip caused the deal not to go through. Blue Chip's actions, if fraudulent, should subject
it to liability.
51. 95 S. Ct. at 1931, quoting Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 179, 174
N.E. 441, 444 (1931) (Cardozo, C.J.).
52. 95 S. Ct. at 1927. The oral testimony would presumably concern whether
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sive and expensive discovery under the federal rules would help make
the settlement value of "strike suits" high. Not only would this litigation
force corporations to abandon some normal activities in order to defend
against litigation, it would also damage the securities markets, and, the
Court implied, it would wreak havoc upon the federal trial apparatus.a
In reaching this pessimistic conclusion, Justice Rehnquist failed to
analyze the intermediate solution proposed by the Ninth Circuit." Had
he done so, he would have found his policy arguments refuted. The
Ninth Circuit's decision would have limited the potential liability of
defendants and the problems of proof that the majority identified. The
appellate court would have limited suit to cases in which plaintiff alleged
a relation sufficiently analogous to a contract to limit the number of
suits and to provide prima facie proof of causation.55
Furthermore, the Court's claim that rejection of Birnbaum would
provoke a flood of trials in federal courts is highly speculative. Adoption
of an intermediate solution, such as that of the Ninth Circuit, might well
cause a substantial increase in the number of 10b-5 complaints filed.
Without a definitive Supreme Court standard, plaintiffs would seek to
expand yet further the class of persons allowed to sue. But the case-by-
case erosion, were it to continue, would cause additional court burdens
plaintiff's loss was caused by his reliance on defendant's misrepresentation.
53. Id. at 1928.
54. See text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
55. See text accompanying note 38 supra. The Seventh Circuit's formulation, like
the Ninth Circuit's, answered the Supreme Court's policy objections. The Seventh Circuit
proposed to allow a cause of action only to investors in securities transactions. Attempts
further to erode Birnbaum would no doubt have continued under its approval, but
substantial numbers of additional trials would not necessarily have occurred. The Eason
rule would have barred plaintiff in Blue Chip Stamps. The decision in Eason dealt
expressly with this problem:
The volume of lOb-5 litigation has already expanded and will no doubt con-
tinue to do so whether or not the purchaser-seller limitation is rejected. The
extent to which a refusal to adhere to Birnbaum will affect that volume is
really a matter of speculation. The fact that the purchaser-seller limitation is
unacceptable does not mean that there will be no limit of any kind of the avail-
ability of private relief. For in each case the plaintiff will have to demonstrate
membership in the "special class" protected by Rule lOb-5 and injury as a di-
rect consequence of the alleged violation. The number of parties who may in-
voke Rule lOb-5 without the purchaser-seller limitation may not differ mater-
ially from the number who would recover by persuading a court to interpret
the purchaser-seller concept flexibly.
Assuming, however, that a complete abandonment of Birnbaum will signif-
icantly increase our workload, we may not for that reason reject what we be-
lieve to be a correct interpretation of the statute or the rule. Indeed, the vol-
ume of future litigation that was more clearly predictable as a consequence of
the Supreme Court's holding in [Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas.
Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971)] was not even mentioned in the Court's opinion as
a possible objection to its broadened interpretation of Rule lob-5 as encompas-
sing the misuse of proceeds of sale.
490 F.2d at 660-61 (footnotes omitted).
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at the pleading stage rather than the trial stage. For instance, many
plaintiffs would be unable to allege a causal link so strong as that shown
by Manor Drug Stores and would be dismissed pursuant to pre-trial
motions. Undoubtedly, upon dismissal, plaintiffs might often appeal,
thus creating additional appellate work. But the specter -of costly and
lengthy trials and discovery is a faint one indeed.
Had the Court wished truly to determine the validity of its "practi-
cal considerations," it could have let the Ninth Circuit's decision in Blue
Chip Stamps and the Seventh Circuit's total rejection of Birnbaum in
Eason stand for longer than twenty months.56 The Court had already
waited twenty-three years before ruling on the purchaser-seller limita-
tion. An influx in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits of 10b-5 suits that
failed to allege that plaintiff had purchased or sold securities would have
given the opinion an empirical rather than a speculative basis. 57
Despite questionable analysis in both the Court's opinion and the
concurring opinion, Blue Chip Stamps was correctly decided. In effect,
the Court's decision is that the common law rather than the federal
securities law will govern cases in which defendant induces plaintiff not
to purchase or sell securities. Both the prevailing and the concurring
opinions point out the availability of a state remedy for a fraudulent
scheme to induce plaintiff to fail to act.5 8  Indeed, Justice Rehnquist
specifically noted that Manor Drug Store's fraud action was pending
in a California court. 9
A major difference between the federal securities law and the state
fraud remedy is the element of intent that is required under each. In
common-law fraud cases in which plaintiff succeeds in establishing
defendant's liability for causing him to fail to act, intent by defendant to
deceive plaintiff is uniformly present.69 The cases do not dwell on that
element; however, they do not suggest the possibility of relief when
defendant's culpability is less. On the other hand, in federal lOb-5
56. The Seventh Circuit decided Eason on December 28, 1973, and the Ninth
Circuit decided Blue Chip Stamps on October 15, 1973; the Supreme Court rendered its
decision in Blue Chip Stamps on June 9, 1975.
57. Of course, the number of suits threatened is one consideration of the Court for
which data would be unobtainable.
58. 95 S. Ct. at 1927 n.9, 1937.
59. Id. at 1927 n.9.
60. See, e.g., Butler v. Watkins, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 456 (1871); Fottler v. Moseley,
179 Mass. 295, 60 N.E. 788 (1901); Rice v. Manley, 66 N.Y. 82 (1876); Kaufmann v.
Delafield, 224 App. Div. 29, 229 N.Y.S. 545 (1928) (defendant held liable for inducing
plaintiff to retain stock, although plaintiff had not decided to sell); Snow v. Judson, 38
Barb. 210 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1862). See generally 37 AM. JuR. 2d Fraud and Deceit §§ 225,
242 (1968).
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actions, plaintiff may prevail with a showing of less than intent to
deceive. In these cases, plaintiff must ordinarily show "scienter" on
defendant's part.6' The degree of knowledge that defendant must have
had is the subject of dispute. No circuit, however, requires so much as a
showing of intent to deceive. 2
In the typical securities purchase or sale fraud situation, defendant
profits in some way from the misrepresentation that damages plaintiff.
When defendant is a broker who arranges plaintiff's purchase or sale, he
profits by receiving a commission. When there is privity between de-
fendant and plaintiff, a bad deal for plaintiff is ipso facto a good deal
for defendant. Even when there is no privity between the parties,
defendant is ordinarily selling to, purchasing from, or arranging transac-
tions with other persons, and profiting thereby. Indeed, given the poten-
tial liability under federal law for statements that induce purchases or
sales, people would rarely make statements that tended to induce others
to buy or sell without the possibility of profiting in some way. Thus,
when a plaintiff purchases or sells securities, a defendant who intention-
ally caused him to do so ordinarily had a motive to misrepresent. By
requiring a low degree of scienter, the federal securities law catches
some defendants in whom intent to deceive is present, but impossible of
proof. Indeed, a possible profit was present in Blue Chip Stamps, where
defendants owed plaintiff an unenforceable duty to sell securities below
value. Ordinarily, persons do not profit when others refrain from pur-
chasing or selling securities. Thus, there is ordinarily no motive for
intentional deception when there is no purchase or sale.
In the Blue Chip Stamps situation the state remedy should work
greater substantial justice than would a federal lob-5 remedy: by paint-
ing with a less broad brush, the state law can effectively discriminate
between defendants who intended to deceive and those who did not.08
61. Note, Scienter and Rule 10b-5: Development of a New Standard, 23 CLEVE. ST.
L. REv. 493 (1974). See, e.g., White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
62. Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562, 598-600 (1972). For
example, the Second Circuit allows recovery on the basis of "reckless disregard for the
truth." Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971). The
Ninth Circuit rejects scienter as a separate element of a 10b-5 action. White v. Abrams,
495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974). However, it allows recovery on the basis of mere
negligence, Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961), as does the Eighth Circuit.
City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1970). The Seventh Circuit
requires less than "bad faith intent to mislead." Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637
(7th Cir. 1963).
63. This difficulty in the federal remedy would be reduced by a sliding-scale
approach to the problem of scienter, as advocated in White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724
(9th Cir. 1974).
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Because of Blue Chip Stamps, defendants who had no reason to intend
deception but who have induced inaction will not be subjected to the
lower federal standard of scienter. Plaintiffs will prevail only against
defendants who actually intended to deceive them, and they will do so
in state courts. On the other hand, defendants who induced a purchase
or sale of securities ordinarily had a pecuniary reason to do so. Such
defendants may have intended deception but their intent may be im-
possible to prove. In those cases the federal scienter standard is appro-
priate. In cases in which defendants caused plaintiffs not to act, exten-
sion of a federal remedy would be inappropriate. The Supreme Court's
decision not to extend such a remedy not only reduces the burden on
the federal courts,64 it also works substantial justice.
HENRY PATRICK OGLESBY
64. The decision in Blue Chip Stamps puts a halt to further expansion of the class
of persons who may sue under rule 10b-5. However, the Supreme Court does not
significantly reduce the size to which that class had grown prior to Eason. The four
categories by which Birnbaum was eroded remain capable of federal suit. See text
accompanying notes 29-32 supra. A shareholder's right to sue derivatively following his
corporation's purchase or sale of securities will continue, as he sues on behalf of a
purchaser or seller. Although no support can be found in Blue Chip Stamps for
continuing to allow "forced sellers" a cause of action, this area presents only a minor
problem. By fulfilling a mere "needless formality," a requirement that they sell their
shares, the forced sellers will comply with the Birnbaum rule. Persons in the class of
"aborted purchaser-sellers" will clearly be able to sue under 10b-5: their contracts bring
them into the operation of the rule. While it does not refer specifically to injunctive
relief, the majority limits its holding to actions for damages.
There is thus ample evidence that Congress did not intend to extend a pri-
vate cause of action for money damages to the non-purchasing offeree of a
stock offering . . . for loss of the opportunity to purchase due to an overly
pessimistic prospectus. . ..
. WFe do not believe that. . . a shifting and highly fact-oriented dispo-
sition of the issue of who may bring a damage claim for violation of Rule
lob-5 is a satisfactory basis for a rule of liability imposed on the conduct of
business transactions.
95 S. Ct. at 1934 (emphasis supplied). Furthermore, "[ilt is not necessary in a suit for
equitable or prophylactic relief to establish all the elements required in a suit for mone-
tary damages." SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963). In a
suit for injunctive relief, the Court's policy concern about strike suits with high settle-
ment values would be irrelevant. Therefore, plaintiffs seeking to prevent an unlawful sale
will be able to sue without purchaser or seller status.
Although Blue Chip Stamps did not involve corporate mismanagement, its primary
significance will be in effectively precluding any further movement in the direction of
affording federal relief for corporate mismanagement. Plaintiffs need expect no further
erosion in the Birnbaum doctrine as to rule lOb-5, and no other federal remedy provides
an effective basis for relief for corporate mismanagement. See note 5 supra.
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Zoning-Petaluma: A New Land Use Ordinance in Search of a
New Judicial Standard of Review
Nearly fifty years have elapsed since the United States Supreme
Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,' affirmed the power of
local governments to regulate land development and established the
lenient judicial standard of "mere rationality" for reviewing local land
use regulations.2 In contrast with traditional Euclidian land regulations,
modem land use regulations reflect an increasing concern for protecting
environmental quality3 and preserving the physical4 and social charac-
ter of the locality.5 These newer, innovative regulations, however, limit
individual mobility7 and increase housing costs.8 In order to reconcile
individuals' desires to migrate and settle freely with localities' concerns
for their environment and quality of life, departure from the Euclid
standard of judicial review and the establishment of a new, more rigor-
ous standard of judicial scrutiny are required. Unfortunately, few recent
areas of constitutional law have enjoyed the unquestioning loyalty of the
federal judiciary for as long as has the Euclid judicial standard of mere
rationality.9
Dissatisfaction with application of the old Euclid minimal standard
to innovative land use regulations is revealed by the decision of Con-
struction Industry Association of Sonoma County v. Petaluma.'0 In
Petaluma the federal courts were asked for the first time to decide the
constitutionality of a local land use plan that attempted to "control [a
town's] future rate and distribution of growth."" Both the district court
and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals departed from the Euclid
standard of review, and each developed its own more rigorous stan-
1. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
2. Id. at 390; see text accompanying notes 21-25 infra.
3. Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 961 (1st Cir. 1972).
4. Ybarra v. Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250, 254 (9th Cir. 1974).
5. Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 6, 9 (1974).
6. Heyman, Innovative Land Regulation and Comprehensive Planning, 13 SANTA
CLARA LAWYER 183 (1972).
7. Bosselman, The Right to Move: The Need to Grow, in II MANAGEMENT &
CONTROL OF GROWTH 271 (R. Scott ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as MANAGEMENT &
CONTROL]; Franklin, Legal Dimensions to Controlling Urban Growth, in II MANAoE-
MENT & CONTROL 216, 226-30; Fielding, The Right to Travel. Another Constitutional
Standard for Local Land Use Regulations, 39 U. Cm. L. REv. 612 (1972).
8. L. SAGALYN & G. STERNLIEB, ZONING AN HOUSING CosTs (1972).
9. See text accompanying notes 29-34 infra.
10. 522 F.2d 897 (1975), rev'g 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
11. 375 F. Supp. 574, 576 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
266 [Vol. 54
1976] LAND USE 267
dards.1 2 An examination of the two opinions reveals, however, that
neither standard adopted in the Petaluma case by the federal courts is
adequate for reconciling the competing interests of individuals and
localities.
Like many other rural communities during the 1960's, Petaluma
was in the path of urban expansion, becoming a growth center for the
San Francisco metropolitan region.' 3 Between 1960 and 1970 its popu-
lation increased from approximately 14,035 to 24,870,14 and by No-
vember 1972 Petaluma's population was 30,500, an increase of almost
twenty-five percent in a little over two years. 5 Petaluma's maldis-
tributed growth created serious spatial and social consequences for
the city, since after 1965 almost ninety-five percent of the new construc-
tion was confined to the east side of Petaluma.' Moreover, during
the 1960's eighty-eight percent of the housing permits in Petaluma were
issued for single family homes.17
The "Petaluma Plan," the subject of the lawsuit, was intended to
correct these spatial and social problems. Central to the plan was
Petaluma's innovative attempt to preserve its rural character by limiting
its future annual residential building permits to approximately six per-
cent of the existing housing stock or five hundred units per year.'8
12. See text accompanying notes 40-62 infra.
13. 375 F. Supp. at 579. Between 1960 and 1970 Petaluma was just one of twenty-
nine communities in the San Francisco metropolitan region that sustained a residential
construction rate in excess of sixty percent of its existing housing stock. Throughout the
decade, these communities accounted for 54.7 percent of the housing permits issued in
the entire San Francisco metropolitan region. Gruen, The Economics of Petaluma:
Unconstitutional Regional Socio-Economic Impacts, in IU MANAGEMENT & CONTROL 173,
177.
14. BupAu OF THE CENsus, UNrrED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, GENERAL
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS, Table 7 Population of Incorporated Places of
10,000 or More 1900 to 1970 Calif. 6-19 (1970).
15. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. Petaluma, No. 74-2100 at 1 (9th Cir., Aug. 13,
1975).
16. Gray, The City of Petaluma: Residential Development Control, in II MAN-
AGEMENT & CONTROL 149, 155.
17. 522 F.2d at 900.
18. Id. at 902. There is some uncertainty concerning the extent and duration of the
residential building permit program. The plan itself exempts requests involving four or
less housing units from the permit quota. Id. at 901 n.2. However, for purposes of its
analysis, the court of appeals did not consider the impact, if any, the exempted units
would have on the housing market. Id. at 902. Similarly, although the "Petaluma Plan"
on its face limits the restrictions to a five year period (1972-1977), id. at 901, the dis-
trict court held that official attempts had been made to perpetuate the plan through
1990. 375 F. Supp. at 576.
The "Petaluma Plan" did not rely solely on a fixed residential building permit quota
to achieve its objectives. The plan contained two other devices for managing the city's
growth. First, like some other communities attempting to manage growth, the "Petaluma
Plan" established an urban extension line to delineate the outer limits of the city's
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Through allocation of these permits, the plan encouraged multi-family,
spatially balanced, and low and moderate income development.1 9
The Petaluma case was initiated by two landowners and an associa-
tion of county builders, claiming that the restrictions imposed on the
housing market by the "Petaluma Plan" were unconstitutional. The
district court ruled that the limitations on residential building permits
below projected market levels unconstitutionally abridged the right to
travel.20 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
district court and upheld the constitutionality of the "Petaluma Plan." 1
Before evaluating the courts' decisions, and particularly their stan-
dard of judicial review, it is necessary to examine briefly the standard of
review generally applied in land use cases. The seminal case in the field
is the United States Supreme Court decision of Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.22 In Euclid the constitutional right of localities to
regulate lot size, building height, and land use through zoning was
challenged. The landowner principally alleged that the mere existence of
the ordinance adversely affected property values and thus constituted an
unconstitutional taking.23 The Supreme Court, recognizing that zoning
expansion for twenty or more years. 375 F. Supp. at 576. See generally Einsweiler,
Gleeson, Ball, Morris & Sprague, Comparative Description of Selected Municipal Growth
Guidance Systems, in II MANAGEMENT & CONTROL 283, 292 (1975). Secondly, Petaluma
limited expansion of its municipal facilities. For example, Petaluma purposefully limited
its water contract with the county water agency for only enough water through 1990 to
supply its needs under the reduced growth called for under its plan. Id. at 577.
19. Specifically, Petaluma allocated 255 permits for multi-family housing and 245
permits for single family housing. The permits were divided evenly between the west and
east side of Petaluma. See Gray, supra note 15, at 152. To encourage low and moderate
cost housing, eight to twelve percent of the allowed housing units are reserved for low
and moderate income persons. 522 F.2d at 901.
20. 375 F. Supp. at 581.
21. 522 F.2d at 908-09.
22. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
23. Besides the property interest of the landowner, in all land use regulations there
are some exclusionary consequences. 522 F.2d at 906. Recently, the exclusionary
aspects have dominated the concerns of commentators and judges. NAACP v. Township
of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, 724 (1975); R. BABcocK & F. BOSSELMAN,
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: LAND USE REGULATION AND HdusING IN THE 1970's (1973). But
the matter was first considered in Euclid. In plaintiff's brief it was argued that if the
village of Euclid were lawfully empowered to remain rural and restrict the normal
industrial and business development of its land, then other comparable communities
would pursue a similar policy that would inevitably restrict and divert industrial
development throughout the Cleveland metropolitan region. 272 U.S. at 374. The district
court, concerned about the social exclusionary consequences of land use regulation, wrote
that, "In the last analysis, the result to be accomplished [by land use regulations] is to
classify the population and segregate them according to their income or situation in life."
297 F. 307, 316 (1924). Justice Sutherland writing for the Supreme Court was also
aware that the effect of land regulation was to divert natural development and warned
that in "Cases where the general public interest would so far outweigh the interest of the
municipality. .. the municipality would not be allowed to stand in the way." 272 U.S.
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ordinances and all similar regulations find their justification in the police
power, 4 rejected the landowner's contention. To test the constitutionali-
ty of land use regulations, the Court formulated its "minimal rationality"
standard. Under this standard, the courts invalidate land use regulations
only when: (1) the regulations fall outside permissible governmental
police powers, or (2) the regulations are clearly arbitrary and unreason-
able, having no substantial relation to a permissible governmental police
power.25 The adopted standard underscores the Court's willingness to
subordinate the monetary detriment of property owners to localities'
needs for land development regulation. The localities' ability to manage
land development is further strengthened by the Euclid case through the
Supreme Court's correlative principle that even when the validity of the
regulation is debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to
control.26
The constitutionality of land use planning having been affirmative-
ly decided in the 1920's, courts in subsequent years have struggled to
define what constitutes a permissible exercise of the police power.
Gradually, the police power concept has expanded beyond the tradition-
al public health, safety, and general welfare concerns. 27 A major impe-
at 390. However, because the exclusionary aspect was incorporated into the landowners
taking claim, id. at 380, the Court never adequately resolved the issue. Fifty years later,
finding a suitable plaintiff still remains the primary obstacle that prevents the courts
from resolving the exclusionary issue first raised in Euclid. See Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct.
2197 (1975).
24. 272 U.S. at 387.
25. Id. at 395. The problem with the due process test is that it chiefly concerns the
municipality and the landowner protecting his property; it only tangentially recognizes
the interest of the outsider who may be excluded by the land use regulation. See note 22
supra. Therefore, litigants have attempted to raise the interests of excluded nonresidents
and heighten judicial scrutiny in land cases by alleging alternative theories. Sager, Tight
Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 767 (1969). The problem with this approach, however, is that stringent standing
rules applied to land use cases make it difficult to argue these issues. Warth v. Seldin, 95
S. Ct. 2197 (1975). The most widely advocated doctrine for increasing judicial scrutiny
is the equal protection doctrine, Sager, supra, but except for cases involving racial dis-
crimination, United States v. Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974.), the courts have
tested allegedly unlawful land regulation classifications by a rationality standard. Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974). Essentially, the rationality standard used
for equal protection analysis is identical to the Euclid standard; the only real difference
between the two tests is that cases involving equal protection claims require an additional
finding that similarly situated persons or property are being treated differently. Feiler,
Zoning: A Guide to Judicial Review, 47 J. OF URBAN L. 319, 328 (1969). Consequently,
for purposes of this note the two claims are treated under the Euclid standard described
above.
26. 272 U.S. at 388. This judicial deference to local enactments has been a major
factor in limiting the success of due process challenges to zoning legislation. Comment,
Exclusionary Use of the Planned Unit Development: Standards for Judicial Scrutiny, 8
HAnv. Civ. RIGHTs-Civ. LIm. L. REv. 384, 401-403 (1973).
27. E.g., Maher v. New Orleans, 371 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. La. 1974).
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tus for this development was the United States Supreme Court decision
in Berman v. Parker.2 8 In the Berman case, Justice Douglas, writing
for a unanimous Court, said:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values
it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as
monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that
the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as
well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.29
In Village of Belle Terre v. Borass0 the Court held that preserving
family values is a permissible concern under the police power.31 The
Belle Terre case was significant because, unlike Euclid and Berman
which involved geographic line drawing, the local zoning ordinance in
Belle Terre involved distinctions between individuals. Nonetheless, a
zoning ordinance that specifically excluded more than two unrelated
persons from occupying a residence in Belle Terre was upheld. The
Court rejected plaintiffs'3 2 contention that the ordinance abridged fun-
damental constitutional rights.33 In reaching its decision, the Court
reversed the attempt of the Second Circuit to infuse the rationality test
with a higher standard of judicial scrutiny.34 Instead, the Court adhered
to the minimal rationality standard announced in Euclid."'
28. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). The Berman case involved a fifth amendment challenge to
a federal urban renewal statute authorizing eminent domain. Although the police power
and the right of eminent domain authorize different activities, the Supreme Court treated
their relation to the public welfare coextensively. Id. at 32. Arguably, the judicial
deference accorded to a congressional redevelopment scheme reviewed in Berman may be
higher than the deference accorded legislative determinations of less representative
legislatures; however, subsequent cases do not make this distinction. Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
29. 348 U.S. at 33.
30. 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974).
31. Id. at 8.
32. By the time the Belle Terre case reached the Supreme Court, the excluded
tenants were no longer living in Belle Terre, and the only plaintiff to argue the case
before the Court was a landowner. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan stated that he
would have denied the landowner standing to raise the constitutional rights of the
tenants, and he argued that the case was moot. Id. at 10-12. But this contention was re-
jected by the Court. Id. at 9.
33. The constitutional rights allegedly violated were: right to travel, right to
privacy, and freedom of association. Id. at 7.
34. Essentially, the test used by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals is derived
from Gunther's analysis of the 1971 Supreme Court term. Gunther, The Supreme Court,
1971 Term-Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection 86 HAiv. L. REv. 1 (1972). As formulated by the Second
Circuit, the validity of local land use classifications depends on whether the legislative
classification is in fact substantially related to a permissible objective. 476 F.2d 806, 814
(1973).
35. 416 U.S. at 3-4. Even in dissenting, Justice Marshall adhered to the Euclid
standard: "I therefore continue to adhere to the principle of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., that deference should be given to governmental judgments concerning proper land-
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In some state courts there is a growing awareness that modem
expansive interpretations of the police power give developing municipal-
ities almost boundless freedom to regulate land use. 6 In these states,
localities' power to regulate land development in a way that curtails
individual mobility is being limited by new, more rigorous standards of
judicial review. The first of these cases was National Land and Invest-
ment Co. v. Easttown Township Board of Adjustment." In National
Land the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the contention of the
township that a four-acre minimum lot size was rationally related to
preserving its rural character.38 The Pennsylvania court, in adopting a
regional perspective, held that although orderly growth is a permissible
objective, avoidance of increased economic responsibilities and burdens,
which time and natural growth invariably bring, cannot b, the primary
consideration of the town's zoning policies.39 In Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Mount Laurel, a case involving a multiplicity of
exclusionary land use devices, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held
that each developing municipality had an affirmative duty to enact land
use regulations that reflected the municipality's fair share of the present
and prospective regional need for housing.40
The critical factor in resolving the constitutionality of the "Peta-
luma Plan" was the selection of the appropriate standard of judicial
review. The district court was concerned with whether a municipality
capable of supporting a natural population expansion4' could legally
limit growth because it preferred not to grow at the rate dictated by
prevailing market demand. 42 In reaching its decision the court engrafted
the state regional welfare approach of National Land onto the federally
use allocation. That deference is a principle which has served this Court well and which
is necessary for the continued development of effective zoning and land-use control
mechanisms." Id. at 13 (citations omitted).
36. Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 252, 181 A.2d 129, 140 (1962)
(Hall, J., dissenting).
37. National Land and Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa.
504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
38. Id. at 529, 215 A.2d at 610.
39. Id. at 528, 532, 215 A.2d at 610, 612.
40. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 NJ. 151, 336 A.2d 713, 724
(1975).
41. 375 F. Supp. at 583. Judge Burke found that the public facilities of Petaluma, in
place, under construction, or capable of being augmented by new capacity, were adequate
at all times for anticipated real demographic and market demands. Id. at 578. For
example, the sewerage capacity of Petaluma at the time of trial could serve approximate-
ly 6,000 to 12,000 more persons. id. at 578. Thus reference by Petaluma to alleged
inadequacies was held to be an excuse intended to justify the "Petaluma Plan" after its
adoption. Id. at 577.
42. Id. at 583.
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protected constitutional right to travel.43 It held that the "Petaluma
Plan" violated the right to travel and that the exclusion of additional
residents, in any degree, is neither a compelling interest, nor a permissi-
ble purpose within the muncipality's power to protect the public wel-
fare. 4'
Aside from the questionable propriety of incorporating state con-
stitutional principles into the federal Constitution, the decision of the
district court was needlessly broad. If preserving the city's rural charac-
ter is not a legitimate exercise of the governmental power to protect the
public welfare,45 then the court should have held that the "Petaluma
43. Id. at 584. The right to travel doctrine is not mentioned in the Constitution, yet
the courts have long recognized the right to travel as a constitutional right. Corfield v.
Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). The first Supreme Court
decision to recognize the doctrine was Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 43-44
(1868). Since Crandall, the fourteenth amendment privileges and immunities clause,
Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900), the due process clause of the fifth amendment,
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), and the commerce clause of article I, Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941), have been proffered to support the right of travel. In
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), the United States Supreme Court
found that the right was closely related to first amendment freedoms. As a penumbral
first amendment right, infringements on the right to travel must be justified by a
compelling governmental interest. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642-44 (1969)
(concurring opinion). The right to travel doctrine is generally applied by the courts
when the exercise of mobility penalizes some other fundamental constitutional right.
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). Occasionally, when deterence to the right to
travel itself is onerous, the courts will invalidate the restrictive legislation. Memorial
Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974). The district court opinion in the
Petaluma case is significant because it is the first case to apply the right to travel
doctrine to land use regulations.
44. 375 F. Supp. at 584. The expected impact the "Petaluma Plan" would have on
mobility and the housing market within both Petaluma and the San Francisco region
was the primary basis for the court's holding. Within the city of Petaluma, the court
determined that during the 1973-1977 period the plan prevented the construction of
approximately one-half to two-thirds of the housing units demanded by market and
demographic growth forces. Id. at 577. Regionally, the court believed that if the "Peta-
luma Plan" were enacted by other growth centers in the San Francisco Bay area, it
would increase the cost of regional housing, impede the mobility of current and pros-
pective residents, and diminish the choice of housing available to income earners with
real incomes less than $14,000 per year. Id. at 581.
45. Id. at 586. Another fact which reveals that the decision of the district court was
overbroad concerns its failure to consider a statutory basis for its decision. Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). At
least two statutory bases for invalidating the "Petaluma Plan" are possible: first, the
numerical restriction on building permits may not have been authorized by the California
zoning enabling legislation. Cf. Albrecht Realty v. Town of New Castle, 8 Misc. 2d 255,
256, 167 N.Y.S.2d 843, 844 (Sup. Ct. 1957). Secondly, preserving the rural character of
Petaluma may not have been authorized by the California zoning enabling legislation.
Cf. Kavanewsky v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 160 Conn. 397, 403, 279 A.2d 567, 570-71
(1971). The recent decisions by the Ninth Circuit in both Ybarra v. Los Altos Hills,
503 F.2d 250, 254 (9th Cir. 1974) and Petaluma, 522 F.2d at 908 are not contrary to
Kavanewsky; for in those cases the Ninth Circuit only decided that preserving a town's
rural character is within the constitutional authority of the police power. It is still
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Plan" failed to satisfy the first requirement of the Euclid rationality test
and should have declared the ordinance unconstitutional on that basis
alone.
Furthermore, in applying a compelling interest test, the district
court drastically reduced local governmental power that was previously
presumed valid unless clearly arbitrary. Under the standard applied by
the court, infringements of the right to travel must be justified by a
compelling state interest.48 This justification, however, too stringently
impairs the city's ability to enact land use regulations, for as Chief
Justice Burger has noted:
[L]ines must be drawn. To challenge such lines by the "com-
pelling state interest" standard is to condemn them all. So far as
I am aware, no state law has ever satisfied this seemingly insur-
mountable standard, and I doubt one ever will, for it demands
nothing less than perfection.47
Because all land use regulations affect demographic and market
forces in some degree, if the holding by the district court is applied
literally, all land use regulation will give rise to a compelling state
interest standard, and all will be found invalid.48 Consequently, the
absolute standard used by the district court is actually no standard at all.
Unlike the Mount Laurel decision, the district court decision in Petalu-
ma provided no meaningful standard for distinguishing between unlaw-
ful and lawful interferences with the market force.49
The district court's reliance on demographic projections was mis-
guided. Demographic projections are not the foundation from which
possible to argue that under the California enabling legislation localities are delegated
less than plenary constitutional authority.
46. See note 43 supra.
47. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
48. See note 22 supra. The striking down of the urban extension line as a
substantial deterrent to travel illustrates the broad impact the Petaluma standard adopted
by the district court might have even for traditional local land use regulations. 375 F.
Supp. at 576. Court interference with local planning is inevitable whenever the courts
analyze the substance of land use plans. Court interference, however, can be diminished
and individuals' interest in mobility protected if the courts limit their analysis to the
planning process instead of the plan's substance. Under this form of analysis the courts
would apply a first amendment, least-adverse-alternative approach whenever first amend-
ment rights such as travel were impeded. Cf. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488
(1960). In the Petaluma factual context, if this approach were applied, the court's
inquiry would be limited to determining whether the town in formulating its land use
plan considered alternative land use plans which did not impede mobility. If the town
failed to consider less adverse alternatives, the court would enjoin the implementation of
the plan until the town demonstrated that no other feasible land use plan was capable of
achieving the objectives of the town. Thus, it was unnecessary for the district court in the
Petaluma case to consider the substance of the "Petaluma Plan."
49. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
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fundamental constitutional rights ought to be constructed. They are too
variable and subject to manipulation to be entrusted with protecting
basic constitutional rights.u Slavish reliance on demographic projections
will result in anti-planning. The purpose of planning is multi-faceted,
and its precise meaning is undefinable; but, since Euclid, land use
planning has meant more than unquestioning devotion to market
forces. 51
Implicit in the duty to plan for market forces is the obligation to
provide the urban infrastructure of roads, sewers, and schools which
urbanization demands. In this respect, the opinion of Judge Burke failed
to adequately consider the financial concerns of Petaluma and was,
therefore, contrary to James v. Valtierra,52 in which the Supreme Court
recognized the legitimacy of fiscal concerns as reasons for public poli-
cies.
Not surprisingly, the district court decision was reversed by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.53 In reaching its decision, the court of
appeals announced two important holdings. First, it concluded that
neither the association of county builders nor the landowners were
within the zone of interest protected by the right to travel and that
therefore both groups lacked standing to bring the constitutional claim
on behalf of the excluded persons."4 Consequently, the court of appeals
50. The difficulty of making accurate population projections is recognized by the
experts. The United States Census Bureau warns that "since the Second World War,
fertility trends have been characterized by wide fluctuations, and as a result, accurate
predictions of fertility, and more generally of total population, have proved extremely
difficult." BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS, SPECIAL STUDIES, FERTLmiY INDICATORS: 1970 Series P-28 No. 36,
at 47 (1971). To overcome this difficulty, the Census Bureau uses four different fertility
assumptions in making its population projections. BUREAU OF Tm CENSUS, UNrrnD
STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, POPULATION EsTMATES
AND PROJECTIONS, DEMOGRAPHIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE UNITP.D STATES Series P-25 No.
476, at 4 (1972). In a ten year period, depending on which series is used the population
variances can range as high as 37.8 percent. Id. Clearly, then for the district court to
consider the 77,000 projected population for Petaluma as final was erroneous.
51. See text accompanying notes 21-25 supra.
52. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
53. No. 74-2100.
54. Id. at 7-12. The procedural issue centers on jus tertil, the discretionary power of
the court to allow injured litigants to raise the constitutional rights of third parties. The
court of appeals, after considering: (1) the existing relationship between plaintiffs and
potential housing consumers, and (2) the practicability that other right to travel claims
attacking the "Petaluma Plan" would be brought by individuals whose rights were in fact
impeded by the plan, denied plaintiffs standing to assert the right to travel of third
parties. The decision, however, is contrary to Belle Terre. See text accompanying notes
31-32 supra. In the Belle Terre case, a landowner lacking any present relationship with
tenants or purchasers whose rights were allegedly infringed by the ordinance was
nevertheless allowed to raise the right to travel claim on their behalf. See text accompa-
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did not decide the right to travel issue.5  Secondly, it held that preserv-
ing a small town character and avoiding uncontrolled rapid growth are
constitutionally sanctioned objectives. 6 To reach the latter conclusion,
the opinion of the Ninth Circuit ostensibly relied on expansive interpre-
tations of the police power sanctioned in Berman and Belle Terre57 and
applied the traditional Euclidian standard of review.58 In doing so, the
court eschewed any suggestion that it was evaluating the wisdom of the
"Petaluma Plan."5
However, in examining the decision of the Ninth 'Circuit, it is
evident that the court tested the "Petaluma Plan" by an unannounced
balancing test. The court of appeals decision contains numerous refer-
ences to Petaluma's attempt to "provide for variety in densities and
building types and wide ranges in prices and rents."60 At one point, the
court characterized the "Petaluma Plan" as "inclusionary," since it
offered new opportunities to minorities and low and moderate income
persons.61 Since courts do not formulate a rule of constitutional law
broader than is required by the precise facts in the case,62 consideration
of the inclusionary aspects of the "Petaluma Plan" must have been
related to the constitutional standard of review applied by the Ninth
Circuit. There was no reason under the traditional test for the court to
devote so much time to characterizing the "Petaluma Plan," for if
preserving the rural character of Petaluma was a permissible exercise
of the police power, then it was irrelevant whether Petaluma's plan was
inclusionary or exclusionary. Apparently, the Ninth Circuit was un-
nying notes 31-32 supra. Moreover, the factors considered by the Court did not compel a
denial of standing. The test is impracticability of third party suits, not impossibility. Cf.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-36 (1925). The "Petaluma Plan" reduces
the practicability that third party suits can be brought in two respects. Pirst, it reduces
housing construction, thus reducing the opportunity to establish the type of relationship
the court deems necessary for standing. 522 F.2d at 908. Secondly, the plan, by
restricting the number of residential projects, greatly reduces the opportunities to show
an interest in a project and thus establish standing under Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197,
2209 (1975). Therefore since the "Petaluma Plan" itself reduces the opportunity for
third party suits, the court of appeals should have allowed the landowners to bring the
right to travel claim.
55. 522 F.2d at 906-07 n.13.
56. Id. at 906-09.
57. See text accompanying notes 27-34 supra.
58. 522 F.2d at 906-09.
59. Id. at 906.
60. E.g., id. at 901 & n.4, 905 n.10, 908 & n.16.
61. Id. at 908 & n.16.
62. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Bran-
deis, J., concurring).
63. See text accompanying notes 21-25 supra.
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willing to permit innovative, restrictive land use regulations without
balancing the existence of these restrictions against the inclusion of some
low and moderate cost housing.
Conceptually, a balancing approach allows the courts to assess the
broad policy implications presented in the case. But unless there are
clearly defined standards to indicate which factors are important, the
approach vests too much discretion in the courts. A major problem with
the Ninth Circuit's decision is its lack of guidance for future cases. The
decision failed, for example, to indicate how much inclusion is necessary
to sustain restrictive land use ordinances; thus localities will be unsure
how to develop their land use programs. Consequently, despite Judge
Choy's attempts to limit the court's role in land use matters,6 4 the Ninth
Circuit's standard of judicial review is likely to increase judicial supervi-
sion of local land use regulations.
Whatever the conceptual merits of the balancing test, its applica-
tion in the Petaluma case was irrevocably undermined when the court
denied plaintiffs standing to raise the right-to-travel argument.65 By so
holding, the court disposed of the most important issue of the case and
precluded any meaningful balancing. No one can deny that the "Petalu-
ma Plan" appears reasonable when viewed by itself. But the dispositive
issue is whether Petaluma can remain isolated. The court of appeals did
not deny that the "Petaluma Plan" will prevent the construction of
approximately one-half to two-thirds of the anticipated housing units
needed during the 1973-1977 period, nor that the plan increases the
cost of housing; 6 however, the Ninth Circuit chose not to hear these
aspects of the Petaluma case.11
Individuals' desires to migrate and settle freely are basic to our
society. 8 Affirming land use regulations that impede mobility without
even considering the concerns of individuals produces neither good land
use planning nor good judicial decisions. Ultimately, a judicial standard
that reconciles localities' concerns for environmental protection and
individuals' desires for mobility must be developed by the Supreme
Court.
IRA J. BOTVINICK
64. No. 74-2100 at 13 & n.12.
65. See text accompanying notes 53-54 supra.
66. See note 43 supra.
67. See text accompanying notes 53-54 supra.
68. See note 42 supra.
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